Saturday, September 23, 2017

Were American Race Laws Too Extreme for the "Nazis"?

                        By Donald Thoresen

                 


James Q. Whitman
Hitler’s American Model: The United States and the Making of Nazi Race Law
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017

It is no secret that the history of law in the United States is one of complex, often contradictory, approaches to race. Nor is it a secret that, beginning in the nineteenth century, scientific examinations of race and its effects on the country’s social fabric resulted in a great deal of effort on the part of scholars, politicians, social reformers, and others to solve this recently concretized and articulated race problem. Eugenics and race science during the Progressive Era (which I have written about here) were no mere historical footnotes. They were seen as pressing issues and prompted much debate on methods for ensuring the country’s future racial health and securing the resultant social benefits.

Such considerations were certainly not confined to the United States. Due to the roughly concurrent rise of political race consciousness in Germany as well as in the American progressive movement and, more importantly, the general history of American race relations, numerous efforts have been made by scholars to posit connections between the Third Reich and American “white supremacy.” The latest attempt to delineate these associations is by James Q. Whitman, Ford Foundation Professor of Comparative and Foreign Law at Yale Law School. He is of the opinion that there is indeed a very real connection between American jurisprudence concerning race in the early twentieth century and the race laws of the Third Reich. He is correct. But, as would be expected, his book is not actually an attempt at professional scholarship but is instead a more or less open attack on “white supremacy.” Even setting politics aside, it is one of the most unprofessional academic books in recent memory, and Yale Law School should be thoroughly embarrassed to count him among its professors.

Dr. Whitman’s claim centers around one basic assertion: that America had strict race laws which were studied and admired by National Socialists and which provided inspiration for the Nuremberg Laws. Even the Jewish author Joshua Muravchik observed, in an otherwise banal and typically hypersensitive review of the book, that Dr. Whitman’s book is little more than yet another example of reductio ad Hitlerum.[1] Dr. Whitman throws as much against the wall as he can in the hope that some of it will stick so that America and, specifically, American whites (rather than the Third Reich, which is forever beyond the scope of objectivity in his emasculated mind) are the ones who really bear the brunt of his critique. He offers the race laws of National Socialism as mirror images of American “white supremacy” not to broaden our understanding of any fundamental historical issues, but simply to shame white America. While it is true that there is a connection to investigate, Dr. Whitman deals with it on only the most superficial level. He fails to provide much adequately deep context surrounding either American or German race law. Both seem, for him, to have arisen from white ignorance and/or malevolence and little else; he believes these laws to be entirely irrational.

In the Introduction, he begins to appeal to the uncritical reader (of which there will doubtless be many, due to the book’s “kosher” treatment of its subject matter and its college freshman-level depth of thought): “The Nazi persecution of the Jews and others, culminating in the Holocaust, counts for all of us [italics mine] as the supremely horrible crime of the twentieth century, and the notion that Nazi policy makers might have been in some way inspired by American models may seem a bit too awful to contemplate” (p. 2). He universalizes his readership ad nauseum throughout the book. Three pages later we are told that “no one [italics mine] wants the taint of an association with the crimes of Nazism” (p. 5). And in case these statements – and plenty of others – were not enough to browbeat the reader into submission to his moral judgments, he writes of “unsettling evidence” for his claims and describes American eugenicists as “repellant” (p. 9). Further examples of such childishness are frequent.

The book is short. It has only an Introduction, two chapters, and a Conclusion. The two chapters contain the bulk of his actual scholarship, which is minimal. The way the book is written and its broader anti-white message are both ultimately as worthy of critique as the facts he presents, which are not particularly revelatory in any way, but are occasionally interesting. In the first chapter, entitled “Making Nazi Flags and Nazi Citizens,” the author writes:

. . . when Hitler and Göring proclaimed the two new anti-Jewish laws at Nuremberg, they did so in speeches that were decorated with expressions of friendship toward the Roosevelt administration and the United States. And the uncomfortable truth, as we shall see in this chapter and the next, is that the two anti-Jewish measures that we call the Nuremberg Laws today, far from marking a clear rejection of all American values, were crafted in an atmosphere of considerable interest in, and respect for, what the example of American race law had to offer; and they brought German law significantly closer in line with American law than had previously been the case (pp. 18-19).

This is the core of his argument and it is hard to disagree with it. There was mutual admiration between the two countries (or at least large factions within them), especially as regards governmental policies designed to increase the racial health of their respective populations. Many American progressives and eugenicists admired the efforts of Germany to fortify its racial health and, as the author clearly shows, many Germans looked to America for ideas on the practical application of laws to accomplish the same thing in their country.

Dr. Whitman begins by describing the Bremen Incident, a rather obscure event in the lead-up to the Second World War in which Jews and Communists rioted over the presence of a German ocean liner displaying a swastika that had arrived in New York City in 1935. The incident is credited by the author as the political foundation of the Nuremberg Laws: a concise, easy story for readers but one which completely fails to encompass the wider historical context of the Laws. Of the thousand rioters, five who “managed to clamber aboard, rip the swastika down, and toss it into the Hudson River” were arrested (p. 20). They were freed by Louis Brodsky, a Jewish judge with a track record of classic Jewish behavior, including “permitting the distribution of pornographic novels” and, in the opinion of the author, “heroically” releasing two strippers who had been arrested for dancing nude at a club in Greenwich Village (p. 21). Unsurprisingly, Brodsky made use of the Bremen Incident to express his views on the Nazis:

The swastika, he wrote, was a “black flag of piracy,” and it stood for everything the United States opposed. To fly it was “a gratuitously brazen flaunting of an emblem which symbolizes all that is antithetical to American ideals of the God given and inalienable rights of all peoples to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness . . . [Nazism represents] a revolt against civilization – in brief, if I may borrow a biological concept, an atavistic throwback to pre-medieval, if not barbaric, social and political condition.” These were stirring words, true in every particular; God bless Louis Brodsky for uttering them [italics mine] . . . (pp. 22-23)

The author claims to view both the prisoners’ release and the judge’s “activist” statement as legally problematic (part of a broader conversation on law itself, which will be discussed below), but his personal feelings on the opinion are made crystal-clear.

This incident created a diplomatic scandal. The American government issued a statement condemning the actions of the rioters but, in Germany, “Joseph Goebbels had already decided to use the Brodsky opinion for Nazi political purposes” (p. 22). Though anyone familiar with the history of Diaspora Jews in white countries will not be surprised by any of the above, it is still worth noting that Brodsky engaged in both the “current year” argument and the “nation of immigrants” argument to free these, presumably Jewish, criminals while claiming the moral high ground and altering the essence of American history to suit his racial interests. It is also interesting that the author implies that Goebbels was somehow being manipulative by putting this event in a wider political context. One wonders how Dr. Whitman imagines politics works without making use of conceptual thinking and the incorporation of new information into any given broader argument. One is reminded of the myriad recent examples of politicians being accused of capitalizing on tragedies in order to push a particular political narrative, as if politics exists in a vacuum and relevant evidence, when deemed offensive by elites, should be disconnected from core arguments.

As it so happened, “Secretary of State Cordell Hull issued a formal apology to the Reich on the very day that the Nuremberg Laws were proclaimed” (p. 22). It was also around this time that the battle between German conservatives and National Socialists was coming to a head. The author believes that this incident caused the swastika flag to take on greater symbolic importance in Germany, which, having previously been displayed in public next to the Imperial tricolor flag, prompted the decision to make it the sole flag of Germany at the Nuremberg rally that year. So, for the author, in a strikingly odd, Judeocentric understanding of history, this means that Louis Brodsky’s release of five anti-Nazi rioters prompted the Nuremberg Laws: Goebbels had expressed his anger at the Bremen Incident by describing it as an insult to the German flag – which it certainly was (although the word “flag” was likely used metonymically as well as literally, something which the author somehow fails to grasp) – and thus the Nuremberg Laws were born. Any reader, regardless of political ideology, should immediately see this as an irresponsibly simple approach to history.

The author then digs deeper into the Citizenship Law, the second part of the Nuremberg Laws, and its connection to American law. He begins with American immigration laws which were race- and ideology-based (anarchists, for example, were excluded), and also included eugenic measures (such as the exclusion of idiots). He makes no attempt to contextualize them and quickly moves on to the concept of second-class citizenship in America and the fascination it held for Germans. He mentions voting restrictions designed to deter blacks from acquiring political influence as a primary example. Germans viewed the American black problem as somewhat analogous to their Jew problem; that is, as an alien race which was threatening the host population and attempting to gain influence over it. The author writes:

. . . when Nazi lawyers considered the American deprivation of black rights, they saw bizarrely, a precisely parallel effort to combat black “influence.” For them, American blacks were not a desperately oppressed and impoverished population, but a menacing “alien race” of invaders that threatened to get “the upper hand,” and therefore had to be thwarted. (This lunatic opinion [italics mine], it should be said, was one that Nazis shared with American racists) (pp. 66-67).

There were numerous German publications detailing laws about blacks in America, including at least one which showed a state-by-state breakdown of various Jim Crow laws (pp. 60-61). Though this is probably the most obvious example of American influence on National Socialist thought, the legal recognition of the right to treat the people of conquered territories as “non-citizen nationals” was equally interesting to National Socialists (p. 40). German scholars were particularly interested in the latter, especially the Insular Cases, in which popular resistance to the granting of citizenship to Filipinos prompted the Supreme Court to approve of second-class citizenship for these people, in contradiction to American law. The flexibility, attention to nuance, and the incorporation of broader social context which American courts exhibited was seen as an important legal development that could be utilized in Germany.

After describing in very little depth the complexities and rationale behind the implementation of these various American race laws, he spends the rest of the chapter making connections between them, Adolf Hitler, and National Socialism. He quotes Hitler in Mein Kampf writing positively about these laws:

There is currently one state in which one can observe at least weak beginnings of a better conception [of citizenship]. This is of course not our exemplary German Republic, but the American Union, in which an effort is being made to consider the dictates of reason to at least some extent. The American Union categorically refuses the immigration of physically unhealthy elements, and simply excludes the immigration of certain races. In these respects America already pays obeisance, at least in tentative first steps, to the characteristic völkisch conception of the state (pp. 45-46).

Hitler naïvely thought that America had protected itself from the racial degeneration that was infecting Europe. He and others also expressed admiration for American westward expansion. America, the author argues, fit well into Hitler’s conception of the new German state based on a racially homogeneous population together with sufficient territorial mass. The practicality of implementing different concepts of citizenship and political “belonging” were at the forefront of National Socialist thought, and there is no question that they looked to America for examples of how this would work.

Further examples of positive statements about America’s handling of its race problem by National Socialists are cited by Dr. Whitman, including quotes from articles in the National Socialist Handbook for Law and Legislation, in which numerous examinations of the American model appeared. The lawyer Edgar Saebisch, for example, wrote positively about the Cable Act of 1922 (repealed in 1930), which stripped American women of their citizenship if they married “noncitizen Asian men” (p. 58). In this discussion of marital race law, he brings up the case of Johann von Leers, a lawyer who became a National Socialist early on and was considered one of Germany’s leading experts on Jews. He does this both to demonstrate American influence on the Nuremberg Laws and to provide an example of ideological hypocrisy. Leers supported the idea of revoking the citizenship of women who opted to marry outside of their race and wrote approvingly of a British law that revoked the citizenship of any woman who married a Muslim who was not a British citizen. After the war, he fled to Argentina and then Egypt, “where he became an advisor on anti-Israel propaganda to Gamal Abdel Nasser” and, believing that “Christian Europe had abandoned the world-historical struggle against the Jews,” became a Muslim himself (pp. 55-57). The failure of von Leers to live up to National Socialist standards certainly does not mean that the standards are incorrect but, of course, the author takes delight in the telling of this story.[2]

The chapter ends with the author using contemporary quotes from European observers who suggested that America was a fascist state. This is entirely false, as any responsible historian of fascism (or indeed any historian of America) will attest. The author might or might not be aware of this fact (he chooses not to interject his opinion here), but includes this additional commentary knowing full well that for the average reader, “fascist” is synonymous with “evil,” and that the association will already have embedded itself in the reader’s mind. Dr. Whitman also finally makes clear, after implying otherwise for dozens of pages, that National Socialists did not technically borrow from American law, but were only inspired by it. He writes:

Comparative law influence is not just a matter of lifting particular regulations, copying particular paragraphs, or transplanting particular institutions. Lawyers, even Nazi lawyers [italics mine], need a sense of the propriety and necessity of their law, and the presence of foreign parallels can provide salutary comfort and inspiration. Modern lawyers in particular often want to believe that they are soldiering toward a better future – and evidence that other countries are soldiering toward the same better future, in however bumbling a way, matters to them. This is perhaps especially true of lawyers plunged into a self-consciously revolutionary situation (p. 72).

One can almost hear the gears of his lawyerly mind shift as he attempts to shield himself from the consequences of his bad writing. He admits that he must turn away from the Citizenship Law in order to find “more provocative evidence of something that looks more like borrowing . . .” (p. 72).

The second chapter is entitled “Protecting Nazi Blood and Nazi Honor.” In it he deals initially with the Reich Blood Law, the first part of the Nuremberg Laws. As was true for many Americans at the time, the notion of racial degeneration was an urgent concern for Germans. It was believed to be necessary to prevent such degeneration from continuing by legal means and, as with citizenship and immigration, the Nazis turned towards America for examples of how to put effective solutions into practice, something which the author finds “certainly depressing” (p. 77). He also starts to become more explicit in expressing a major underlying theme of the book: that America was even more extreme than the Third Reich when it came to race law (thus virtually guaranteeing that his book will end up on university syllabi across the country). He begins his efforts in this direction by mentioning that the notion of the “one drop rule,” whereby someone was considered black if he displayed the slightest hint of Negroid admixture (a belief which was widely held to be true in America) was rejected as “too extreme” for Nazis (p. 77).

Why was American race law considered too extreme by National Socialists? He doesn’t actually say. What he does do is provide some basic explanations for why some of the laws put into practice in Germany were “less extreme” than those of America. First, there was a strategic conflict between those elements in the Party who were interested in strategic street battles and those, particularly the Party leadership, who wanted the state to have a monopoly on violence; second, there was a conflict between legal radicals, moderates, and conservatives in the Party; and third, there were foreign relations to consider (p. 81). But there is little reason to believe that National Socialists thought that American race law was too extreme in and of itself, only that it was not practical for Germany. Dr. Whitman fails to make this distinction in what is likely a deliberate effort to come up with what amounts to merely a good “sound bite” about American race law. It is not a stretch to imagine gullible, purple-haired college students casually asserting that America was “literally worse than Hitler” after reading such nonsense.

The conflict between street violence and governmental control was seen in both practical political terms and in ideological terms. The author maintains that the National Socialist leadership believed that such actions were “damaging Germany’s international image, and therefore impeding economic recovery,” and that they “reflected a breakdown in the central party control of affairs that was always integral to the Nazi ambitions” (p. 82). He suggests that this was the primary reason for the enactment of the Citizenship Law. If the Party leadership could provide tangible evidence of their handling of these very basic concerns, those National Socialists who enforced their beliefs in the street would then have little reason to do so in the future. The state would become an effective tool of resistance to its domestic enemies, and some of the Party’s wilder elements could be restrained.

He goes into far more depth about the conflicts between National Socialist radical lawyers, moderates, and conservatives, which is the most interesting part of the book in that, for the first time, he provides some broader conceptual context to the subject matter. He begins by discussing the 1933 Prussian Memorandum, an outline for a basic National Socialist doctrine of race law in three parts: Race Treason, Causing Harm to the Honor of the Race, and Race Endangerment. The text of the Prologue, quoted by the author, explains the basis for these laws:

The fundamental principle of the egoistic age of the past, that everyone who bears a human countenance is equal, destroys the race and therewith the life force of the Volk. It is therefore the task of the National Socialist state to check the race-mixing that has been underway in Germany over the course of centuries, and strive toward guaranteeing that Nordic blood, which is still determinative in the German people, should put its distinctive stamp on our life once again (pp. 84-85).

It then goes on to explain that “henceforth no Jews, Negroes, or other coloreds, be absorbed into German blood” but “that the proscription will have no application to currently existing marriages” (p. 85). From the text of the “Causing Harm to the Honor of the Race” section of the memorandum, the author quotes a reference to America:

Causing harm to the honor of the race must also be made criminally punishable. It scandalously flouts the sentiments of the Volk when, for example, German women shamelessly consort with Negroes. That said, the provision is to be limited to cases in which the association takes place in public and occurs in a shameless manner and gives gross offense to the sentiments of the Volk . . . It is well known, for example, that the southern states of North America maintain the most stringent separation between the white populations and the coloreds in both public and personal interactions (p. 86).

For Dr. Whitman, the inclusion of the last statement is proof that American race law was even stricter than what was being proposed in the Prussian Memorandum, and that an awareness of American Jim Crow is evident. He also suggests that the continued legality of prior mixed-race marriages in Germany bolsters this claim. American law often declared mixed-race marriages civilly invalid as well as criminal. So, while it is true that mixed-race marriages were more strictly controlled in America than those in Germany, he fails to recognize that the American laws were more or less organically developed and not decided upon in a committee setting. Surely, this accounts for at least some of the difference.

The internal debate which surrounded these proposals was complicated. Not only were two factions of National Socialists in disagreement, but so too were two different approaches to law itself. Here is where Dr. Whitman’s legal background allows him to provide content of some interest. The Prussian Memorandum increased tension between radicals and legal traditionalists within the Party who, he writes:

. . . [insisted] that the Nazi program of persecution conform to the logic and strictures of the highly developed “legal science” for which Germany was famous. These people were not soapbox political dissidents, but bureaucratic officeholders who displayed the instinctive conservatism of trained jurists, and who succeeded for a while in defending some of the traditional standards of German lawfulness (p. 88).

The problem for the legal traditionalists was how to reconcile the criminalization of mixed-race marriages with the fact that they would still be recognized as valid under civil law: “rewriting the Criminal Code would entail rewriting the Civil Code as well – a daunting proposition for the conventional German jurists” (p. 89). Another problem was how to reconcile the fact that some marriages would be made illegal, but those “grandfathered” in would remain legal. Additionally, German jurists were well aware that the generally accepted Western legal standard was one in which marriage was “ordinarily not a matter for criminal law” (p. 90). The final serious problem with the memorandum was what precisely would be the legal definition of a Jew.

Here again, the author finds that the Germans turned to American law for guidance and uses the transcripts from the meeting of the Commission on Criminal Law Reform on June 5, 1934 as evidence. The meeting was called in order to resolve the legal controversies described above and included radicals, moderates, and conservatives. Prior to the meeting, some of the conservatives in the Party had suggested that education would be preferable to the criminalization of race-mixing. The first man to speak, Fritz Grau, addressed this question with a direct reference to American Jim Crow. The author quotes from the transcript of his presentation:

Other Völker too, one might say, had achieved such a goal [i.e., the elimination of race-mixing through education and enlightenment] essentially through social segregation. That statement is however only correct with certain provisos. Among these other Völker – I am thinking chiefly of North America, which even has statutes along these lines – the problem is a different one, namely the problem of keeping members of colored races at bay, a problem that plays as good as no role for us in Germany. . . It is my conviction that just taking the path of social segregation and separation will never achieve the goal, as long as the Jews in Germany represent a thoroughly extraordinary economic power. As long as they have a voice in economic affairs in our German Fatherland , [. . .] I do not believe that they can really be segregated from the body of the German Volk in the absence of statutory law. This can only be achieved through positive statutory measures that forbid absolutely all sexual mixing of a Jew with a German, and impose severe criminal punishment (p. 99).

As the author observes, it is clear that Grau believed that the Jews in Germany were too powerful to be vulnerable to any version of the Jim Crow laws which kept American blacks in check. Further discussion of American race law ensued, with each side referencing it and demonstrating beyond a shadow of a doubt that National Socialists were very familiar with it. This alone proves the author’s thesis. However, as mentioned earlier, the notion that American race law was “too extreme” for Germany is ludicrous. Dr. Whitman refutes this – his own assertion – by including transcripts from this meeting which clearly demonstrate that it was not ethical considerations but rather practicality within a German context which prompted the National Socialists to reject American-style segregation. However, this is not to say that American race law provided no real influence.

One particularly interesting example of this was an issue raised by Karl Klee, a professor of criminal law at the University of Berlin. He wondered whether “the new Nazi law regime should be race-based, simply declaring the separation of the races, or racist, declaring the superiority of some races and the inferiority of others” (pp. 103-104). The author writes that some had argued that to declare Jews an inferior race would be unnecessarily antagonistic and would damage Germany’s international reputation. Klee turned to American race law in his response opposing this. He argued that American race law was “unquestionably founded on a belief in racial inferiority,” and that Jim Crow “was the American equivalent of one of the principal ‘race protection’ strategies Nazis were using on the German streets in 1933-34, the boycott” (p. 104). Klee said that American segregation was a “social boycott” designed “against Negroes and others, absolutely certainly on the idea of the inferiority of the other race, in the face of which the purity of the American race must be protected” (p. 104). As the author states, Klee believed that “what the American example showed was that true race-based criminal law ought to be unapologetically racist criminal law” (p. 105).

Perhaps the most interesting issue under discussion at this meeting, however, was the legal implications of the definition of a Jew. A “fundamental principle of German law” was that “criminal law required clear and unambiguous concepts” (p. 105). Here the conservatives argued that, since a clear and unambiguous definition of a Jew had yet to be formulated, judges would be unable to base their rulings on anything other than “vague sentiments of Jew hatred” (p. 105). This, combined with a “presumption of innocence” as a “basic requirement of legality,” placed German race law on very shaky foundations (p. 105). It was this issue that turned the discussion towards competing conceptions of law itself – and, again, towards America.

The radicals argued that traditional German law was simply too wedded to the notion of clear concepts. Roland Freisler, a powerful National Socialist jurist and judge, had much to say about this. For him, race protection was a political issue and did not require a “scientifically satisfactory definition of race” (p. 106). In his response to the objections of the conservative legal traditionalists, he referenced American law:

. . . it is not the case that all states that have to reckon with the possibility of Japanese immigration have spoken of the Japanese, but some have spoken of Mongols, even though it is without a doubt the case that Japanese and Chinese are not to be assigned to the Mongols, but to an entirely different Volk blood group. Why have the states done this? I cannot believe that they have done it just in order to delineate a concept. Rather I believe that they have done it, because they were targeting a kind of race image [Rassebild], and have only erroneously lumped the Japanese in with the Mongols . . . That clearly shows that the racial point of view has been placed in the foreground . . . (pp. 106-107).

For Freisler, the concept of race was understood to be meaningful, even if not adequately defined scientifically. The idea that there had to be a strict definition of every particular race in order for race legislation to proceed would be practically limiting and thus politically ineffective. For Germany to maintain itself as a homeland for Germans, the reliance on traditional conservative legal principles had to be abandoned when necessary.

A similar approach to law was to be found in America under the influence of progressives, of which Freisler was certainly aware. Though American race law made no mention of Jews, Freisler argued that even using the very broad concept of “colored” people, as was the case in many American states, would be sufficient for German judges:

It seems to me doubtful that there would be any need to expressly mention the Jews alongside the coloreds. I believe that every judge would reckon the Jews among the coloreds even though they look outwardly white, just as they do the Tatars, who are not yellow. Therefore I am of the opinion that we can proceed with the same primitivity [Primitivität] that is used by these American states. A state simply says: “colored people.” Such a procedure would be crude [roh], but it would suffice (p. 109).

Freisler admired what the author refers to as the “American common-law style of legal racism, with its easygoing, open-ended, know-it-when-I-see-it way with the law” (p. 109). The radical National Socialist position regarded the law as a means to accomplish something bigger than law itself. That is to say, law was a means to an end, not a value in and of itself.

In the last section of the chapter, Dr. Whitman tries once again to defend his assertion that American race law was “too extreme” for National Socialists. He quotes a teacher’s guide, published in 1934, on the subject: “Sharp social race separation of whites and blacks has shown itself to be necessary in the United States of America, even if it leads in certain cases to human hardness, as when a mongrel of predominantly white appearance is nevertheless reckoned among the niggers” (p. 127). He then writes that “[t]his was the world of the American one-drop rule, disturbing even to Nazi commentators, who shuddered at the ‘human hardness’ it entailed” (p. 127). This is an incredible leap. Would any honest reader describe the quoted passage as an example of “shuddering?” Does the phrase “human hardness” necessarily have a negative connotation? How does the concept of “human hardness” fit into the National Socialist conception of youth guidance and social virtue? The author superimposes onto the past, onto another culture, his own subjective views. This is precisely what a proper historian should resist doing to the maximum extent possible.

His last example in defense of his assertion about the National Socialist view of American law as having been”too extreme” is the eventually agreed-upon definition of who is a Jew. Under the Reich Citizenship Law of 1935, a person was not considered a Jew according to the “one drop rule.” This is the best piece of evidence he offers that could possibly validate his claim. But, as with all history, context is everything. The German Jew is not an American Negro. There is no simply basis from which to deduce that because the German legal definition of a Jew was not the same as the American definition of a “colored” that National Socialists viewed American race law as too extreme. He ends this section with another lawyerly attempt to weasel himself out of the trap set by his own poor historical work:

The bottom line is that the Nazis regarded American classification schemes as too harsh, and the American race problem as too different [italics mine], for any unmodified borrowing to have taken place. But what ultimately matters is that they knew that there was an American example, and indeed the example that they turned to first, and over and over again (p. 131).

Was it too harsh or too different? Based on virtually all the evidence provided by the author, it was the latter. So why does he continually assert the former? It isn’t hard to guess.

In his concluding chapter, Dr. Whitman rehashes his main arguments and becomes even more explicit in his tiresome and trite anti-white messages. He writes, “The Nazis, let us all agree [italics mine], would have committed monstrous crimes regardless of how intriguing and attractive they found American race law” (p. 136). He then turns specifically to what this all means for America:

. . . seeing American through Nazi eyes does tell us things we did not know, or had not fully reckoned with–things about the nature and dimensions of American racism, and things about the place of America in the larger world history of racism. Not least, seeing America through Nazi eyes tells us some uncomfortable things about the character of American legal culture (pp. 136-137).

But what of this American legal culture? He writes, “In the early twentieth century, the United States, with its deeply rooted white supremacy and its vibrant and innovative legal culture, was the country at the forefront of the creation of racist law” (p. 138). (One cannot help but wonder whether there is some connection between “white supremacy” and vibrancy and innovation.) He mentions that other countries also looked to America for guidance concerning race law, including Brazil, Australia, and South Africa. He fails to ask why they would do so. Do countries seek solutions to problems or do they simply seek problems? Why would a country want to create legislation for a problem that did not exist?

Like every other anti-racist writer, his explanation for every inequality is “white supremacy.” He observes that “American legal history of the decades after 1877 is a largely unrelieved record of shameful evasion of the principle of equality that the Reconstruction Amendments were supposed to enshrine . . .” (p. 142). Why? Could it be that they were unworkable? Could it be that some races are simply incapable of living up to the expectations of whites and conforming to white social norms? He mentions the tension between the competing narratives of a white supremacist America and an egalitarian America as if the only explanation for this tension could be the fundamental and entirely irrational racism of whites. It is truly amazing that otherwise intelligent men can be so thoroughly deracinated as to not ask such obvious questions and/or that they are so terrified of the answers that they hemorrhage intellectual capital on the pages of disingenuous and shoddy books such as this in their attempts to disprove that which is obviously and demonstrably true: that there are racial differences, that these differences have ramifications in the real world, and that these ramifications most often result in what can only be described as white supremacy – not the vague, spectral notion of some sort of conspiratorial whiteness to which these pathetic eunuchs refer, but actual, empirical, natural white supremacy.

Dr. Whitman closes the book with a section on legal culture and turns once more to an issue raised during the debates on the Prussian Memorandum, that of the role of law in society:

What Freisler admired about American law is manifestly the same thing that we often celebrate in the common-law tradition today: the common law’s flexibility and open-endedness, and the adaptability to “changing societal requirements” that its judge-centered, precedent-based approach is often said to permit. Other Nazis too had admiring things to say about American judge-made common law, which, they declared, had facilitated the creation of a healthy law that “emerged out of the Volk” rather than being the product of barren legal formalism (p. 146).

He goes on:

. . . it is the case that Nazism emerged in a continental Europe with a code-based civil-law tradition. But it would be utterly mistaken to imagine that the Nazis embraced or embodied that civil-law tradition. On the contrary, the critical truth of legal history is that the Nazis set out to smash the traditional juristic attitudes of the civil-law jurist. Far from representing the traditions of the legalistic state, the Nazis belonged to a culture of contempt for the ways continental lawyers had been trained to work (p. 149).

Like economists, jurists often see themselves as scientists who utilize hard and fast “laws” of their profession which cannot be violated because to do so would be a violation of those laws. This tautological approach was anathema to National Socialist revolutionaries. It is in this context that Freisler spoke of legal “primitivity” rather than “science.”

The law is merely a tool by which to fashion order from chaos. It is not sacrosanct, it is not based in nature. It is a human construction. As such, it can be used to facilitate a better society or it can become mired in textual muck and act as a weight on human progress. Among the many fundamental issues National Socialism addressed, this is among the most important. To reject a “scientific” approach to law is to liberate the people from arbitrary and often detrimental restrictions on the collective will. The author writes: “Nazi law was law that was liberated from the juristic past – it was law that would free the judges, legislators, and party bosses of Nazi Germany from the shackles of inherited conceptions of justice . . .” (p. 152). This is why National Socialists turned to American law, then under the (somewhat fading) influence of the progressives, for guidance. This is also why they observed the New Deal with much interest. Dr. Whitman quotes one National Socialist commentator on the Supreme Court’s decision to strike down New Deal programs as “incomprehensibly formalistic and alien to life” (p. 154). Another commentator wrote that “[l]ife-law before formal-law is the fundamental drive of national socialist legal life” (p. 155).

The author of this book is an unabashed anti-white who wants to quash any residual (or burgeoning!) racial consciousness among American whites – and possibly to inject a fresh strain of conservatism into contemporary American legal culture in the process, but he is not entirely clear on this last point – and anyway, at this particular time in history, this is probably in the interest of whites due simply to the fact that the court system as it stands is almost universally allied against white collective interests. Those are the only goals of this book. Nothing he presents is innovative or insightful. This is little more than a diatribe against whites dressed up as scholarship. Professionalism is almost non-existent in these pages and any decent historian should be appalled while reading this book. He regularly drops context in favor of easily digestible nuggets of half-cocked information and what amounts to stupid academic sloganeering. While the connections he makes between National Socialist Germany and America are often real, it is clear that he understands them only on the most superficial of levels and is unwilling to dig deeper, perhaps because, like most whites, he is terrified of what he will find. Perhaps he knows deep down that the races are unequal, but cannot figure out how to cope with this glitch in his conditioned worldview, so he fights it by burying such thoughts deep in comforting platitudes. Or maybe he is just a sick, soulless son of a bitch. Either way, the era he describes should be conceived in moral and political terms as the exact opposite of the way in which it is presented in this book. All this book will do is to further deceive and corrupt the minds of historically illiterate readers. But, of course, that is what Dr. Whitman and Princeton University Press had intended all along.

 

Notes


1. Joshua Muravchik, “Did American Racism Inspire the Nazis?,” Mosaic Magazine, March 9, 2017 (accessed March 20, 2017).

2. For a concise outline of the proper White Nationalist approach to white Muslim converts such as Johann von Leers, see Greg Johnson, “The Muslim Problem,” Counter-Currents Publishing, January 27, 2015 (accessed March 29, 2017).

Thursday, September 14, 2017

Dostoyevsky on the Jews

                         By William Pierce

           


Portuguese translation here

Editor’s Note:

Fyodor Dostoyevsky was born on November 11, 1821. In commemoration of his birthday, we are reprinting the following essay by William Pierce from National Vanguard.

Fyodor Dostoyevsky (1821–1881) was one of Russia’s greatest writers. The son of a physician of modest means, he had the opportunity for an education, and was trained as an engineer. He remained close to the common people of Russia, however, in the experiences of his life and in his writing.

Dostoyevsky was a fervent patriot, but his association with a circle of radical writers led to his arrest at the age of 27. He was subsequently sentenced to death, reprieved at the last minute, and transported to Siberia, where he spent four years in a prison labor camp. This was followed by several years as a private in a Siberian unit in the Russian army.

After his return from Siberia, Dostoyevsky wrote a number of novels, including Crime and Punishment (1866), The Idiot (1868), The Devils/The Possessed (1871), and The Brothers Karamazov (1880), all of which enjoyed immense popularity. It was his Diary of a Writer, however, published in a number of installments in the period 1873–1881 which most explicitly stated his feeling for his people and for Russia.

Dostoyevsky’s Diary dealt with a great many issues of burning interest to his fellow countrymen, showing clearly the insight and sensitivity which made him one of the most beloved of all the great writers Russia has produced. Boris Brasol, who translated Diary of a Writer into English, has described the reaction of the Russian people to Dostoyevsky’s death on February 9th, 1881:

The news of Dostoyevsky’s passing spread instantly, like an electric current, to the remotest parts of Russia, and a wave of mourning swept through the hearts of her saddened people. . . . Enormous crowds attended his funeral: men and women from all walks of life — statesmen of high rank and downtrodden prostitutes; illiterate peasants and distinguished men of letters; army officers and learned scientists; credulous priests and incredulous students — they were all there.

Whom did Russia bury with so great a reverence? Was it only one of her famous men of letters? Indeed not: in that coffin lay a noble and lofty man, a prudent teacher, an inspired prophet whose thoughts, like mountain peaks, were always pointed toward heaven, and who had measured the depths of man’s quivering heart with all its struggles, sins, and tempests; its riddles, pains, and sorrows; its unseen tears and burning passions. . . .

As much as his people loved him, Dostoyevsky in turn loved them — and despised their enemies and exploiters. Foremost among the latter were the Jews of Russia. In Dostoyevsky’s time there were some three million of them, some descended from the Khazars, an Asiatic tribe of southern Russia which had converted to Judaism a millennium earlier, and some who had flocked into Russia from the West during the Middle Ages, when they were forcibly expelled from every country in western and central Europe.

Scorning honest labor, the Jews had fastened themselves on the Russian peasants and craftsmen like an army of leeches. Money-lending, the liquor trade, and White slavery were their preferred means of support — and their means of destroying the Russian people.

So great was the Russians’ hate for their Jewish tormenters that the Russian rulers were obliged to institute special legislation, both protecting the Jews and limiting their depredations against the Russian people. Among the latter was a ban against Jewish settlement in central Russia; they were restricted to the regions of western and southwestern Russia (the “Pale of Settlement”) where they had been most heavily concentrated at the time Catherine the Great had proclaimed the ban, in the 18th century.

This, of course, was regarded by the Jews as “persecution,” and it was their incessant wailing about not being allowed to fasten themselves on the people of central Russia which first moved Dostoyevsky to set his pen to paper on the Jewish question. In the section of his Diary published in March 1877, the writer remarked:

. . . I know that in the whole world there is certainly no other people who would be complaining as much about their lot, incessantly, after each step and word of theirs — about their humiliation, their suffering, their martyrdom. One might think it is not they who are reigning in Europe, who are directing there at least the stock exchanges and, therefore, politics, domestic affairs, the morality of the states.

Dostoyevsky, who had become all too familiar with Jews and their personal attitudes toward their Russian hosts, first as a boy on his parent’s small estate, where he observed the Jew’s dealings with the local peasants, and later in prison, where he noted the aloof behavior of the Jewish prisoners toward Russian prisoners, went on to speculate about what would happen to the Russians if the Jews ever got the whip-hand:

. . . Now, how would it be if in Russia there were not three million Jews, but three million Russians, and there were eighty million Jews — well, into what would they convert the Russians and how would they treat them? Would they permit them to acquire equal rights? Would they permit them to worship freely in their midst? Wouldn’t they convert them into slaves? Worse than that: wouldn’t they skin them altogether? Wouldn’t they slaughter them to the last man, to the point of complete extermination, as they used to do with aliens in ancient times, during their ancient history?

This speculation turned out to be grimly prophetic, for only a little more than four decades later bloodthirsty Jewish commissars, who made up the bulk of the Bolshevik leaders, were supervising the butchering of Russians by the millions.

Dostoyevsky correctly identified the secret of the Jews’ strength — indeed, of their very survival over a period of 40 centuries — as their exclusiveness, their deeply ingrained mental outlook upon the whole non-Jewish world as an alien, inferior, and hostile thing. This outlook led the Jews to always think of themselves as having a special situation or standing. Even when they were trying most ingratiatingly to convince the non-Jews that Jews were just like everyone else, they maintained the inner attitude of a people who constituted a special community within the larger, Gentile community. Dostoyevsky pointed out:

. . . It is possible to outline, at least, certain symptoms of that status in statu — be it only externally. These symptoms are: alienation and estrangement in the matter of religious dogma; the impossibility of fusion; belief that in the world there exists but one national entity, the Jew, while, even though other entities exist, nevertheless, it should be presumed that they are, as it were, nonexistent. ‘Step out of the family of nations and form your own entity, and thou shalt know that henceforth thou art the only one before God; exterminate the rest, or make slaves of them. Have faith in the conquest of the whole world; adhere to the belief that everything will submit to thee. Loathe strictly everything, and do not have intercourse with anyone in thy mode of living. And even when thou shalt lose the land, thy political individuality, even when thou shalt be dispersed all over the face of the earth, amidst all nations — never mind, have faith in everything that has been promised thee, once and forever; believe that all this will come to pass, and meanwhile live, loathe, unite, and exploit — and wait, wait . . .

Is it any wonder that, although virtually every American with a high school education has either read Dostoyevsky’s Crime and Punishment or his The Brothers Karamazov (or both), his Diary of a Writer has been quietly consigned to oblivion by the controlled educational and publishing establishments in this country? The only printing of Diary of a Writer currently listed in Books in Print is one issued by a small, specialty publisher (Octagon Books) for sale to libraries and priced at a prohibitive $47.50. That price tag ought to keep it safely out of the hands of curious American readers!

Those fortunate enough to be able to borrow a copy of the book can read a great many more of Dostoyevsky’s penetrating comments on the behavior of and attitude of the Jews in Russia toward the Russian people during the 19th century. Dostoyevsky especially condemned the exploitation of the poor, ignorant, and helpless Russian peasants by the voraciously greedy and utterly heartless Jews. For example:

Thus, Jewry is thriving precisely there where the people are still ignorant, or not free, or economically backward. It is there that Jewry has a champ libre. And instead of raising, by its influence, the level of education, instead of increasing knowledge, generating economic fitness in the native population — instead of this the Jew, wherever he has settled, has still more humiliated and debauched the people; there humaneness was still more debased and the educational level fell still lower; there inescapable, inhuman misery, and with it despair, spread still more disgustingly. Ask the native population in our border regions: What is propelling the Jew — and has been propelling him for centuries? You will receive a unanimous answer: mercilessness. ‘He has been prompted so many centuries only by pitilessness to us, only by the thirst for our sweat and blood.’

And, in truth, the whole activity of the Jews in these border regions of ours consisted of rendering the native population as much as possible inescapably dependent on them, taking advantage of the local laws. They have always managed to be on friendly terms with those upon whom the people were dependent. Point to any other tribe from among Russian aliens which could rival the Jew by his dreadful influence in this connection! You will find no such tribe. In this respect the Jew preserves all his originality as compared with other Russian aliens, and of course, the reason therefore is that status of statu of his, that spirit of which specifically breathes pitilessness for everything that is not Jew, with disrespect for any people and tribe, for every human creature who is not a Jew . . .

Now, what if somehow, for some reason, our rural commune [i.e., the institutionalized system of Russian peasant society] should disintegrate, that commune which is protecting our poor native peasant against so many ills; what if, straightaway, the Jew and his whole kehillah [i.e., organized Jewry] should fall upon that liberated peasant — so inexperienced, so incapable of resisting temptation, and who up to this time has been guarded precisely by the commune? Why, of course, instantly this would be his end; his entire property, his whole strength, the very next day would come under the power of the Jew, and there would ensue such an era as can be compared not only with the era of serfdom but even with that of the Tartar yoke.

Again, how tragically prophetic!

Source: National Vanguard, Issue no. 72, 1979

 

Sunday, September 3, 2017

Capitalism, Science and Technics, and the Economy of Human Progress

No to unfettered capitalism.

One can argue that landing a man on the moon was the greatest accomplishment – certainly from a scientific/technical standpoint – in human history.  And of course there are other great accomplishments in space exploration history, the Voyager missions being one example.  There have been important practical spinoffs of immense utility that have come from the space program.

If in the future, if humanity reaches the stars and colonizes other worlds, if we are able to avert an asteroid/comet collision, or do any of the things we could be capable of doing (if Whites survive), then we will have the space program to thank – and also the military program, which has also resulted in important spin-off technologies (and of course, there has been important cross-fertilization between the space and military programs, in rocketry for example).

So, was the space (and military) program an example of “free market” capitalism?  Free enterprise?  Big business?  Wall Street?  No, it was not.  It was a big government project, funded by the taxpayer, primarily done for reasons of national prestige, national competition, and for scientific discovery.  Not the profit motive. Indeed, Neil Armstrong on the moon was the sort of “public spending” that libertarian conservatives (including some in the “movement”) decry.

We are told as well that there should be no government funding of basic science research (I won’t even mention the idea of some libertarians that national defense should also be privatized.  Why not?  We can have a Chinese-owned corporation [outsourcing is cheaper, more profits!] handling the US nuclear arsenal. Makes perfect sense).  This is due to serious misunderstandings about the nature of capitalism and of science/technics. 

Looking at biomedicine, are the cutting edge treatments that Big Pharma makes so much money off of – are most of these originally developed by Big Pharma?  Was the original research that investigated the fundamental processes targeted by these treatments conducted by Big Pharma? For the most part, that is not how such discoveries are made. The sort of basic science research that eventually leads to new treatments is usually conducted in academic (usually government funded) research laboratories. This is the “high risk/high reward” phase (from a capitalist viewpoint) – some avenues of research yield no positive outcome, many discoveries have no immediate use but eventually over time prove to be of immense value, and some seem to have more immediate utility. These latter move to small biotech for development and, if things look promising, finally move to Big Pharma for the latter stages of development and clinical trials. The large corporations – obsessed with profits, red tape, and diversity training – are not the ones doing the bulk of the basic discovery work.  And as those discoveries with no immediate use eventually are found to have utility, then those discoveries go through the same pipeline up the corporate ladder.  The same process holds for discoveries in chemistry, physics, astronomy, what have you. With respect to technics, the same applies as well.

If one considers important discoveries and inventions, the source of these is typically one of the following:

1. Private individual inventors and hobbyists, thinking up discoveries on their own, or inventing by tinkering in their garage, based as much on scientific curiosity, hobby interests, thirst for fame and acclaim, etc. as on the idea that their idea/invention will be immediately marketable, and

2. On the other end of the scale, you have big government projects run for national interests (e.g., NASA, Pentagon) or government (or non-for-profit NGO)-funded academic laboratories.

You are not seeing corporations, small business owners, Wall Street, etc. driving basic science research, space exploration (private businesses building rockets or launching satellites is not basic science or exploration, it’s utilizing existing technologies to make a buck), etc. You don’t see the investors on “Shark Tank” putting their money into fundamental basic science research.

The reason should be obvious. Capitalism is about making money.  It is about profit.  The profit motive yields tunnel vision and short-term thinking.  Investors want a return on their investment within a reasonable time frame and they want some sort of assurance of a high probability of success. They will fund incremental improvements in existing technologies. They will fund new technologies only if these are patentable and will be able to enter the marketplace in the near future. Investors will not, repeat NOT, invest in basic science research resulting in non-patentable discoveries that serve the common good. They are not interested in knowledge for the sake of knowledge. There’s no profit in national prestige. They are not interested in a fundamental discovery that may take a generation or two to make its impact and become potentially marketable. They are not comfortable in investing in basic science research in which there is no guarantee of even the hypothesis to be tested being correct. A capitalist at the turn of the 20th century would have invested in a more efficient train steam engine while laughing at the Wright brothers.  A capitalist today will invest in an incremental improvement in an existing drug than in some radical new research direction that may be able to effect a complete cure of the disease in the future. What interest does a capitalist have in sending a spacecraft to look at Pluto?  How will Pluto boost their profit margins?  Who knows?  Who cares?

I believe that if ALL was left up to big business and profits, we probably would be at the level of technology of the 1920s today, if even that.  Incremental advancement is too slow. Leaving discoveries of immense importance undiscovered because a selfish fatcat can’t see a way of turning a profit off of it is a recipe for complete societal stagnation. We can’t depend on a system that makes ballplayers and rap singers fabulously wealthy to have the long-term vision to invest in the common good of humanity. All you need to do is look how business interests have betrayed the race through the promotion of cheap labor immigration (hypocritically socializing the costs while privatizing the profits – if they really believe in free market libertarianism, then they can pay for the schooling, medical care, policing, etc. of their imported employees – or pay them enough so that they can afford it themselves. But, no. As part of unending corporate welfare, we have to pay the benefits for their employees).

Capitalism: crush the infamy!

Friday, September 1, 2017

Beyond Left & Right: Wolfgang Streeck's Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism

                        By Donald Thoresen

               


Wolfgang Streeck
Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism
New York: Verso, 2014

As anyone who regularly reads Leftist academic literature can attest, often hidden within it is a sense of loss, an implicit — perhaps subconscious — desire for particular values and ethical norms deemed to have been lost since the Industrial Revolution.The critical reader is often struck by the disjuncture between these messages and the general thrust of the Leftist attack on Western civilization and the white race — the very things that kept many of the various problems of industrial capitalism (and modernity in general) at bay. The Left has engaged in a systematic program of tearing down the foundations of white society yet bemoans the loss of the ethical restrictions that arose from those very foundations.

A New Rightist might agree with a particular Leftist’s analysis of a particular set of symptoms, but the Leftist’s diagnosis will be radically different because he is limited in what he is allowed to explore by the very nature of his moral-political worldview. A Leftist will complain, for example, about low voter participation in Western democracies or the rampant corruption within the banking system but will never attribute these things to the demographic dismantling of white societies and the resultant loss of social trust and faith in the system that stems from the dilution of white culture. And, of course, there is never a mention of the domination of the financial system by a hostile, predatory, and rootless Jewish elite.

To ignore race and culture is to always have an incomplete understanding of any historical process. One simply cannot offer a wholly accurate or sensible critique of “satanic mills” or the juggernaut of financialization without understanding the racial and cultural checks and balances which had to have been eroded before such things could become ubiquitous in the West. In its willful ignorance of these facts, the Left is very similar to the mainstream Right. And this is precisely why neither group is ever able to justify its positions without an extraordinary amount of obfuscation, wrong-headed intellectuality, and outright lies.

When we except the Jew and all the complications he entails from the equation, the average Leftist is probably closer to our economic positions than the average mainstream Rightist. In recent decades, we have seen on the Left a distinct turn away from “hard” questions of class and economics and towards “soft” postmodern political whining and Gramscian Cultural Marxism. Despite what some in the New Right may think, this does not make all on the Left happy. There has been an internal backlash against this for some time, for reasons so obvious we need not dwell on them here. As such, there is a tremendous opportunity for the New Right to incorporate the disaffected “traditional” Left into its intellectual sphere by dealing seriously with economic questions and leaving the manufactured and ill-fitting Left-Right economic dichotomy in the dust. But first we need to understand their language and we need to be conscious of exactly where our various ideas converge and diverge. The best way to begin to move in this direction is simply by reading Leftist critiques and extracting the value contained therein so that we may reformulate their arguments, find their conceptual weaknesses and provide the crucial missing information regarding the role of race in questions of economics and culture.

Following the recent review by Eugène Montsalvat of Alain de Benoist’s book, On the Brink of the Abyss: The Immanent Bankruptcy of the Financial System, it seemed appropriate to offer readers the opportunity to discover another work which, based on Mr. Montsalvat’s review, seems to touch on some similar topics and concepts but from a somewhat heterodox Leftist position. It is also a work which might prompt those in the New Right who continue to maintain a bias towards capitalism to begin to question their economic assumptions and ideological commitments.[1] The book is Wolfgang Streeck’s Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism.[2] It is an “expanded version” of his Adorno Lectures from June 2012 at the Institute For Social Research at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University in Frankfurt, Germany.[3]

Starting from a conceptual framework grounded in Marxism and the crisis theory of the Frankfurt School, Streeck traces the development of capitalism and its effects on democracy and the nation-state from the early 1970s (the era in which Keynesian economics gave way to the globalism and internationalism of neoliberalism) to the present. The book is important not only in that it provides a cogent critique of capitalism and neoliberalism, but that within this critique is a very serious stance against internationalism, which logically opens the door for a nationalist, racialist response to these problems. Indeed, implicit in the entire book is a call for a resurgence of nationalism to counteract the problems of international finance and globalization. It is not only a highly thought-provoking work, but it is a good way to introduce oneself to serious contemporary Leftist economic critiques while remaining free of the anti-white, anti-West bias one finds in much of this kind of literature. In order to stay with the general theme of this piece, however, I will set aside certain aspects of the book in order to focus on a few major themes I feel to be most relevant to the New Right.

Wolfgang Streeck is a German sociologist and the emeritus director of the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies in Cologne, Germany. He has published extensively and taught at numerous prestigious universities throughout his career, including the University of Köln, Columbia University, and the University of Wisconsin-Madison. His work has focused on “collective group representation and self-government in contemporary democratic societies, starting out, but by no means ending, with collective bargaining” in which his “special concern was with the inclusion of labor and its organizations in public policy […].”[4] He acknowledges the influence of the Frankfurt School and their work on crisis theory, as well as that of Karl Marx, but treats them and their various approaches to capitalism not as beatified and definitive but rather as tools to be used when appropriate and discarded at will when their ideas do not seem to sufficiently explain current problems. That is to say, he is certainly of the Left but he is not defined or limited by its orthodoxy — the explicit admission of which often slips into his writing.

In the book’s introduction Dr. Streeck writes that, as a student at Frankfurt University, he attended lectures and seminars by the Jewish sociologist Theodor Adorno but “did not understand much. . . . Only later did I realize how much I had missed as a result. Thus, my strongest memory of Adorno has remained the deep existential seriousness of his work — in stark contrast to the indifference with which so much social science is conduced today, after decades of professionalization.”[5] He also writes: “Fortunately, no one will think me qualified to discuss Adorno’s work.”[6] These statements appear to carry a tone of respectful distance — as if he knows what his audience wants to hear and is unwilling to disappoint them, but perhaps is not fully onboard the entire intellectual package himself. He takes a similar tack with regard to Marxism when he writes: “After what has happened since 2008, no one can understand politics and political institutions without closely relating them to markets and economic interests, as well as to class structures and conflicts arising from them. Whether or not this is ‘Marxist’ or ‘neo-Marxist’ is a matter of complete indifference to me, and I have no wish to enter into it.”[7] Upon first reading, these statements seem to be of minor importance, even mere asides. But as the book progresses and his larger theme plays out, the above interpretation seems less and less like the wishful thinking of a Rightist reviewer. Regardless, within the first few pages of his introduction the reader is made aware that what will follow might not necessarily be what the typical Leftist, Marxist or otherwise, would expect from a book on the end of capitalism.

Buying Time is fairly straight-forward. It is not so dense that a non-specialist could not profit from it. Yet, despite its relatively short length (about 200 pages), it covers a lot of ground and deals with some very complicated economic questions. The first part of the book, “From Legitimation Crisis to Fiscal Crisis,” is an “account of the nexus linking financial, fiscal and growth crises, a nexus which has so far resisted successful management and confronts politics with unending mysteries.”[8] In it he describes the crisis theories of the Frankfurt sociologists, through which the problems of capitalism came to be seen as less economic and more social. They believed that the “capitalist line of fracture . . . was no longer its economy but its polity and society; located in the field of democracy rather than the economy, of labour rather than capital, of social integration rather than system integration.”[9] Thus began the gradual shift from the supposedly scientific economic principles of Marxism to attempts to undermine capitalism as a social system — the “legitimation crisis” of the chapter title. The idea was that “[d]emands for the democratization of all areas of life and for political participation beyond the limits of existing institutions would grow into a rejection of capitalism as a society and explode from within an obsolete organization of work and life based on private property.”[10] That this did not happen is self-evident. Contrary to what the Frankfurt School models predicted, the masses did not reject the mixed economy of postwar capitalism at all. But the elites did.

The late 1960s brought a tremendous growth in consumerism and an expansion of markets, both old and new. The very generation poised to reject such developments — the Baby Boomers — was the primary engine driving this fast-paced materialist machine. At the same time, as Dr. Streeck points out, “the money economy tirelessly conquered new spheres of social existence that had had previously been reserves of unpaid activity, opening them up for production and absorption of surplus-value.”[11] He spends a bit of time here talking about the rehabilitation of the concept of wage labor as well, a process that he believes found fertile ground in the Protestant work ethic: this newly adrenalized consumerism fit neatly into a culture in which work was a sacred duty and a man’s value was attached to his financial success and to the degree to which he subordinated other aspects of his life to his pursuit of that success. Dr. Streeck, interestingly, mentions the role of feminism in the process of the financialization of Western culture. He notes how women, who had begun to view family life and housework as drudgery and the male work world as somehow liberating, “often became allies of the employers seeking labour-market deregulation, to allow ‘outsiders’ to undercut (male) ‘insiders’.”[12] He sees this as having “deepened corporate integration and served as a vehicle for personal identification with the aims of profit extraction.”[13] For Dr. Streeck, the entry of women en masse into the workforce was a clear attempt to break the power of labor. And, unlike many of his Leftist contemporaries, he leaves it at that. There is no ensuing moralizing about liberation or personal dignity or patriarchy.

Tied in to this collection of significant social shifts were the numerous strikes which occurred around the world from the late 1960s to the mid-1970s. These, the author claims, resulted in a momentous break in the social relationship between labor and capital. He writes: “[Capital’s] response was to begin with preparations to withdraw from the postwar social contract, overcoming its passivity, restoring its capacity for action and organization, and extricating itself from democratic efforts to plan its activity and use it for other objectives than its own.”[14] It was this response to the “test” of democratic power over capital, inherent in the nature of the strike, that created the massive push for liberalization and market expansion, exemplified by the Reagan-Thatcher years. The Keynesian economic policies of Western governments and the relatively high expectations of Western labor continued to be a barrier between capital and its interests. That is to say, labor and the public sector continued to resist the interests of capital and demanded some level of social responsibility and so capital “escape[d] into the market: freeing the capitalist economy from the bureaucratic-political and corporatist controls of the reconstruction period, with a recovery of profit margins to be achieved through free markets and deregulation instead of through government policies with their danger of social obligations coming with them.”[15] During the period of the oil crisis of 1979, the power of trade unions was curtailed and deregulation implemented across the board. This overhaul of the system of social safety nets that had developed in the postwar period was “increasingly defended with reference to the expansion of markets beyond national frontiers. . . . At the end, over and above national differences and specificities, stood a ‘lean’ and ‘modernized’ welfare state increasingly geared to ‘recommodification,’ whose ’employment-friendliness’ and lower costs had been bought by lowering the minimum subsistence level as a social right.”[16]

There is much more to the first part of this book: further critiques of the Frankfurt School, more details of the neoliberal turn and of the various types of crises under capitalism but, as Dr. Streeck himself admits, there is little that is groundbreaking in and of itself in the these chapters. These topics have been under discussion for some time and merely provide the historical groundwork for his more important arguments. But for the purposes of this review, what is most important about this first part of the book is that the author begins to subtly shift the standard Leftist narrative by connecting globalization with a lack of nationalism. He writes:

The utopian ideal of present-day crisis management is to complete, with political means, the already far-advanced depoliticization of the economy; anchored in reorganized nation-states under the control of international governmental and financial diplomacy insulated from democratic participation, with a population that would have learned, over the years of hegemonic re-education, to regard the distributional outcomes of free markets as fair, or at least as without alternative.[17]

The problem, for Dr. Streeck, is not globalization qua globalization, nor is it the nation-state itself, but rather the authority imposed upon the nation — indeed, the transformation of the character of the nation itself — by the dominant internationalist political and economic order.

In the next part of the book, “Neoliberal Reform: From Tax State to Debt State,” the author describes two types of states: the traditional “tax state” and the neoliberal “debt state” along with the corresponding social categories of Staatsvolk and Marktvolk. The tax state, as one might guess, is a state in which taxes are the primary source of government revenue. Numerous theorists, notably Joseph Schumpeter, had attempted to predict the future of this model and had concluded that it would ultimately fail. Simply put, they believed that the citizenry would be squeezed past the breaking point for the benefit of the rich, who could and would easily evade contributing their share of taxes, thus making the state and therefore capitalism itself unsustainable. These ideas, however, “would ultimately be banished to the catacombs in the history of economic thought, especially after 1945, when a welfare-state capitalism domesticated along Keynesian lines appeared to usher in a new era.”[18] Dr. Streeck goes into some detail about these debates and the history of this line of thought, but this discussion occurs primarily so that he can provide a historical context for the replacement of the tax state by the debt state. What matters for our purposes is that the tax state is beholden to the citizenry by the very nature of its revenue source. There is generally going to be a fairly high degree of accountability when a government must rely on the people it governs for its ability to function.

The author defines the debt state as “a state which covers a large, possibly rising, part of its expenditure through borrowing rather than taxation, thereby accumulating a mountain of debt that it has to finance with an ever greater share of its revenue.”[19] Arising from the efforts of the capitalist class to deregulate in the wake of the social turmoil and organized labor activity of the late 1960s and 1970s, the financial sector played a major part in the implementation of the debt state model. Dr. Streeck writes that “finance markets had to be integrated internationally in order to satisfy the huge credit needs of rich industrial countries, especially the United States. This process . . . was under way globally by the 1980s at the latest.”[20] The rapid expansion of consumer credit, and the resultant sense of immediate prosperity, allowed for easy arguments to be made about the cutting of government expenditures and the privatization of institutions that had previously been integral to the relationship between the tax state and the citizenry. Thus a process began by which Baby Boomer consumerism, easy credit, an expanded and deregulated financial sector, and privatization allowed capital to spread globally with state support, thereby further severing the ties of the state to its people. The author writes: “In the debt state . . . a second category of stakeholders appears alongside the citizens who, in a democratic tax state and established political theory, constituted the only reference group for the modern state.”[21] This leads us to Dr. Streeck’s concept of the Staatsvolk and theMarktvolk.

The two models of state described above necessarily involve two different conceptions of citizen. As the debt state replaces the tax state, these two groups which increasingly overlap. The first group, the Staatsvolk, is based on ties to the state by virtue of birthright and reciprocal obligations of national and community interest; the second, theMarktvolk, is “bound to national states purely by contractual ties, as investors rather than as citizens.”[22] The author provides a chart that makes the differences very clear:

Staatsvolk vs. Marktvolk


national vs. international


citizens vs. investors


civil rights vs. claims


voters vs. creditors


elections (periodic) vs. auctions (continual)


public opinion vs. interest rates


loyalty vs. “confidence”


public services vs. debt service[23]


As the state further acquiesced to the demands of the capitalist class and further shifted the practice of government to the debt state model, the value of the traditional ‘citizen’ shifted accordingly. Governments became beholden to international creditors and national investors and proportionally less accountable to the Staatsvolk, to whom little was now owed and whose opinions and needs were of secondary importance to maintaining a good international credit rating and appeasing the Marktvolk power brokers. In the neoliberal order, these two groups are the source of a delicate and malignant tension in debt states. He writes: “Democratic debt states must manouevre between their two categories of stakeholders, keeping them both at least sufficiently happy that they do not withdraw their loyalty or, as the case may be, their confidence.”[24]

Dr. Streeck sees seven fundamental problems with the emergence of this new class of international “citizen”:

first, that the “rising indebtedness of the rich democracies has for some time been curtailing their effective sovereignty, by subjecting the policies of their governments to the discipline of financial markets”;[25]


second, that the “main aim of lenders to governments in their conflict with a state’s citizens must be to ensure that, in the event of a crisis, their claims take precedence over those of the Staatsvolk — in other words, that debt service gets priority over public services”;[26]


third, that in “struggle for ‘market confidence,’ debt states must make visible efforts to show that they are always ready to fulfill their civil law contractual obligations”;[27]


fourth, that “to combine austerity with growth is like squaring a circle,” which is to say that spending cuts increase the likelihood of default and so economic policy becomes a complicated balancing act;[28]


fifth, that “an ever larger part of the Marktvolk also belongs to the Staatsvolk,” thereby creating conflicting loyalties in individual citizens over the future of their nation, i.e. whether their allegiance is to the community or their pocketbook;[29]


sixth, that the “power of investors feeds mainly on their advanced international integration and the presence of efficient global capital markets, both of which make it possible for them to switch quickly from one investment to another if ‘confidence’ is lost”;[30] and


finally, that markets “may engage the services of the ‘international community’ and its organizations to back up their claims on a debt state. In doing this, they can take advantage of their organizational lead over a state system which, while embedded in global markets, continues to be nationally based.”[31]


In each of the above, we see clearly that the essential problem of the debt state model and the ascendancy of the rootless Marktvolk is much deeper than any particular mode of governance and/or economy, however great the degree to which either contributes to the degradation of a particular nation or region. The most fundamental problem is the ideological valorization of internationalism over nationalism. In other words, neoliberal capitalism is a multifaceted and sometimes subtle — but always insidious — process by which the very concept of “citizen” is subverted and the integrity of national identity diminished through the political philosophical “long con” of international solidarity perpetrated by both the Left and the mainstream Right.

In the third part of the book, entitled “The Politics of the Consolidation State: Neoliberalism in Europe,” Dr. Streeck refers to the collective internationalist financial and political class as the “consolidation state” — “an international regime operating at multiple levels of government.”[32] As the traditional state system withers under the pressures described above, this new state model is gaining ground. The European Union is emblematic of this new approach to governance: a supranational, undemocratic regulating body based not on the needs of European national citizens but on appeasing its investors. This, along with a common currency, “serve[s] to eliminate national sovereignty as one of the last bastions of discretionary politics in an integrated market society.”[33] For Dr. Streeck, the influence of an international governing body on nominally independent nation-states is an obvious and demonstrable threat to democracy. The market dictates the direction of the nation rather than the reverse, and the traditional tax state’s “duty to protect” becomes the consolidation state’s “duty to pay.”[34] The consolidation state seeks to utterly destroy national sovereignty, its only remaining foe.

The author goes into far too much detail about particular European countries and their various roles as both collaborators and victims of the consolidation state to be covered here, but he makes a compelling case for what has been described above with specific examples from recent history, including analyses of, among other things, Germany, Greece, and, perhaps most interesting of all, Italy. In the final chapter of the third part of the book, Dr. Streeck reveals himself to be pessimistic about the situation. He asks: “What is to be done in a . . . unified Europe, when intergovernmental obligations and the laws of financial markets have closed the traditional democratic channels of interest articulation?”[35] International capital seeks nothing other than the complete submission of the state and its citizens to the power of the market and it appears at the moment that little can stop it. In one particularly telling paragraph, which is well worth quoting at length, Dr. Streeck writes:

If constructive opposition is impossible, those who are not content to spend their life paying off debts incurred by others have no option other than destructive opposition. This is needed to strengthen the delaying effect of what is left of democracy in national societies. If democratically organized populations can behave responsibly only by giving up use of their national sovereignty, and by limiting themselves for generations to keeping their creditors happy, then it might seem more responsible to try to behave irresponsibly. If being rational means accepting as self-evident that the demands of ‘the markets’ on society must be met, at the expense of the majority who have nothing to show but losses after decades of neoliberal market expansion, then indeed irrationality may be the only remaining form of rationality. Of course, it may take a long time for this conclusion to impose itself. Its denunciation as ‘populist’ is a tried-and-tested technique of rule, which in Germany goes together with largely successful attempts to equate criticism of monetary union and of the general course European integration has taken in the past two decades with opposition to ‘Europe’ in general, a longing for parochial Kleinstaaterei, or even the imperialist nationalism of the interwar period.[36]

This paragraph is interesting in that it encapsulates the frustrations felt by many in Europe but also in the United States and elsewhere in the white world. Whites in North America, for example, have long tended to politically and ideologically back theMarktvolk (in the United States, the Republican Party) and what have we gotten for having done so? The shipment of jobs overseas, a degraded popular culture, and, most importantly, the importation of masses of non-white scab laborers that threaten to forever alter the character of our nations. Of course, Dr. Streeck does not enter into the questions of immigration or race in any way, but it is crystal clear that this is a huge part of the problem. And when one unveils the racial and cultural character of theMarktvolk — Jews and their greedy, deracinated collaborators — the concept acquires greater accuracy and a far deeper and greater significance.

In the final section of the book, “Looking Ahead,” the author lambasts neoliberals for their refusal to recognize the very real differences between regional cultures and national populations. Here he comes very close to broaching the topic of race but never makes the critical leap. In discussing the possibility of a democratic European constitution, he writes that one “[could] come about only if these [local, regional, and national] differences are recognized in the form of autonomy rights: a refusal of such rights cannot but result in separatism, which would either have to be bought off or violently suppressed. The more heterogeneous a national population is, the bloodier is the history of (successful or failed) attempts to unify it.”[37] Friedrich von Hayek, who is discussed earlier in the book as the man who originated the idea of what was to become the consolidation state, is similarly taken to task, further placing the author well outside the dichotomy of Left-Right. He writes:

Hayek’s error of reasoning, in his plan for an international federation wedded to neoliberalism, was to think that all participating national societies would happily adapt to — and could therefore be induced to merge their particular interests and identities into — the free market that central government would have to seek to establish for the sake of international peace. What escaped him was that people would try to defend their way of life and their economic practices by building on their cultural traditions and using whatever political institutions they had left to them. Perhaps the reason was that he considered such peculiarities to be no more than tattoos on the skin of a universalHomo oeconomicus; or that the democratic possibility of collective action against the justice of the market simply did not exist in his world.[38]

One would have to resort to a very loose interpretation of the above to not recognize that Dr. Streeck is far more attuned to identitarian politics — and far more complicated and interesting — than the standard Leftist. If one follows his argument to its logical conclusion, nationalism is not only a positive force in the short term but is an absolutelynecessary force in the long term, if the West is ever to successfully challenge its internationalist overlords. The author might suggest that any effort to resist the influence of the consolidation state is worthwhile and, of course, he would be correct. But it will take a special kind of solidarity to do it successfully and definitively, one based not solely in economic interests but in race and culture. The Occupy Wall Street movement is the most recent and obvious example of how efforts based purely in economics, with no concern for national borders or a philosophical foundation in anything deeper or longer-lasting than vague de jour notions of multiculturalism and “fairness,” crumble under the weight of the neoliberal order and alienate those working class whites who would most benefit from real reform.

My hope here was to provide not only a selective review of this particular book but to encourage the reader to expand his intellectual input above and beyond the false dichotomy of Left and Right as it pertains to economics. There are interesting ideas being explored on the Left that could be of value to our particular political project. By exposing oneself to some of this literature one has access to a contemporary language of political economy that might otherwise be overlooked. And when one becomes versed in this language and this literature, one easily sees the opportunities for the conversion of disaffected and open-minded white Leftists, as well as new ways of defending the interests of already converted whites. Indeed, there is no one outside of the New Right who has the intellectual flexibility, the willingness, and the ability to use the entire spectrum of empirical data to paint an accurate picture of both the sources of these problems and their actual “on the ground” ramifications. Buying Time is an excellent book in nearly all respects. But it suffers from the author’s ignorance of — or unwillingness to address — the most basic biological realities that undergird these profoundly dangerous transformations of economy and state.

Words

1. Alain de Benoist, On the Brink of the Abyss: The Imminent Bankruptcy of the Financial System (London: Arktos, 2015).

Eugène Montsalvat, “Alain de Benoist’s On the Brink of the Abyss: The Imminent Bankruptcy of the Financial System,” Counter-Currents Publishing, August 10, 2015, https://www.counter-currents.com/2015/08/alain-de-benoists-on-the-brink-of-the-abyss/ (accessed August 11, 2015).

2. Wolfgang Streeck, Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism (New York: Verso, 2014).

3. Ibid., vii.

4. Wolfgang Streeck, “Report to the 2014 Meeting of the Advisory Board of the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies,” http://www.mpifg.de/people/ws/forschung_en.asp (accessed August 11, 2014).

5. Streeck, Buying Time, vii.

6. Ibid., vii.

7. Ibid., xv.

8. Ibid., xvii.

9. Ibid., 14.

10. Ibid., 16.

11. Ibid., 17.

12. Ibid., 17.

13. Ibid., 18.

14. Ibid., 26.

15. Ibid., 27-28.

16. Ibid., 28-29.

17. Ibid., 46.

18. Ibid., 72.

19. Ibid., 72-73.

20. Ibid., 73.

21. Ibid., 79.

22. Ibid., 81.

23. Ibid., 81.

24. Ibid., 83.

25. Ibid., 84.

26. Ibid., 86.

27. Ibid., 87.

28. Ibid., 88.

29. Ibid., 88.

30. Ibid., 88.

31. Ibid., 90.

32. Ibid., 96.

33. Ibid., 114.

34. Ibid., 116.

35. Ibid., 159.

36. Ibid., 159-160.

37. Ibid., 180.

38. Ibid., 181.