Tuesday, January 30, 2018

Teaching More Millions to Hate Us

                         By Jared Taylor

 

On September 11, President George W. Bush explained to us on national television that "America was targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world." Two days later, he spoke of terrorists who "hate our values" and "hate what America stands for." The next day, at the National Cathedral, he said, "They have attacked America, because we are freedom's home and defender." If that were indeed what motivated the men who flew airplanes into the Pentagon and World Trade Center, there would be reason for the huge military operation President Bush now tells us we need in order to "whip terrorism."

But what the president said about the attacks is not just nonsense; it is dangerous nonsense. If our country believes him, and we go to war against Islamic fundamentalism, we will succeed only in adding millions more to the millions who already hate us, and some of them will launch yet more attacks on us, perhaps even worse than the ones we have just suffered.

Does President Bush really imagine Osama bin Laden saying to his men: "Those Americans are just too damn free; they've got too much opportunity. Let's kill as many as we can"? The idea is absurd. Islamic militants have a grudge against us because of our attacks on Afghanistan, Libya, Iraq, and the Sudan. But the main reason they hate us and want to kill us is that we support Israel. Can anyone deny that if we were not Israel's enthusiastic backer those thousands of Americans would still be alive? It is no coincidence that the two nations against which suicide attacks are now launched are the two nations out of 160 that walked out together from the Durban racism conference in defense of Israel. To Muslim fundamentalists we and Israel are one and the same, and we have given them ample reason to think so.

Fundamentalists dislike us for what we are,  but they hate us and kill us for what we do.  They despise our loose sexual standards, and many of them have not forgotten the Crusades, but this does not make them mad enough to kill us. They kill us because we support and finance a country they see as having been illegitimately carved out of the very flesh of their Islamic kinsmen. With so much at stake, it is vital that we not be confused about what motivates the terror we plan to combat.

If there really were something about the essential nature of the United States that made people try to kill us, the president's plans would be justified. Congress would be right to appropriate an emergency $20 billion for a war against Islamic terrorism. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz would be right to promise, as he did on September 13, a "sustained and broad" campaign on the scale of the Gulf War. The Senate would be right to authorize the president, as it did on September 14, to use "necessary and appropriate force" to retaliate.

But that analysis is wrong, and acting on it will bring calamity. The real question is: Why have we so obviously chosen sides in a bitter, decades-long fight in the Middle East? Is Israel so clearly in the right that we should risk the hatred of half the world in order to support it? With the risks so great, we should understand what we are doing with perfect clarity. If we go to war, it will not be because we are the land of freedom and opportunity, but because we are the best friend and benefactor of Israel. Should we go to war for Israel? Should we spend $20 billion to kill Muslims, and thereby expose our cities to inevitable reprisal for the sake of Israel? There had better be convincing answers to those questions, but no one is even asking them.

Americans are prepared to kill and die for America; they will think twice about killing and dying for Israel. Surely, it is because he dares not say thousands of Americans have just died because of Israel that President Bush invents preposterous motives for the men who killed them.

But even if Americans were prepared to fight for Israel, a war to "whip terrorism" will only whip up  terrorism. Israel has responded with great force to terror attacks, and the fury that provokes among Palestinians leads only to more terror. What we are planning will have the same effect, except that the terror will be directed at us.

Of course, there is a way Israel could end all Palestinian terror attacks. It need only act on the principle President Bush announced on September 11: to make "no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them." By that terrible logic, Israel should exterminate every Palestinian — it has the means to do that. By that logic we should exterminate every Iraqi, Afghani, Yemeni, and Iranian — we have the means to do that, too. Of course, we would then have to exterminate all  Muslims, since by then all would be potential terrorists.

If we fight Israel's enemies, the United States will become like Israel: a garrison state and battleground. Our leaders are already warning us that our safety will henceforth require more inspections, restrictions, and intrusions. There will be worse. The latest series of revenge killings in the Middle East has finally driven some of Israel's own Arab citizens to violence. Is it out of the question to suspect that if we launch our own jihad against terrorism, we may eventually drive some of our 7 million Muslim citizens to violence against us?

By all means, let us find and even kill the people who helped carry out these terrible acts of terror against us. But it is madness to invent false motives for them, to pretend we have done nothing to provoke them, and to launch a war for Israel that will only give yet more millions reasons to hate us. If that is our response to terror we will only ensure for ourselves yet more terror, yet more smoldering ruins and shattered lives.

Jared Taylor is editor of American Renaissance.


The Cuckservative

                        By William Solniger

Parasitic wasp laying eggs inside living caterpillar host


A caterpillar rests upon a twig, With no intent to conquer earth or sky; He merely wants to eat until he’s big Enough to turn into a butterfly — And on that day, he’ll think of flying high.

No soaring, tragic thoughts he entertains,
No hearty lust for trouble or for war;
He knows these things are never worth the pains That could be spent on eating more and more — At least until the time he’s waiting for. 

But, though he marches on his abdomen,
His principles stand high as mountain-crests:
He never deals to insects or to men
The interference he himself detests —
And hopes, in turn, to labour free of pests.

Two mangy wasps fly over with a whine,
One large and strong, the other lean and smart,
Our munching caterpillar to malign —
Who, though he has the muscle, lacks the heart To shed his courtesy with an upstart.

The big wasp buzzes, in a righteous rage:
“Look how you eat with privilege and style!
“And yet your kind, though in another age,
“Ate my kind’s food, and drove them to exile” —
With that, she stings him hard with venom vile.

Before our green friend can retaliate,
The thin wasp starts up a loquacious drone:
He cries: “My friend, not violence but debate
“Befits those high ideals that are your own;
“A herbivore, when guilty, should atone.”

So our friend speaks with reason, truth and skill, Refutes the she-wasp’s false and arrant tale, And hopes that now they’ll leave him eat his fill; But, cries the wasp, “Mere facts cannot avail,” “When love and justice lie upon the scale.”

On principle, our caterpillar leaves Things to a vote; which, carried two to one, Resolves that all his ancestors were thieves, And orders him a penance that, when done, Might exculpate this perpetrator’s son.

He lets the wasps lay eggs in his insides,
And then goes back to forage and ingest;
His hard work for the waspling-eggs provides,
But still he won’t expel them from their nest:
“When one makes gains, he profits all the rest”.

In time they grow to almost half his weight,
And dragging them around is quite a chore;
But still compassion gives no way to hate:
He minds not for the body, just the maw —
“Too much control brings danger to our door”.

But then they start to eat him from inside,
An outcome he’d neglected to foretell;
Though saddened at their lack of civic pride,
He reckons all things will be just as well
As long as he preserves his empty shell.

At last they burst forth from his hollowed hide — Emancipated larvae in array;
We might expect our friend dissatisfied:
His food purloined and insides chewed away,
He’ll never see his glorious dreamed-of day.

But our green friend, though empty, fills with bliss To see adopted children come to birth;
It’s true he dreamed of other things than this,
But don’t we all, before brought back to earth
By family values and their simple worth?

And thus he guards the offspring of his bowels: Protects them first in thick cocoons of string; Then roundabout the little wasplings prowls, To fall with rage on any hostile thing,
Until he starves to death — and they take wing.

A caterpillar lies upon the mud, Who never showed a housefly-maggot’s pluck Against whoever came to suck his blood, Then meekly shouldered all of his ill luck; The word for such a creature — is a cuck.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vMG-LWyNcAs

Fast-Politics

                                   By G

       


In our increasingly consumerist society, there is a growing desire for all things to become more quick, predictable, and satisfactory. This is perhaps most obvious in the development of fast-food and fast-food culture. A typical trip to McDonald’s is expected to proceed rapidly. Once at the counter, you don’t need to explain your order in detail. “Number four, large.” You swipe your card. You get your meal. You walk out. You get in your fast car, take the fast highway, take the fast lane, and turn on your radio to zone out to “top hits” music that was produced quickly and efficiently. The songs are brief enough to not be too boring. The verse, chorus, verse, chorus, bridge, chorus: all as predictable. The electronic instruments and synthesized voices go in one ear and out the other, as billboard after billboard passes before your eyes.

The role the Internet is playing in magnifying fast-consumption is absolutely mind-boggling. The fact that computers alone are revolutionizing the service industry by catapulting it into a new realm of speed and efficiency goes without saying, but the Internet has changed life forever, especially in the consumerist West. Shopping at Amazon happens at light speed; a half-hour shopping session typically involves spinning the mouse wheel and looking at thousands of items until one’s eyes glaze over. Dating apps give the user a selection of mates and dates at high-speed. If need be, a user can simply masturbate to one of the readily available free porn sites. Video after video, fetish after fetish; the user scrolls past hundreds of “actors” being bent over.

Social media plugs one into a spotlight for millions of potential “friends,” feeding the ego at an unprecedented speed. People thumb their smartphones on Facebook, viewing one “viral” video after another, produced by “content creators” who name their companies in predictably appropriate ways: NowThisBuzzfeed,In the NowWired. “This is cute.” “This is sad.” “This is inspirational.” “This is weird.” “This is cool.” One after the other, minute after minute, the mind consumes and then quickly forgets. The user posts a selfie to appear on the light-speed “feed” of his or her “friends” in hopes that his many ghost friends will click the precious ego button. Perhaps afterwards, he will view some memes featuring a few lines of text, and with a chuckle, thumb away to the next meme.

What is most disturbing is that while all the generations in our society have converted to Internet life, the fact is that the majority of people were not raised with this phenomenon. We are not all “converts.” Millennials were the first to be raised by the Internet, and the results have been a severe magnification of the lightspeed-consumer mindset. Most importantly, this mentality has completely changed the means by which culture is propagated, as well as the nature of political strife. Yes, there has been a steady increase in the demand for “results” in generation after generation. But with the Internet, we have witnessed the birth of a generation incapable of pausing.

Civil argumentation, philosophy, book reading, all of these things are dead or dying. Philosophy has no place in a world that demands immediate results in response to instinctive, primal desires. Anything which makes one uncomfortable or presents a challenge is immediately discarded. Self-denial is slowly becoming immorality in the eyes of the contemporary West. To deny our instinctive impulses and primal desires is to question the notion of immediate satisfaction, and long-term gratification is becoming more and more alien. Watch how the individual who chooses not to participate in social media is treated; almost as a Martian. He is thought of as strange, or even untrustworthy. After all, only a complete weirdo wouldn’t want to be plugged into a machine pumping us full of egoism at high speeds.

The more bourgeois we are, the more common it is for this to happen. Trust-fund students who have never worked a day in their lives are commonly ignorant of a reality which ever slows down or pauses. As such, their moral codes and behaviors follow a mind raised on NowThis. A controversial idea (or speaker) is not met with open debate or inquiry; it is to be chanted at, screamed at, cried at, or attacked. The primal emotions overwhelm, and (as expected) satisfy. Speakers who have confronted these mobs ought to know better than to try and use well-constructed argumentation. One might as well be trying to teach Japanese to a dog. You’re here, you’re controversial, and they can make loud noises. The dominos for a primal masturbation of emotions are all in line. Nothing else matters.

The future is one of fast-politics. It is a primal and ugly future. The hearts and minds of the younger generations will not be won over with scholastics, philosophy, or esotericism. It will be won with primal strategies. This is why people like Milo, Gavin McInnes, Paul Joseph Watson, and their like have been so successful among the young, for better or worse. They either understand the game, or they are embedded in the game. In Gavin’s case, I assume that he understands the game, and plays its tune. Vice follows the same steps for media success: topics need to catch the eyes quickly, frames need to change quickly, and documentaries need to end quickly, with only the juiciest bits intact.

All aspects of this rising new movement against the status quo need to understand how the future is to be won, and for better or worse, adapt to the contemporary strategies of political and cultural strife. Sophistication will not win the future. Philosophy will not win the future. Esotericism will not win the future. The future will be won with effective memes and viral videos. If you as a member of this movement can’t stoop to this level, you’re not here to save Western civilization. You’re here for yourself. The time has come to break the emergency glass, make use of every method, take no prisoners. Learn how to appease the unpaused, and the future is yours.

Sunday, January 28, 2018

Gustave Le Bon

                       By Alain de Benoist

Gustave Le Bon, 1841–1931


Translated by Matthew Peters

Editor’s Note:

We are publishing this translation in commemoration of Gustave Le Bon’s birth, on May 7, 1841.

Gustave Le Bon

Psychologie des foules [The Crowd]
Paris: PUF, 1971


“The crowd is always intellectually inferior to the isolated individual, but from the point of view of feelings and of the acts these feelings provoke, the crowd may, according to circumstances, be better or worse than the individual. Everything depends on the nature of the suggestion to which the crowd is exposed.”

This diagnosis was made by a man of imposing stature and an ironic and severe appearance, a slightly haughty face, an immense forehead, piercing eyes, and an old-fashioned beard evoking the gods of the Renaissance. He was named Gustave Le Bon. He was born in 1841 at Nogent-le-Rotrou.

Descended from a family of soldiers and magistrates, of Bourguignon and Breton ancestry, Gustave Le Bon was a friend of Théodule Ribot (Les maladies de la personnalité [Diseases of Personality]) and Henri Poincaré (La science et l’hypothèse [Science and Hypothesis]). His body of work, which is one of the most important in the last two centuries, is dominated by two titles: Psychologie des foules (The Crowd, 1895) and L’évolution de la matière (The Evolution of Matter,1905).

An indefatigable traveler, it was his accounts of his first expeditions (to North Africa, India, and Nepal) that first attracted attention to him. “The point that has remained most clearly fixed in my mind,” he wrote in Les lois psychologiques de l’évolution des peuples (Félix Alcan, 1894), “is that each people possesses a mental constitution as fixed as its anatomical characteristics, a constitution which is the source of its sentiments, thoughts, institutions, beliefs, and arts.”

A forerunner of social psychology, he was interested as much in ethnography as in anthropology, sociology, the philosophy of history, physics, biology, the history of civilizations and political doctrines, cartography, and even the psychology of horses and horse riding!

A man of science, living alone in his laboratory, in 1878 he invented the first clock that could rewind itself through daily variations in temperature. Shortly after, he proved the existence of radioactivity. Long before Einstein, he demonstrated the falsity of the dogma of the indestructibility of matter by establishing that matter and energy are just one and the same thing under different aspects (Mémoires de physiqueL’évolution de la matièreLa naissance et l’évanouissement de la matière).

In 1902, he founded the famous Bibliothèque de philosophe scientifique (Library of Scientific Philosophy), an imprint still published today by Flammarion.

Dedicated to Théodule Ribot, The Crowd both established its author and all but gave rise to a new field of study. By 1929, the book was in its 37th printing. The central idea of The Crowd is that the individual becomes another person upon joining a crowd, a “cell” whose behavior ceases to be autonomous and who subordinates himself more or less fully to the group, whether permanent or temporary, of which he is one of the constituents.

The “Mental Unity of Crowds”

In a largely uninteresting Preface, Otto Klineberg, a professor at the Sorbonne, recalls one of the essential principles of the psychology of the form (Gestalttheorie): the whole is more than the simple sum of its parts.

As with the theory of wholes, the crowd is therefore more than the mere addition of the individuals of which it consists. “It is for these reasons,” writes Le Bon, “that juries are seen to deliver verdicts of which each individual juror would disapprove, that parliamentary assemblies adopt laws and measures of which each of their members would disapprove in his own person. Taken separately, the men of the Convention were bourgeoisie of peaceful habits. United in a crowd, they did not hesitate, under the influence of some leaders, to send the most manifestly innocent people to the guillotine.”

Suggestion becomes exaggerated by being reciprocated. The criminal crowd that murdered de Launay, the governor of the Bastille, on July 14, 1789, consisted largely of idle onlookers, shopkeepers, and artisans. Likewise the butchers of Saint Bartholomew’s Day and the Wars of Religion, the “tricoteuses” of 1793, the Communards, etc.

The same excesses could also be observed on the other side: “The renunciation of all its privileges which the nobility voted for on the celebrated night of August 4, 1789, would have never been accepted by any of its members taken in isolation.”

One can therefore state a “law of the mental unity of crowds,” characterized by “the disappearance of conscious personality and the orientation of feelings and thoughts in the same direction.” “We have entered the era of crowds,” writes Le Bon, who emphasizes the consequences of the (legal) irruption of the masses into political life. With disturbing consequences—if it is true that “crowds having no power other than that for destruction, their domination always represents a period of disorder.”

Baron Motono, a former Japanese minister for foreign affairs who translated The Crowd into Japanese, wrote: “With the progress of civilization, the races, just like the individuals of each race, tend to become increasingly differentiated. It is therefore not towards equality that humanity advances, but rather towards a progressive inequality” (L’œuvre de Gustave Le Bon, Flammarion, 1914).

Le Bon himself also believed that “the racial factor must be placed above all others, for on its own it is is much more important than all the others in determining the ideas and beliefs of crowds.”

This explains why the traits of character manifested by crowds, being ruled by the unconscious, are “possessed by the majority of the normal individuals of a race in much the same degree.” The “psychological crowd” thus acts to reveal the collective soul, in the sense of Jung: “The heterogeneous is swamped by the homogeneous, and the unconscious qualities predominate.”

Which goes to explain the short-range quality of mass action: “The decisions of a general nature made by an assembly of distinguished men, but of different specialties, are not sensibly superior to the decisions that would be made by a meeting of imbeciles. They can only assemble, in fact, those mediocre qualities that everyone possesses. Crowds accumulate, not intelligence, but mediocrity.”

Traditions guide the people. Only the exterior forms of traditions are modified, which gives the illusion of societies breaking with their past. “A Latin crowd,” notes Le Bon, “however revolutionary or however conservative it be supposed, will invariably appeal to the state to realize its demands. It is always distinguished by a marked tendency towards centralization and by a leaning, more or less pronounced, in favor of a dictatorship. An English or an American crowd, on the contrary, sets no store on the state, and appeals only to private initiative. A French crowd lays particular weight on equality and an English crowd on liberty. These differences of race explain how it is that there are almost as many different kinds of crowds as there are nations.”

Le Bon adds: “The ensemble of common characteristics imposed by environment and heredity on all the individuals of a people constitute the soul of this people.”

Crowds are also intolerant and “feminine” (“but the most feminine of all,” says Le Bon, “are Latin crowds”). Among them, instinct almost always prevails over reason. Inclined towards simple-mindedness, to excessive judgments, they do not tolerate contradictions. “Always ready to rise up against a weak authority, they bow down with servility before a strong authority.”

Men of Action

To know the art of impressing the imagination of crowds is to know the art of governing them. “It is always the marvelous and legendary side of events that most especially strikes crowds. Moreover, all the great statesmen of every age and every country, including the most absolute despots, have regarded the popular imagination as the basis of their power.”

Napoleon said to the Council of State: “It was by becoming a Catholic that I ended the Vendéan War; by becoming a Muslim that I established myself in Egypt; by becoming an Ultramontane that I won over the priests in Italy.”

“Man can generally do more than he believes, but he does not always know what he can do” (Hier et demain). The leaders of crowds reveal this to him. The leaders of crowds are not men of thought, but men of action. They have more energy than pure intelligence. Their ascendancy takes the form of a grand design that catalyzes wills and orients instincts.

Simple ideas make the conquests of crowds easier, above all ideas that are rich in promises, among which Le Bon cites “the Christian ideas of the Middle Ages, the democratic ideas of the last century, the socialist ideas of today.”

Georges Sorel, the author of Réflexions sur la violence [Reflections on Violence], wrote: “If psychology someday succeeds, among us, in being annexed to the domain of knowledge that a man must possess to have the right to call himself truly cultivated, we will owe the result to the persevering efforts of Gustave Le Bon.”

The Crowd has been translated into a dozen languages, including Russian, Turkish, Japanese, and Arabic. Heralding the great revolutionary convulsions of the present century, indeed the most recent developments of psychological warfare, it was in the 1920s the bedside reading of officers of the École supérieur de guerre, and among them, in 1922, the young Captain de Gaulle. Durkheimian obscurantism, which has since oppressed French sociology, has been unable to conceal its importance.

The book is 82 years old. It has not aged a day.


 Note

The only book on Gustave Le Bon published since the Second World War is that of Robert Nye, The Origins of Crowd Psychology: Gustave Le Bon and the Crisis of Mass Democracy in the Third Republic(London: Sage Publications, 1975). Although it is almost exclusively focused on the political aspect of Le Bon’s work, it contains a significant number of hitherto unknown details. Its author, a history professor at the University of Oklahoma, gives us more than a study of Le Bon, for he has also investigated the individuals who knew Le Bon during his lifetime.

In 1976, a Society of the Friends of Gustave Le Bon (Société des amis de Gustave Le Bon) was founded on the initiative of Pierre Duverger (34 rue Gabrielle, 75018 Paris). Chaired by Jacques Benoist-Méchin, it proposes to reprint four books by Le Bon: Psychologie de socialismeLes lois psychologiques de l’évolution des peoplesLes opinions et les croyancesand Psychologie de l’éducation.

Source: Alain de Benoist, Vu de droite: anthologie critique des idées contemporaines (Paris: Le Labyrinthe, 2001 [1977]), pp. 282–284.

Friday, January 26, 2018

How to Destroy the Republican Party

                         By Gregory Hood

        

White advocates have no political power. White advocates have all the political power.

Those who don’t favor the genocide of the white race have been completely marginalized. And yet, in another sense, White Nationalists dominate American life.

To paraphrase Marx, where is the party in opposition that has not been decried as “racist” by the party in power? Where is the opposition party that has not cleverly retorted that their enemies are the “real racists”?

Sometimes it seems that American political debate boils down to accusing the other side of being like those evil White Nationalists. This suggests that the world recognizes that White Nationalism is “itself a power,” a power that cannot be ignored. You can love us or hate us, but you can’t pretend we don’t exist. Underlying every issue that is debated—guns, health care, immigration, foreign policy—is the reality of race, the undercurrent that is never spoken about by the Right but that dominates American life.

Much of white advocates’ political activity, other than pure education, consists of trying to bring this undercurrent to the surface. Unfortunately, White Nationalist political influence within the mainstream is chiefly negative. Associating with certain groups or figures hurts their credibility with the larger public, which is conditioned by the controlled media to remain anti-white.

However, there is a positive side to this. We aren’t here to elect Republicans after all. If activists concentrate enough on a certain subculture or political issue, it becomes associated with the white advocacy movement. Those hostile to white survival avoid it, but it can still serve as a way to attract unattached people who might be interested. Subcultures like folkish heathenism or black metal are cultural examples, and Southern nationalism is moving this way as a political example.

One can imagine issues like immigration or guns evolving in a White Nationalist direction. As groups that focus on such issues become racialized, many people will bail out, but those who remain involved will become more dedicated, and a “safe space” will be carved out for white advocates to organize. Furthermore, these spaces will still exist even if they are no longer respectable. This is why Leftists fight so hard to prevent white advocates from participating in even non-political venues, especially music scenes.

“The power to destroy a thing is the power to control a thing,” said Paul Muad’Dib in Dune. Believe it or not, White Nationalists have this power. Take the conservative movement. All it takes to demolish a conservative gathering is for one person to show up with a “racist” sign. There are costs to such actions, obviously. In the short term, it makes it more difficult for any white advocates who are trying to work within the movement. It increases the internal defenses of the anti-white thought police within conservatism. It empowers a progressive media, which gleefully trumpets any proof of racism.

However, in the long term, it creates an association in the public mind between a major political force and the cause of white people generally. Isn’t that what we want?

James Mason writes in Siege that white advocates must think of all white people everywhere as our army. They may not volunteer, but circumstances and political action will cause them to be conscripted. For white advocates, the overall strategic objective of political activity is to make race the defining difference between various political, cultural, and social groups, as a precursor to the formation of an ethnostate, the great dream of the White Republic.

Arguably, race is already the defining difference on a host of issues, but only on a subconscious level. The explicit issues are things like “limited government,” capitalism vs. socialism, or religion vs. secularism. We have to cut through the distractions and bring out what is already implicit in the narratives we see every day.

How do we do this?

Do we just show up where we are not wanted, screwing up mainstream conservative plans?

It’s a start. But this can’t just be trolling.

A successful movement has to have waystations that we control all along the political spectrum. Part of this means overt vanguardist groups for the true believers. But another part of it means creating cultural spaces: publishers, websites, bands, or spiritual groups. Yet another part of it means trying to reclaim turf from the Left, like unions or the environment.

However, for now, the bulk of White Nationalists’ power consists in the power to destroy.

If our goal is to make all white people our “army,” we have to deal with the fact that the largest group of politically active whites is affiliated with the Republican Party.

One of the perennial debates in White Nationalism is between attacking conservatives, working with them (or infiltrating them), or just ignoring them. The correct answer is essentially “all of the above.”

Everyone knows that there are certain issues—immigration being the key example—that come as close as they can to being defined as purely “racial” without crossing the line. The media knows this, non-whites know this, and white advocates know this. The only people who don’t already know this are the professional anti-immigration groups and activists, and this ignorance (deliberate or otherwise) is the thin reed that allows them to continue to operate and have a voice at the system’s table.

There’s no point in showing up to an anti-immigration rally talking about a non-white America. Everyone involved in the issue already knows that this is what it is about, and the battle lines are already drawn. All overt White Nationalist participation in the issue can do is make their job harder, lessen the numbers of uncommitted people who want to engage in the issue, and reduce the value of the movement as a whole. It is better to show up quietly, make new contacts, and educate and move them along separately and below the surface to waypoints further along the spectrum.

In contrast, something broad, like the general opposition to President Barack Hussein Obama, should be racialized. The two-party system leads to political groupings that are so broad that ideology is less important than emotional identification. “Team Red” vs. “Team Blue” means more than ideology. So forget the idea that the Republican Party is “anti-white,” because there is no monolithic party the same way there is in Europe. Anyone can call himself a Republican. The broader, more inclusive, and more race-neutral a Republican group is, the riper it is for infiltration.

The media are looking for signs that the Republican Party is transforming into an all-white, rump opposition party that opposes the President purely on racial grounds. White advocates should give them what they want. The case that should be made is essentially the Mantra: the system is anti-white.

A single sign at a Tea Party rally that says “Obama is Anti-White” will make every blog. A post on the Campaign for Liberty website that “the government targets whites” will go viral. Showing up to an Americans for Prosperity meeting to ask a question about why non-white small business owners get special advantages, which “hurts whites,” will become the subject of every discussion afterward.

The key is to racialize every mainstream issue, to make implicit racial polarization explicit. Constantly emphasize that (1) the government is targeting whites on racial grounds and (2) the opposition is organized on racial lines. The media will do the rest of the work, since they will promote anything that fits their own narrative of angry white males standing in the way of progress. So much the better.

George Lincoln Rockwell often spoke about “political jujitsu,” using the very power of the controlled media to his advantage. Rockwell accomplished this with outrageous stunts and imagery that could not be ignored, especially that of the swastika. Today, the media’s hysteria over “racism” has advanced to the point where such tactics are no longer necessary to get attention. Something as harmless as a Confederate flag at a war memorial or a white student union can throw the whole country into an artificially produced uproar. This is an opportunity to exercise power, because the media can do white advocates’ job for them.

Media people think that tax protesters are racist. Good. Argue that whites are hit with a “disproportionate impact” in any tax increase and that this is deliberately discriminatory.

Media people think that gun owners are racist. Good. Argue that whites disproportionately own guns because non-whites disproportionately commit crimes.

Media people think states’ rights are racist. Good. The best way to further this is to argue that Barack Obama’s “drive for equality” is about using federal power to target whites.

In every case, make the point that the egalitarian principles of the system are violated when it comes to whites. Make race the central question even on issues that were once considered race-neutral.

The media will broadcast these reasonable positions in tones of shock and outrage, but they will broadcast them nonetheless, and the effect is bound to be educational.

 1. Some of our people will begin thinking racially.


2. They will see that the system is stacked against us.


3. They will also know that there are people out there who will represent their racial interests.


4. And they will see mainstream Republicans rushing to denounce and silence them.


We want to increase media criticism of Obama’s opponents as racists. We want to increase the feeling that minority conservatives are Uncle Toms and race traitors for hire (which they largely are). We want to increase the reliance of the Republican Party on white voters, so it is harder and harder for them to ignore or betray white interests.

In our own consciousness, we need to consider ourselves already the true leaders and authentic spokesmen of our race, and we need to communicate that attitude to everyone else.

It’s important to clarify that this is simply a tactic. It’s a separate question if the Republican Party can be reforged into a pro-white party or used for anything practical. Nor should this strategy actually concede egalitarianism as a desirable goal. The point is to use the Left-wing media to sow discord in the controlled opposition and break some people away from it.

We should also do the same thing to the libertarians.

Simply criticizing Republicans from the outside is useful, but it is not enough, because it largely goes unheard. Race-based criticism from within, amplified by the media’s bias against the Establishment Right, can destroy the controlled opposition and open the way for a new alternative. A well-written article on Counter-Currents can be read by tens of thousands. A well-staged stunt at a Republican event can be seen by tens of millions.

We have power. We have the sexiest idea there is. We know this because they can’t shut up about us. Let’s use it. Whites will become our army when we force everything down to a simple choice: The System is anti-white. We are pro-white. Which side are you on?

 

Democracy: The God That Failed

        

John McNaughton, Obamanation (detail)


Editor’s Note:

This is the transcript by V. S. of Richard Spencer’s Vanguard Podcast interview of Jonathan Bowden about democracy. You can listen to the podcast here

Richard Spencer: Hello, everyone! Today it’s a great pleasure to welcome back Jonathan Bowden. So, Jonathan, how is everything over in England? I hope it’s not too dreary there in late January.

Jonathan Bowden: Not too bad, not too bad. It’s not particularly sunny. A little overcast, but pretty usual for this time of year.

RS: Very good. Today we’re going to talk about democracy. Democracy might be a kind of magic word in the English language and all languages in the Western world, if not the world altogether for that matter. It seems that everyone supports democracy. If you say something is democratic then it’s assumed that something is inherently good and so on and so forth.

And yet, at the same time, while democracy seems to be the most beloved form of government the world is almost universally unhappy with its leaders. If you look at the United States, Congress, which is the most democratic institution, at least as designed by the founders, they have approval rates in the teens or maybe as high as 20%. I’ve seen some single digits. They’re basically not popular at all. At least the last US president and Obama himself have become quite unpopular and if you look at the rest of the world it becomes even more interesting and perhaps the emotions are even more violent.

You can think in terms of the Arab Spring. Of course, in some cases those are reactions against leaders that were not elected, but even in Israel you had very strong public reactions against rightfully elected leaders. Things like the Occupy Wall Street movement and Tea Party certainly show that there is a powerful discontent in the air. It seems like all governments are unpopular.

So, we have an interesting world situation of democracy seems to be the reigning ideology and yet all of these regimes are suffering from a legitimacy crisis.

I’ve now set that up. Jonathan, let’s take a bite out of this topic by looking at something that I think all of our listeners can relate to and that is the election here in the United States. I have to say, it’s hard not to look at this spectacle which will cost billions of dollars and billions and billions more in opportunity costs. It’s hard not to look at these candidates and not come to the conclusion that they’re some of the most depressing, uninspiring, if not loathsome individuals that this country is able to produce. With, of course, the exception of Ron Paul who is a sort of avuncular figure who I respect, when I look at all the rest of the politicians I don’t have any desire to be governed by any of them.


So, what are your thoughts on this, Jonathan? We seem to be in a very strange state of affairs here at the beginning of the 21st century.

JB: Yes, I think democracy has not “had its day,” but it needs a bit of renewal from somewhere. The difficulty is to find out where it could come from. There are no marks at all for anyone who says they’re undemocratic or anti-democratic. I’ve always privately favored a sort of enlightened aristocracy, but that’s not coming back, enlightened or otherwise.

The difficulty is that if you excuse people from any say at all — and democracy is a very partial say, let’s face it — you’re left with a sort of emptiness at the core of citizenship, however defined.

One theory I’ve always had is that you would have graded voters whereby you would never take anyone’s vote away. They’ve got that now, and to take it from them in any sense would be widely seen as regressive. Yet, you might add votes to certain people. So, certain people that you favor. The philosophical gurus or people of alleged eminence might be given a million votes instead of one, and that might make things rather interesting in certain respects. But the old problem, of course, the old chestnut then comes up, “Who decides who would be given such a differential calculus in terms of what votes they could command?” So, you’re back to the old conundrum.

I think modern Western parties have become dreary and oppressing in that they tend to the center, which immediately puts a premium on philosophy of any sort. Anyone who is at all radical is weened out of the process and excluded pretty early on.

In the current Republican contest, only Ron Paul seems to have an agenda which could be said to be at all philosophical or ideological. Romney is an establishment and moderate-status Republican. Gingrich is difficult to determine from this distance. Sometimes he goes with the social conservatives and the Christians, sometimes he goes with the libertarians, sometimes he goes with the establishment of the party, and he seems to be a sort of megalomaniac politician from this distance on the other side of the Atlantic.

I remember all the fuss that was about him when he was a congressional leader a while back, but that’s fizzled out and tailed off. Again, viewed from a long way away and I’m not sure what his status is with the American population now and whether he has any sort of a democratic bounce in him or whether he’s just a stand-up politician because they want a contest and there has to be another candidate other than Romney for that to come about.

RS: I think the latter is the case. I certainly don’t understand it. And if you look at some basic polls, outside of the Republican electorate in South Carolina Gingrich is essentially hated. I also think he is a megalomaniac. I think all of these politicians are inherently narcissistic and kind of even sociopathic, but he seems to be a great megalomaniac without being interesting. He’s not exactly Captain Ahab or Macbeth or something like that. He’s a megalomaniac, but then when you learn more about him you wish you knew less.

JB: Why did he emerge as the Republican congressional leader so many years ago?

RS: I don’t know the full story. I think if you look at Newt’s life he’s always been kind of blustering and pompous and certainly has thought very highly of himself, and I think maybe you could just chalk it up to ambition alone. I think he was one of those types that always wanted to be in charge.

I know that one popular website in the United States they released a memo he wrote while he was an assistant professor, some very small professor, at a very small college in the South and he wrote a memo to the dean. I forgot the name of the college. It was like Backwoods College of Georgia or something. The memo was like, “Backwoods College of Georgia: The Next Hundred Years.”

He’s always been a very ambitious person, but again with other people of that sort they seem to have something interesting about them or you want to learn more about what drives them. But not so with Newt.

But what do you think this is about the kind of person that becomes a democratic candidate? I don’t think we should just look at the current ones we have now and say, “Oh, they’re a bunch of sociopaths and liars and used car salesmen” or something. I think it’s worth it to delve into that deeper.

I’ve always thought that democracy almost inherently favors this type of person who, on the one hand, is never going to offend anyone. So, he’ll never be radical. He’ll always try to please all. But also just the day to day of campaigning, the act of telling promises, telling everyone that you in a sense love them and they’re the greatest people on Earth and so on and so forth, the demands of that, the rigor of that, will lead to only sociopaths succeeding in a democratic system as we know it. What do you think about that, Jonathan?

JB: Yes, I think it obviously does favor a particular type of psychology. It does favor candidates of a certain type that will emerge over time. It does favor narcissistic and self-regarding individuals. It favors social psychopathic behavioral forms. It favors gratification exercises psychologically in terms of the candidate that rendered them closer to particular types of salesmen, auctioneers, actors and actresses, and all of these have been accentuated by 24-hour media and the need to appeal to such a media on a regular basis.

I also think there’s been a sort of downgrading of expectation. If you scroll back to the early 1960s and look at the Kennedy phenomenon when the Kennedys were considered to be, given the rapture that dictatorial figures are given within a plebiscitary democracy, there was this real culture of the Kennedys. There was a sort of quasi-erotic worship of the Kennedys as items, as movie stars, as moguls of politics.

Camelot was considered to be a sort of phenomenon in its own right. I think it’s the failure of Camelot and related projects — the scandal that brought down the Nixon dam, Watergate — the tarnishing of these quasi-authoritarian democratic figures. Kennedy very much on a level with Lloyd George in the British experience, who was only just about a democratic politician and who made an appeal to the mass electorate which was slightly undemocratic in certain respects. Churchill had an on-and-off reputation of a similar sort. It’s noticeable that would either of those figures and would Kennedy have survived in the present media bubble, given Kennedy’s extraordinary private sex life, had a scintilla of that been known about him in the 1960s that he was on these various drugs for ailments that he had that made him suffer from satyriasis, as it appeared. Just think what the 24-hour media and satellite news would make of that.

Clinton’s presidency was turned into a misery and an utter nightmare for infractions which were, on the Kennedys’ register, quite minor in the maelstrom of the early 1960s.

Similarly, Churchill’s private penchant for depression and extreme drunkenness and Lloyd George’s bigamy where he had two families going at the same time, one on the north of the Thames in London and one on the south of the Thames in London, when he was Prime Minister and when he was wartime Prime Minister at the height of the Great War, a war which Britain could very well have lost had it not been for his reorganization of the Ministry of Supply militarily.

So, I think a lot of democratic politicians are the product of the contemporary media circus. The fact that the flaws of would-be great men will always be exposed now but they won’t be exposed by biographers 40 years after their deaths, they’ll be exposed before they get into office and they’ll be exposed in the early stages of being elected by their parties. That’s before even the electorate gets to decide between them and other parties.

RS: That’s true. I don’t think a normal person would want to run for office. For instance, I’ve never been arrested or anything like that, but I’m sure, even when I look back over my relatively uneventful life, you could find something and inflate it to make me look like a maniac or some kind of reprobate. I think in some ways just a normal person who might have some healthy patriotic desires doesn’t want to put himself through that or his family through that.

Also, let me ask an even more jaundiced question. In some ways, do you think the people have gotten worse and more degraded? And what I mean by that is that if you look back at some 20th century democratic leaders . . . Churchill, to a degree, obviously had an aristocratic background, and he was clearly a great intellect. I think he was a great failure both as a military leader and a statesmen, but we can save that for another podcast. Charles de Gaulle and others like the Kennedy phenomenon and others like that, these were hardly perfect people, and I’m sure we have a wide variety of opinions on them, but they were in a sense better than the average man. The average man could look up at someone like de Gaulle and think that he’s a great man, that he’s someone worth admiring, he’s a military leader and so on and so forth.

I think now the people almost want a kind of person who is like them in a sense. I remember there’s this woman named Christine O’Donnell. I don’t know if news of her crossed the Atlantic. She seemed to be a well-intentioned woman and she was a little bit of a Puritan. Kind of a Christian Evangelical fanatic. I think she had a Catholic background, but she was an Evangelical Protestant. She was involved in some kind of rockin’ out to Jesus campaign and anti-masturbation campaign of all things, but I think what bothered me about her was she was clearly quite stupid. She probably had a room temperature IQ. She had nothing more to say than the nice girl at the coffee shop has to say to you. It just seems a little strange to elect the girl at the laundromat and make her a senator. I remember she had these ads where she would say, “I’m you.” That was the end of the ad. It seemed to be democracy in its essence.

But do you think, Jonathan, that we’ve seen a kind of transition from people wanting to look up to their leaders and now the public almost wants to elect themselves or something? They want someone who’s normal, who’s not going to offend them. I’ll just throw in here as well that Obama had a State of the Union address last night and I had better things to do than watch it, but I was just scanning some headlines today and one magazine put it through an analysis and it was actually at an 8th grade reading level, his State of the Union address. So, do you think things are becoming worse, that we’re entering a kind of idiocracy where essentially the masses will have boobs like themselves ruling the country?

JB: Yes, I think that’s what’s happened. I think anything great has about it the nimbus of the sinister and people have been taught not to want that anymore or are taught to be suspicious of it. In politicians of the past there was room for more character. There was room for more egoism that would show itself to the electorate.

With Churchill there would be moments of contempt, aristocratic contempt for the masses and with Lloyd George there would be moments of populist radicalism which were genuine rather than feigned, although he was a deeply manipulative politician in his way and a precursor to many things later in the century. He foreshadowed Roosevelt’s New Deal and all sorts of things. George was, in Britain, very much a prototype and a partial outsider as a politician as well. He’s an interesting example of someone who supported a pacifist course during a very popular war, the Boer War, at the turn of the 20th century when he was pro-Boer and anti-war and had to be guarded by the police because of threats to his life once at Birmingham town hall.

So, it was quite a radical figure to come in from that fringe to be the First World War leader and the great populist manipulator of the press and public opinion, but there’s no doubting whatsoever that these were gigantic figures in contemporary terms.

If you take politicians like Bill Clinton or John Major or Barack Obama or even Tony Blair, they’re cut from a much more minor cloth, and the public wants it that way otherwise there would be a yearning for greatness.

I saw over the weekend Ralph Fiennes’ modern-day version of Coriolanus, the Shakespearean play. Coriolanus is the type of leader who despises the masses and, despite being a military hero, is thrown out of Rome at the behest of the mob led by the tribunes because he won’t kowtow to the people, and he won’t give them even what passed in ancient Rome for what amounted to democratic sentiment. That’s one of Shakespeare’s less well-known plays from late in his career.

But that’s something which almost couldn’t happen now because there are no aristocratic strands in politics left. Politics is completely bourgeois and plugged into mass sentiment. Although some of the politicians, like David Cameron in Great Britain, come from an impeccably upper-class background, they’ve learned to play the game and the game is to be totally unideological, to be all things to all people, to give nothing away, to never say a remark that could be misunderstood, to never be sardonic or witty, because that’s dangerous. You exclude the majority from the debate, which is perceived as truculent and threatening. Never to be imprecisely precise, by which I mean somebody who gives loaded or slightly wolfish or dangerous answers to anything. You must never appear to be dangerous at all. Indeed, you have to campaign as an anti-politician essentially. Somebody who doesn’t really want political power and would never take a country to war, which is all very ironic because when these people get in, they hunger for political power as expressed and exercised and, in the case of the United States, are highly prone to take the country to war.

So, you almost run against what it is to be political, and in the United States you have a very radical formulation of this whereby all of these candidates declare themselves to be anti-Washington outsiders, which amongst many of them is totally absurd. Transparently so. They’ve been insiders from the very beginning. Possibly, from the perspective of Western Europe, a politician like Jimmy Carter, when he started out, may have been a genuine outsider and after the Republican White House mired in the Nixon scandals early in the ‘70s people wanted somebody who was an outsider. But nearly every major American politician, I would probably guess to include Ron Paul as well, is an insider. He may not be an insider’s insider, but the idea that George W. Bush could run against Washington is completely absurd. These are all pork barrel politicians up to their neck in favoritism and doing deals for people in their senatorial and congressional areas.

RS: Without question. Let’s put a little pressure on that. As you are saying, in terms of doing deals, we have a military-industrial complex that one can measure in the trillions. This is huge amounts of money. In many ways, we do have a ruling class and an aristocracy. However, it’s one that dare not speak its name, in a way. It’s one that justifies itself on not being an aristocracy or ruling class.

In terms of a lot of the financial elite, it’s literally invisible. I think that the average Joe on the street might see the politicians as the kind of rulers and he can strike out at one if he or she does some bad things, but obviously there’s a bigger and more invisible ruling class that has an immense amount of power. I’m, of course, referring to the financial industry, the investment banking industry, and things like that.

What would you say about this? We have a kind of strange ruling class today. It’s one that is aristocratic in the sense that you can actually define it by families and certain peoples and so on and so forth, but then it’s either invisible or it pretends it’s not what it is.

Now, you could expect that if you’re talking about, say, Wilhelm I or something he would wear martial uniforms, he’d have a certain flamboyance to his outward demeanor. He would say, “I am an aristocrat. I am a ruler. I am the state.” But now we have this ruling class that pretends it’s not a ruling class.

JB: Yes, it’s almost a Marxist idea, actually: the class that does not rule.

RS: Right.

JB: The ruling class that isn’t one. I think it all feeds into the idea that everything’s mixed together and in a strange, surreal way isn’t quite what it seems to be and that’s because everything has to be put through a prism of contesting itself before the people’s assent. I think you would find the ruling groups in Western Europe and North America will be much more naked and much more transparent if they didn’t have to consult the people every 4 or 5 years in what is a pretty minimal democracy, really. All you get is a couple of goes twice a decade, occasionally a little more, where you put a cross or a tick on a ballot in a plebiscitary way for parties that represent a range or spectrum of allowed and permitted opinion and for prominent personalities within those parties.

Usually, a lot of voting is negative where people are voting deliberately to keep somebody out rather than voting because they want a particular candidate. So, one wonders next time how many people will vote against Obama come what may whatever he said, how many people will vote along purely ethnic and racial lines in the United States where from a distance the Republicans seem to be essentially a White party with a few stringers and a few hangers-on from other groups. But essentially it’s the party White Americans feel comfortable in voting for and the Democrats have some working class White voters and union votes, but other than that are essentially a minority, ethnic mish-mash party with some feminist input as well.

You almost have a demographic deficit now whereby it’s going to be increasingly difficult for the Obama effect, in relation to the Democrats, to be resisted because I can see one of the two candidates in every presidential election, president and vice presidential candidate, being ethnic from now on into the future with the Democrats, because I don’t think they’re going to get elected otherwise. It struck me from a distance that Hillary Clinton ran a harsher campaign against Obama than the Republican official ticket did when it came to the presidential election. I may be wrong there because I’m viewing it from a great distance, but that’s what it appeared to me and I wonder whether she would have been the candidate of choice had it not been for certain ethnic changes in the demography of the Democratic Party which meant that in the end she couldn’t get the votes. She was carrying a lot of baggage from the first Clinton White House. That’s true. But maybe she couldn’t get elected because, basically, when you add up the Latino bloc and the Black bloc and the mixed bloc you’re not really going to necessarily elect that many White candidates again in terms of the Democratic Party.

RS: I think you’re right. What you’re referring to is also what I call the majority strategy. It’s something Sam Francis wrote about quite a bit in the ’90s and Steve Sailer has written about it more recently, as well as Peter Brimelow. It’s this basic idea that the GOP is relying on White Nationalism in a way. You know, I’m being a little bit cheeky in saying that, but people just get a sense that the GOP is not threatening to them, it represents their values, so to speak, you have White guys up there who aren’t really offensive, you kind of trust them more, and so the GOP gains power by White people rallying around it.

And yet overtly it is in many ways an anti-White party. I mean, I don’t think none of those people, even the Christian Right, or especially the Christian Right, would claim that this is an Anglo-Saxon country and that we have a long tradition with Europe or something like that. They’ll claim quite the opposite.

But then, on the other side, you have essentially, as opposed to the majority strategy, the minority strategy. But with the Democrats it’s totally overt. It’s, “We are the party of color, and we can obviously help our election prospects quite directly by allowing in more immigration and doing some amnesties here and there.”

Let me ask you, Jonathan, a little bit of a philosophical question. A lot of conservatives of the past — I’m thinking of people like Burke, but certainly many others and this would probably include, actually, most of the Founding Fathers of the United States — had a fear of democracy. They thought it could get out of control. They thought the people were too uncouth and too unsophisticated to make serious decisions. Essentially, there’s been a tradition of a conservative critique saying “we need wise rulers, might limit their power, but still we’ll have these people make sound decisions on the matter. We can’t allow populist sentiments and furious emotions to hold sway.”

So, in some ways, you can ask, “Is democracy the problem? Is it this mass frenzy that’s a real danger?” But you could turn that around and say that, “We have no democracy at all.” Every election that we have it’s claimed in the media and by all the politicians that, “This is the most important election of your life! You’ve got to go out and vote!” And yet nothing really changes. You might turn a knob here and tweak something there, but in terms of the general thrust of this country, at least, nothing changes. There’s more debt, more multiculturalism, more regulations of your life, more White guilt, whatever you want to say. It just keeps getting worse.

And I would say in the European context there are some things about it which are quite anti-democratic. Vlaams Belang was a legitimate party that achieved electoral victories quite rightly and yet it was kicked out of the government because it was claimed to be anti-democratic, which means they held views that the ruling order don’t like.

So, let me ask you, Jonathan. Do you think that in our age the danger is too much democracy or do you think that the danger is that there’s no democracy at all, that it’s all an illusion?

JB: Well, I think it’s true that we basically have democracy with a system attached to it and that system is liberalism. Perhaps the system could be called liberal democracy and you basically have to be a liberal to take part in the game. Partly a very real game, partly a charade that takes place in the democratic tent.

Liberals themselves understand that their system as it exists and can be described is a toss-up between pure liberalism theoretically and democracy. How much democracy you have can determine whether liberalism is endangered within the system itself. Liberals always worry about what will happen if people start voting for illiberal candidates in a liberal democracy. When do you choke that off? When do you say it’s illegitimate? When do you ban the parties of such people? Are you permitted to ban the parties of such people? Or do you just demonize them through the media and put maximum pressure on them in that way?

Also, there are religious and civic minorities, (32:27 ???) and so on, that perceive not to wish to part of a liberal democracy or if they do put up parties of a sectional and sectarian type are seen to be threatening in relation to liberal democracy. There numbers are not enough to achieve critical mass.

But liberals opine and wring their hands about these issues all the time. The limits to freedom within democracy and the degree to which they have to chop and change between liberalism and the democratic tenant. Some liberals will talk openly about dispensing with elements of democracy to preserve liberalism as a system. You don’t get that in the Anglo-Saxon world very much, but in continental Europe where things sometimes take a more theoretical cast of mind there are some people who will honestly talk in that way.

Others think that there can be no infraction upon democracy at all and you have radical libertarians, the Ron Paul type, who believe in the maximum participation and the maximum freedom of speech. Freedom of speech is highly curtailed in the Western democracies in order for multiculturalism to survive and for multiculturalism not to be threatened in any way. Indeed, there are probably more inhibitions in terms of mainstream freedom of speech and there are more things that can’t be discussed than ever before. All of it taking place within an atmosphere where everyone is told that there is maximal debate. Indeed, people have too much debate and there’s nothing that cannot be said and that censorship is the worst possible thing.

The grammar that liberalism polices democracy with is political correctness, which is a form of censorship. There’s no other way of looking at it if one is rational about it rather than emotive about it. You have a situation now where the slightest politically incorrect remark made by any candidate — Left, Right, or center, it doesn’t matter where they come from — the litmus test which is applied to them is, “Has their discourse been politically correct or not?”

Every time Ron Paul is mentioned on this side of the Atlantic some obscure journalism that was associated with him and that is regarded as “racist” is mentioned almost in the same breath and in the same paragraph. Now, I’m not close to the Paul candidacy from this distance, but I gather that it’s pretty small beer really.

RS: Yes.

JB: But it’s because they can link his name to something that’s incorrect, and if they could do the same with Gingrich, which they might be able to do given some of his remarks in South Carolina, which could be seen to be subliminally politically incorrect and group-oriented, then they will try to do so.

So, the debate is highly circumscribed and that’s because of the sort of society that you’re living in. All political correctness is, in a root way, is a way of giving inoffense to the overwhelming majority of people, because people don’t lose their group identities in a multiple group society. So, if people make the slightest comments that could be perceived as negative of any group numbering more than 10 people that will be used against them.

RS: Yes, I agree. Let’s move the conversation a little bit to the historical aspects of democracy. Just to set up this aspect of the discussion, there is an important distinction to be made between liberalism and democracy. If you define democracy as the will of the people and in some ways the will of the people could be to round up this minority group and ship them off or throw them off into the ocean or something. So, people would consider that shocking and completely illiberal and unacceptable, but that would be the will of the people if 51% of the vote decided it was so. So, there is a strong antagonism between democracy and liberalism.

Let’s think about this a little bit historically. I want to bring up the work of Hans-Hermann Hoppe, who’s an economist and political thinker. If you talk to your average Joe Bag-of-Donuts and you tell him about a king or an aristocratic ruler and you ask, “Do you think you are more free today?” I think the answer would most likely be, “Yes.” And probably an enthusiastic, “Yes!” But, as Hoppe points out, if you want to judge liberty by any real criterion then in the age of democracy liberty has declined precipitously.

If you look at rulers of the past: Genghis Khan — he conquered people with the sword — he would never conceive of taxing their income at the rates incomes are taxed in Europe and America. Louis XIV was not a totalitarian by any stretch of the imagination. If you look just objectively speaking, there was more liberty in his society than there is now in democracy.

And so I think why someone thinks they’re free now is they think that we are the government, so to speak.

What Hans-Hermann Hoppe points out is that earlier people would look at the state and essentially think that, “Oh, the state is doing that. The aristocrats are doing that. And that’s not me. They have their own interests, so I better keep them in check.” And I’m sure the state looked upon its subjects in the same light. There was maybe a good tension that was productive and kept liberty alive but then also allowed the aristocrats to perform their real function, which is the protection of the realm and the use of violence.

But we now have this illusion in the modern world that we are the government. So, in a sense, “Weare going to go to war in Iraq. What tax rate should we have? What kind of immigration policy should we have?” This idea that we are the government.

So, this seems to be an historical consciousness of the highest order. It’s a big thing that people in the Western world, and really around the world, think. So, Jonathan, where do you think this is going, this “we are the government”? Where did it come from? Where is it going? And do you think there are any prospects that we might be able to move past this notion of representation or really identity between the people and the state?

JB: I think the only way you could get out of this conundrum is direct democracy, which Alain de Benoist on behalf of GRECE and the New Right has often advocated. This is closer to the type of democracy that exists in cantonal Switzerland, for instance.

Switzerland is quite an interesting example because Switzerland has avoided for most of the 20th century much of the things that have come in other democracies. They avoided participation in both great European wars, World War I and World War II, of course. The Swiss are highly privately armed and can put 2 million people in the battlefield with heavy military and armed training, and yet they haven’t fought a war and haven’t needed to for 500 years.

They’re also extraordinarily socially conservative. Women didn’t get the vote until very late in Switzerland. This is seen as regressive and unduly conservative by most champions of liberalism and democracy.

But there is something to be said for direct democracies. Certainly, the elitist liberalism that you have in the West now on all sorts of things, such as multiculturalism and who you go to war with and certain federal things such as the European Union in the Western European context, are decided for by tiny elites and the population is largely excluded and popular wishes in these matters are regarded as ignorant and ill-informed and are often against them are swept to one side.

Now, that doesn’t say too much for democracy, yet at the same time you have an ultra-democratic spirit that believes that everything needs to be put out to tender, put out to poll, and assessed by the popular will.

Direct democracy, where people decide on issues not on candidates and don’t vote for parties but vote for issues like, “Should we be inside or outside the European Union?” in the British context . . . Well, you’ll probably have a majority to leave the European Union totally contrary to the political instincts of the British ruling class, which contains a lot of skepticism about the union but always watches to remain within it.

One of the issues where liberalism and democracy are most fraught and at variance with one another is the issue of crime, particularly crime and punishment. This shows up a great difference between the United States and Western Europe. In Western Europe, liberal elites have contrived, basically by coming to dominate the thinking of these center-Right and center-Left parties in their respective parliaments, not to all mass instinct in relation to the issues of law and order to gain a hand. This is why punishments and so on for all sorts of infractions from the most serious to the least serious in Western Europe are considered by the populace to be absurdly soft and not stringent enough at all.

Whereas in America . . .  Where I think . . . What is it? 37 states have the death penalty?

RS: Well, I’m sure it’s something like that. We have the largest prison population in the world.

JB: The death penalty in Western Europe is regarded as a sort of harbinger of political lunacy. Only those who are totally outside the system dare advocate the death penalty even though quite a few Tory MPs privately support it.

RS: Right.

JB: The last time there was a debate in the House of Commons on that was . . . A long time ago there was an attempt to frustrate the having of such debates, because it could canalize dangerous psychological energies on behalf of the masses. The masses support the death penalty 67% through 90% depending on the clientele of the poll and how you ask the question, but there is absolutely no question that the masses would be allowed to decide on issues like that where they would give regressive and reactionary answers according to the political establishment. Those views would be considered to be regressive and reactionary by conservative politicians in Western Europe never mind liberal or Leftist politicians.

So, there are enormous areas where the popular will is frustrated by the democratic mandate, and the only way that could be broken is if people decided on a six months basis on five key questions, which would be put out to referendum and put out to debate. The political class would say that this would end up in chaos because the masses don’t know what they want and could be easily swayed by demagogues and by media interests, which of course is a possibility, but we’d have a controlled management of mass instinct through liberal democracy and representative politics where often people get a version of what they don’t want and all they do is vote to prevent something worse.

RS: Yeah. Do you think also that the kind of world that de Benoist is imagining really requires a racially homogenous, and really culturally homogenous if not religiously homogenous, population? I agree that Switzerland is a civilized place. I’ve actually spent some time there a little while ago. I enjoyed it. They obviously have a stable and healthy culture.

At the same time, as an American, when I hear someone talking about direct democracy I can just imagine people voting on their television sets and voting the country free ice cream or voting that we should take away all the money of every person who earns more than a million dollars and give it to the people or something. You know, I just almost find myself siding with the bureaucrats on that issue. I think that a Swiss population could come up with some more sound decisions than America as it’s currently constitute could.

But maybe no population could. I’m not a fan of William F. Buckley, but he had a very nice line that is worth repeating and he said that he wanted America to be like Switzerland and he said that he was talking to a Swiss man and he asked him who the leader of his country was and the man said, “Oh yes, he’s a good man, but at the moment I can’t remember his name.” And Buckley, in one of his good moments, said, “That is a good political system where the population is depoliticized” in a sense. They’re not getting riled up by demagogues. They’re not watching Fox News every day. They’re living their lives, maybe having a family, maybe running a business or something. I don’t know. I think there’s something quite healthy sounding about an order like that.

Well, Jonathan, as we bring it to a close let me just ask you to look in a crystal ball for a little bit. What do you think is the future of democracy? I mentioned this when we first began this discussion that we had some time of stability, one could say, where the Cold War was ending, you had great big credit booms and economic booms in the Western world, we had notions of the end of history and so on and so forth, but we seem to be entering a new world now. I think things like the Arab Spring, maybe even Occupy Wall Street or the Occupy movement, are harbingers of this, that we seem to be entering a world where there’s going to be a lot more anger, there’s going to be a lot more people on the streets even in the wealthier countries. There’s just going to be a different kind of politics. We seem to be entering a new world.

So, maybe you could talk a little about what you see going forward and how democracy will fit in all this.

JB: I think it’s all determined by economic stability. The fact that Britain, for example, is a trillion pounds — a billion billion pounds — in debt this week, and although there are attempts, of course, to manufacture reduction in the budget deficit . . . If this ever triggered a major economic catastrophe such as has hit a small European nation like Greece, Iceland, or the Republic of Ireland . . . If a storm hit a major European country like Spain, Italy, France, or Britain — Germany would be much less likely on present scenarios — then I think all bets are off. I think you would see a fracturing in democracy. You would see a lot more generalized protests. You would see a lot more loutishness. You would see a lot more associated apathy. The two would go together. You would see a vanguardism by militant minorities, and you would see greater disengagement on behalf of larger and large republics.

I think that’s already accelerating. I think democracy will invert itself and become a purely minority game whereby in the future only important and triggered minorities actually vote. You may get a situation where 60% vote, but within that the election is decided by small, little groups that cross over party and other boundaries. So, the number of people who change their minds between elections and the number of voters who are targeted by one side or the other make the decisive switch.

I could well see a situation where democracy in the 21st and 22nd centuries approximates to democracy in the 19th century whereby you had a restricted franchise, and the majority didn’t vote because they weren’t able to. In Britain, all women couldn’t vote, and in 1867 key parts of the professional and upper middle class got the vote, but nobody else did apart for those above them in the hierarchy. So, a very small number of people decided the elections, but they were genuine elections.

I think what you’re going to have in the future is a very small number will decide them and yet everyone can still vote. It’s just the majority chooses not to.

RS: Out of apathy?

JB: Out of apathy, out of reverse anger, out of not understanding the difference between the candidates as the differences become more and more nuanced and less and less observable.

I do think the end of ideological politics in the West as it is perceived by many who belabor the fact that they can’t tell the difference between the parties anymore. The difference between the British parties is minimal. The difference between the Canadian parties is minimal. American politics I think, well, the mainstream candidates of a Romney sort . . . The difference between him and a centrist Democrat is, I would imagine, meaningless, really.

RS: Yeah.

JB: Only the injection of religion into politics, as it appears from a Western European distance, gives some sort of charge, partly to react against by some people, over the water in the United States.

But I personally predict that democracy and the liberal humanism that floats on it at the present time are going to be in trouble, but it’s going to be different types of trouble in different settings. In some places, it will be militant minorities going into the streets and courting trouble of all sorts. In other situations, it will be the apathy of the overwhelming majority.

There comes a point where in local elections and so on so many people subtract from the process, and you have 2/3rds not voting in elections in Western Europe, there comes a moment when those elections lose all validity. When the system itself becomes unable to operate . . .

This is true now at the level of the European Union. One of the reasons that the European Union can’t function isn’t because they can’t decide to go forward to a European state — a federal Europe, a USE. like the United States of America, the United States of Europe — or to backtrack to the nation-state . . . They are caught in the middle of those two polarities. That is true, but it’s because the European populations do not give the political class the endorsement required to make decisive decisions. That’s why the debt-based crises in individual nation-states can’t be ameliorated effectively. The popular will is important and mainstream politicians don’t have it and therefore can’t arrive at long-lasting solutions.

I think in the United States the inability that there seems to be to cut the deficit in any effective way and the logjam that appears from a distance to exist in congress now that you have a president of one party and assemblies of the other is all to do with the delegitimatization of both. I think Obama doesn’t have legitimacy, but apart from canalized anger in his midterm neither really do the Republicans who’ve come in to force him.

RS: Well, before we go, do you think that when this liberal age, or if this liberal age, really implodes on itself, if all those trillions in debt come home to roost that there could be maybe an opening for the kind of aristocratic politics that you and I would want to see? Maybe even one could gain power, certainly by force of arms, of course, but also one could gain power by charisma alone. When this whole order is delegitimized that people might begin to look towards someone who’s a kind of visionary.

JB: Yes, I think that could only occur if what exists now was totally discredited in the minds of the people who are alive now or in the future under such systems. I think that if such a discrediting did occur then all bets are off and although aristocracy in the sense of the ancient world or even 18th-century Europe prior to the bourgeois revolutions at the end of that century will never come back in the same form.

The notion of aristocratic rule could return maybe with a restricted franchise, maybe with an elect caste that’s seen to be the sort of philosopher-kings of a society, maybe with quasi-military figures who have to be civilian in order to rule but come from a military background, particularly if there’s a lot more social chaos around and that’s felt to be necessary.

But with 24-hour media, if the halters that liberalism provides that prevent charisma as an end in itself and prevents phenomena like a more aristocratic version of the Kennedys from emerging periodically and coming about, if those tendencies were annulled, arrested, or staid then you would see something else. I think that at the present time there are too many inhibitions that prevent the emergence of that type of politicking. People would always cluck as soon as it began to emerge that so-and-so is a dangerously authoritarian or sleek candidate, that so-and-so is a dangerously charismatic candidate and we know where that ends up, that so-and-so has undemocratic credentials or a whiff of elitism about them. Elitism, of course, being one of the most wounding politically incorrect charges. It’s not used very much because hardly any politician dares to make any elitist statements.

But as soon as the thing begins to tumble you will see elitist politics reemerge. It’s difficult at this stage of the game to see the forms that would take, but you’d know it as soon as you saw it. It’s only when the masses are prepared to embrace it again, because they would have to. We live in mass societies now. Even if the masses were prepared to have less of a say they would have to endorse that, paradoxically enough.

RS: Well, we can all hold out hope. Jonathan, thank you for being back on the program. This was a wonderful discussion and I look forward to talking with you again next week.

JB: Thanks very much! It’s been a pleasure to be here.

Thursday, January 25, 2018

Framing Finance

                      By Donald Thoresen

             


Alex Preda
Framing Finance: The Boundaries of Markets and Modern Capitalism
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009

How is it that formerly socially unacceptable activities become acceptable? One can point to numerous examples throughout history of seemingly sudden reversals or alterations of social norms. Some of these, of course, work in favor of the greater good (however defined), others clearly do not. But these cultural disruptions are rarely the revolutions their advocates claim them to be. They are the result of time and labor on the part of various types of human collectives to incrementally attain some particular goal. A revolution is really nothing more than a grand unveiling, the culmination of earlier processes, the historical moment at which time seems to accelerate for the disinterested onlooker as the revolutionaries’ efforts come to fruition and become too big to ignore. That is to say, “revolution” is ultimately just the name given to the final stage of a gradual transformation that simply caught non-participants off guard.

All ostensibly revolutionary social and cultural changes are, in essence, linear phenomena and can thus be more or less accurately traced back to their sources and analyzed. One of the more impactful of these changes in recent human history was the intrusion of the financial system into daily life, in particular the transition of financial speculation from a devilish “back alley” vice to a noble and visionary calling. The vast majority of us are so caught up in the financial system — as both the players and the played, both winners and losers — that we hardly notice its presence anymore. It is simply taken as a given.[1] The true extent of the invasiveness of financialization is undetectable without deliberate study. There is virtually no space in which the consideration of finance in one form or another is not prominent and, often, decisive. But it was not always this way. The forces of international capital — so often accompanied by Jews and Jewish values — have transformed Western attitudes and behavior by systematically and systemically subverting traditional white proscriptions against usury and gambling and substituting new values and norms designed to legitimize and expand predatory global finance.

Alex Preda, Professor of Accounting, Accountability, and Financial Management at King’s College London, has written a fascinating book entitled Framing Finance: The Boundaries of Markets and Modern Capitalism, in which he explains how speculators and financiers were able to step forth from the shadows of moral condemnation and insinuate themselves into respectable society. Grounded in a history of the stock exchange, the book examines the paths and implications of this transformation and how “observational boundaries [mediate] the relationship between financial markets and society” (p. 22). The following will be a highly simplified overview of this densely theoretical book with a focus on a selection of things that should be of particular interest to the New Right.

For Dr. Preda, stock markets are “the core component” of the perception that financial markets are “central with respect to social and economic stability” (pp. 5-6). He suggests that to understand how financial markets and the stock exchange became so integral to the economy we need to better understand the “boundaries between finance and society at large” (p. 6) and that the issue goes beyond the public merely “indifferently noticing” (p. 6) that financial markets exist. Dr. Preda wants to find out how “dispersed actions are coordinated and how uncoordinated actors engage on uncertain paths of action” (p. 6). How was it that international finance was able to take root in Western cultures so easily? How is it that so many of us have been manipulated into accepting not just the mechanics of financialization but its philosophical — even moral — value?

The market is neither entirely individualistic nor collectivist. Individual economic actors have their own reasons for pursuing a particular course of action but these generally fall into some kind of pattern. Those who follow similar patterns, who invest their faith, time and money in similar schemes ultimately form a type of collective. But what exactly sustains this collective is hard to pinpoint. Because the market cannot be explained exclusively in terms of either individual or collective action there must be other mediating factors. It is because of this that Dr. Preda rejects the traditional notion of a “spirit of capitalism” in favor of a more materialist explanation. He writes: “Instead of searching for an elusive ‘spirit,’ perhaps we would do better investigating concrete material arrangements. Instead of trying to find the Graal of a collective mind, perhaps we should set for ourselves the task of investigating how embodied, talking, adroit, ingenious, industrious actors can coordinate among themselves, albeit in a dispersed and uncertain fashion” (p. 8). There are two ways in which this is accomplished: indirect observation and boundary construction.

Dr. Preda makes the distinction between direct and indirect observation because, except for a select few “actors concentrated in the same space, or who meet periodically” (p. 9), financial markets cannot be directly observed. The vast majority of us who participate in the system never get to “see” it. But some observation must occur for any social system to function because it is required for the determination of appropriate levels of trust/distrust. As such, those seeking social legitimacy cannot be entirely secretive in their actions. They need people to observe them. However, being able to control the methods of observation and select what exactly is observed is important. The author writes:

The willingness to be observed, to show a face to the world, results from the need for legitimacy, trust, and for attracting interactions or customers. Think of open kitchens in restaurants, for example, to build trust. Also, professionals like doctors and lawyers allow external (though controlled), direct (e.g. publications, documentaries, interviews) for this same reason. Since impersonal trust implies, among other things, reliance on (observational) procedures and processes, it follows that the object of observation cannot be independent of observational procedures. The “lenses” which mediate observation thus shape or “co-constitute” the object being observed. (p. 10)

Dr. Preda suggests that boundaries can be such lenses. They can, of course, physically distinguish between various actors but they can also be “communicative.” Communicative boundaries are “more than discursive distinctions, symbols marking the bodies of social actors, or institutional roles: communication boundaries can be incorporated in artifacts, theoretical models, and forms of knowledge” (p. 11). Boundaries allow controlled, indirect observation and they also channel behavioral paths. As such, boundaries generate “social entities” (p. 11) and “legitimate the group’s activities and integrate them into the society at large . . .” (p. 11). The group is observed just enough to render them unsuspicious, which then ultimately leads to legitimacy. After achieving legitimacy, the public’s behavioral patterns are conditioned by this same legitimacy. The public can (or must) now interact with this legitimate social entity and tailor their behaviors in accordance with its rules of inclusion/exclusion, its routines, its expectations, and its demands.

Having established his basic theoretical premise — that the legitimacy of financial markets relies on the boundaries with which they are framed — the author digs into the theory and history of financial markets. In the first chapter, “The Boundaries of Finance in the Sociological Tradition,” Dr. Preda examines four basic sociological capitalist archetypes: the manufacturer, the accumulating capitalist, the religious capitalist, and the entrepreneur. He compares each to the figure of the speculator. He begins with Adam Smith, who believed that the manufacturer was “superior to all other social characters generated by the capitalist economy” (p. 30). In the Smithian conception, increasing the economic health of the state is the primary role of the economy. The manufacturer represents this public spirit: “unencumbered by ideologies, skilled, practical, self-interested, yet in harmony with fellow citizens” (p. 31). The manufacturer provides a pivot upon which other aspects of the economy revolve and a social model to which others aspire. The speculator, on the other hand, is the opposite of the manufacturer. He is one who “lacks skills, knowledge, and care for productive capital” and “transforms self-interest into selfishness, endangers the harmony of interests, and enfeebles the state” (p. 33). In the Smithian economy there is “no difference between political and economic heroes” (p. 33) because one requires the other and each, ideally, works together for the benefit of the state which, ideally, exists to serve the greater good. The speculator, by producing nothing of value, exists outside of this symbiotic relationship and thus outside of the realm of the public good.

The accumulating capitalist is a Marxian figure. As is well known, for Marx “the key relationship of capitalism is that between the capitalist and the worker: while the former accumulates, the latter sells his only possession” (p. 35). This relationship is seen to be as much a social one as it is an economic one. One might think then that speculation as a social phenomenon would play a greater role in Marx’s analysis yet it does not figure all that prominently. Financial speculation is seen, in essence, as a form of primitive accumulation. Dr. Preda writes:

. . . on the one hand speculation participates in concentration processes, contributing to the general logic of capital. On the other hand, it transfers capital away from productive tasks. By doing this, individuals engaged in financial speculation undermine ownership relationship, and with that the system of characters (or figures) on which the capitalist order is based. (p. 36)

Is it any wonder that a Jew would somehow find an upside to speculation? The expansion of credit capital transforms savers into speculators and then investors and savings are transformed into capital. Financial markets thus aid the expansion of the capitalist order. But, as one might expect, even the transformation of ordinary people into capitalists via speculation is not so terrible for this grandson of a rabbi. The credit capital created by speculation which, as we have seen, Marx believed to be a form of primitive accumulation, allows capital to expand without the “direct violence” of labor exploitation (p. 37). So, all things considered, it is not so bad. The speculator absorbs some of the horrors of capitalist exploitation and helps to somewhat slow the spread of capitalism by removing capital from production. Adam Smith saw speculation as a destabilizing force and so did Karl Marx, but it should not come as a surprise that one saw this as an unqualified negative and the other as a (qualified) positive.

The figure of the “religious capitalist” is rooted in Weberian analysis. For Max Weber, the speculator is just one part of the inherent rationality of capitalism, itself based in a religious drive. Dr. Preda writes that, in this conception, accumulation “has to be obey certain rules: the virtuous capitalist accumulates by his own ingenuity, frugality, sustained work, and constant preoccupation with economic success” (p. 41). Yet how then does Weber justify speculation, which cannot easily be grounded in religious norms (at least not Christian norms)? The answer is that capitalism has a dual nature: one side is rational and the other is charismatic. The author summarizes Weber’s position: “The grand speculators whose daring exploits and ‘coups’ fascinate the public are the manifestation of a charismatic authority not entirely compatible with the rational, ethical constraints imposed by Puritanism upon profit-seeking” (p. 41). Financial markets rely on social trust and “tacit rules” (p. 41) for their ability to draw wealth into their orbits. For Weber, the speculator, by increasing the interdependence of citizens through social absorption into the accumulation process, strengthens the bonds that hold together societies. Dr. Preda writes: “The stock exchange does not simply fulfill economic functions: by processing wealth into reciprocal obligations, it makes social actors reciprocally dependent” (p. 43). These reciprocal relationships, however, necessarily rely on the ethical integrity of those at the top of the financial hierarchy. If one were to start reneging on obligations or behaving outside the norms of the society in which the market exists the financial system would ultimately fail to function.

In his analysis of the figure of the entrepreneur, Dr. Preda discusses the ideas of Werner Sombart and Joseph Schumpeter. Noting that earlier forms of wealth accumulation very often included “robbery, privateering, and treasure hunting” (p. 45), Sombart argued that part of the capitalist spirit was rooted in risky adventure. The author writes:

These potentially rewarding yet high-risk activities required daring, innovative, energetic participants, qualities which were later channeled into project making. This implied selling (not always ripe) ideas to a broader public, a process in which the projector’s powers of persuasion played a crucial role. Trading projects on financial markets combined these powers of persuasion with gambling fury in the figure of the projector, or entrepreneur (p. 46).

He notes that, while organizational skills are important, for Sombart, the “talent for persuasion is key: after all, the public must be convinced to part with their money on the basis of the simple promise that an idea will yield a profit in the future” (p. 46). In this conception, the entrepreneur is a character into which the high-risk behavior of unethical proto-capitalists is channeled towards legitimate activity by his rhetorical power “to convince and impress the public, to make promises and awaken hopes, [mediate] between markets and society,” something which “is essential with respect to the former’s legitimacy” (p. 46).

Joseph Schumpeter, in contrast, believed the entrepreneur to be less characterized by Sombart’s “gambling fury” than by a “desire to challenge existing organizational forms” (p. 47). Capitalism tends to drift toward routine (mechanization, for example) but the entrepreneur is, by nature, resistant to routine. He seeks innovation and represents a sort of elite human who is able to think beyond social restrictions while maintaining a grasp of their necessity — a tension which produces innovation. The speculator, on the other hand, cannot be included in this group because he is unconcerned with innovation and progress qua innovation and progress. He seeks simply to profit off the innovations and progress of others.

In the second chapter of the book, entitled “Prestige, at Last: The Social Closure of the Stock Exchange,” Dr. Preda analyzes the processes by which “financial groups anchor the world of the stock exchange into society not just at the site of economic interests and profits, but in more stable, multi-sited ways” (p. 52). He argues that financial markets arise out of a combination of networks and communication systems. Networks necessarily precede markets (how can one transact business without other individuals who are following some organizational and/or behavioral template?), but there are multiple networks involved in any given market which require communication systems to function.[2] The author writes: “Market actors continuously send observable signals to each other, around which relationships are built. This makes markets into self-validating signaling systems, which can process uncertainties into information patterns” (p. 53). It is through these “self-referential communication networks” (p. 54) that routines are created. Routine then becomes a stabilizing force within the network which “translates the logic of personal ties into that of impersonal transactions and vice versa” (p. 54). For these routines to function efficiently there must be tools with which “heterogeneous pieces of information are made comparable, interpreted, and used in financial decisions” (p. 54). And there must be people with expertise to use them. These people — economists, stock brokers, analysts and others — function as intermediaries who “[process] uncertainties” (p. 54) for those within the network. They also provide external legitimacy by suggesting to outside observers that there is an objective logic to the network (the financial market).

As mentioned earlier, the legitimacy of financial markets was not always taken as a given. In the 17th and 18th centuries financial transactions took place on the margins of society. In London and Paris, for example, they “took place in coffee houses and in adjacent streets, with traders and customers being often chased by the police, and forced to move across various locations” (pp. 60-61). The author points out that the neighborhoods in which these transactions took place were often already crime-ridden areas containing a mixture of social classes and groups. He quotes a pamphleteer who, in 1720, wrote of Exchange Alley in London as being inhabited by “Turks, Jews, Atheists, and Infidels” who “mingle there as if they were a kin to one another” (p. 61). This diversity and accompanying criminality was seen as socially disruptive by the larger society. Dr. Preda writes: “In London, it is the French and the Dutch, and everywhere the Jews [italics mine], the absolute foreigners, who are seen as the paragon of the stockbroker. Society’s incompatibility with the stock exchange is thought to be so great that the foreigner becomes a metaphor for the disreputable role of the broker” (p. 64). Of course, this is awkward reasoning on the part of the author. He characterizes resistance to foreigners as having resulted from resistance to the stock exchange itself rather than making the rather obvious connection that respectable society merely recognized that they were largely one and the same. And even when foreigners are not mentioned, as is the case in many of the moral pamphlets issued as warnings about speculation, speculators are portrayed as feminine, nasty, and brutish con men (pp. 64-65). There was obviously a common understanding that speculators were undesirable to begin with.

In addition to the marginal physical spaces in which speculators and traders met to conduct business at this time, they lacked a legal space for their transactions. Legal acknowledgement of marketplace transactions did not occur until the 20th century.[3] Not only were financial securities not seen as similar to goods but most transactions took place through the exchange of paper slips which could, quite obviously, be “easily destroyed, lost, or forged” (p. 62). With the frequent social condemnation and the haphazard transactional methods, those involved in the stock market had to acquire legitimacy in order to expand and further fill their coffers. They had to control and define both their physical and social space — to define themselves as a status group. The author writes: “Among the most important mechanisms involved in the creation of status groups were controls of (a) space, (b) access to membership, (c) securities lists, and (d) honor” (p. 65).

As stated above, it was in coffee houses, private clubs, special governmentally-designated areas, and the street where stock brokers conducted their business prior to the late 19th century. In France, for example, the government decreed in 1724 that all stockbrokers had to transact business in the Jardin Royal, which was surrounded by archers to prevent disorder (p. 66). This in itself is evidence of the social disorder wrought by speculators and speculation. By the late 19th century, brokers had organized to an extent that they could often rent or buy buildings to use as stock exchanges, although the street remained an important place of business. This bifurcation resulted in “official” and “unofficial” stock exchanges, with a degree of mingling between the two. Physical and social spatial contests helped to define the boundaries of legitimacy and illegitimacy.

As far as membership and securities lists are concerned, there had been attempts to regulate these from early on. From the late 17th century, for example, membership rules for various “legitimate” stock exchanges — including, at times, limits on the number of Jews, membership fees, and citizenship and age requirements (pp. 68-69) — had been attempted.[4] Additionally, “brokers had control of lists of traded securities” (p. 69). There were official lists and unofficial lists and, as would be expected, only official brokers could decide which securities would indeed be official. The author is quick to point out, however, that the existence of official lists “did not mean standardization of price data” (p. 71). The stock market was still a very rough and tumble world. Because financial markets were still, at best, a moral gray area and because the diversity of brokers resulted in a strange mix of elite and criminal, citizen and foreigner, gentile and Jew, which was repellent to average citizens, attempts were made to acquire a facade of honor.

Brokers banded together to create governing bodies with which to implement the membership rules and monopolization of securities lists outlined above but also to try to control brokers’ behavior. Dr. Preda writes: “In the absence of any adequate legal frame, honorability was the only means to ensure the inviolability of contracts” (p. 72). These efforts included such rules as brokers only being allowed to smoke after 4 o’clock in the afternoon, fines for standing on chairs or tables, and visiting other stock exchanges. Offenders were fined and repeat offenders would be black listed (p. 72). These seemingly odd rules, indicative as they were of the actual chaos of the stock exchanges, worked successfully to curb some of the outwardly “bad” behaviors of brokers.

Various literary guides to trading began to appear as well. These positioned brokers as being privy to a specialized “scientific” knowledge (esoteric yet seemingly accessible to those who wanted to learn at the masters’ feet). This literature tried to “counteract negative views and to represent the stock exchange and its figures as examples of a successful bourgeois life and career” (p. 80). By the late 19th century, stock brokers were generally thought of as upstanding citizens. This, of course, enabled them to draw those who might have previously been repulsed by their choice of occupation and their personal behavior into the fold. By creating and then policing their borders — both physical and “communicative” — these men were able to expand their hold on the public’s imagination and thus their hold on the economy.

In chapter three, “Financial Knowledge and the Science of the Market,” Dr. Preda delves more deeply into the guise of science applied to financial markets in order to further claims of respectability. He observes that part of the traditional resistance to speculation was that it was incapable of being understood in terms of calculation. There was an inherent chaos to the practice which was clear to most observers of the day. Trades took place with hand gestures and glances, and between different classes, nationalities, and races. He notes a French Revolution-era source as describing brokers and speculators as “vampires thirsty for blood, shrouded in darkness” (p. 84). In 1719, one London observer wrote:

To all Men whose Eyes are to open’d with Reason and Argument it shou’d be onough to fill them with Abhorence, to think that the scandalous Mechanick, Upstart Mistery of Job-brokering should thus grow upon the Nation; that ever the English Nation should suffer themselves to be impos’d upon by the New invented Ways of a few needy Mercenaries, who can turn all Trade into a Lottery, and make the Exchange a Gaming Table: A Thing, which like the Imaginary Coins of Foreign Nations, have no reality in themselves, but are plac’d as things which stand to be calculated, and reduc’d into value, a Trade made up of Sharp and Trick, and Mang’d with Impudence and Banter (pp. 84-85).

The chaos of the stock market did not jibe with the notion of a world that could and should be understood as rational and ordered. Resistant to classification and calculation, with a corresponding air of devilry and immorality, speculation and financial markets could not be seen as legitimate. In the Smithian conception of economy, for example, the speculator was not “enhancing the wealth of nations [or] the well-being of their citizens” (p. 87). These notions persisted for quite a while. Over time, however, as brokers and stock exchanges became “respectable,” the public, which now had a greater capacity to observe these people through boundaries established by the brokers themselves, had to come to terms with competing notions of outward legitimacy and the “radical unknowability” (p. 87) of the market.

In the mid-19th century, there was a marked increase in publications about finance by interested parties. This greatly shifted the discourse away from morality and unknowability and towards the idea that speculation was a science. As the author points out, it was around this time that gambling itself was medicalized. That is to say, the gambler was transformed from an immoral figure to someone with a mental illness: “individual cases were treated as pathologies, as deviations from normal social behavior” (p. 89). This took the moral edge off the question of speculation and helped turn it into an object of rational study. The speculator, like the gambler, was now a focal point of scientific inquiry, divorced from traditional morality. And, like the gambler, the speculator could be conceived as following some internal logic that could be deciphered and understood rationally by experts. Financial markets themselves then also had to follow some internal logic. Dr. Preda writes: “If [financial markets] were to be made into an object of inquiry, an inquiry led by its own rules, then the eighteenth-century mode of seeing markets as an amalgam of people, cries, plots, plans, staged performances, and manipulations — in short, as an observable chaos — had to be replaced” (p. 90). The new financial literature “promoted the notion that financial markets are governed by principles which are not controlled by any single individual or group [italics mine]” (p. 91). If financial markets were governed by scientific laws, then individuals or groups taking advantage of their position to engage in fraud or other shady behavior were necessarily aberrations within a rational financial universe. The behavior of particular groups could go unnoticed. Everything that needed to be known about the functioning of markets and the behavior of investors and brokers could be determined scientifically with little need to resort to moral or ethical judgment.

Chapter four is entitled “Close Up: Price Data, Machines, and Organizational Boundaries.” In it, Dr. Preda argues that technology — in particular the stock ticker — facilitated the notion that financial markets were knowable and scientific while at the same time creating a new boundary to selectively reveal, and thus further legitimize, the mechanics of speculation. This new technology created a distance between human actors and actions. He writes: “With respect to financial data, trust and authority are dissociated from individuals and transferred to technology: trustworthy data are data produced or recorded by authoritative technology, which can be transferred across heterogeneous contexts without losing their properties” (p. 117). Just as the medicalization of gambling brought speculation out of the realm of morality, the stock ticker brought financial markets out of the realm of human agency. With a machine to filter knowledge and action into standardized chunks, financial markets began to look more and more like fields of objective and impersonal natural law.

Acquaintance with the codes and operations of the stock ticker further bound investors and brokers: “as an investor, one had to learn a special telegraphic code from the broker’s manual and spend as much time as possible in his office. Brokerage houses advertised their codes as a sign of seriousness and reliability” (p. 130). Obviously, this enhanced the image of the broker as being privy to specialized knowledge. But at the same time the public had to be granted a certain degree of access to this world, both in order to maintain observable legitimacy and to increase the influx of capital by attracting investors. As such, brokerage houses often freely published their transaction codes, statistics, and diagrams (p. 131). This new public access worked very well. Investors were not only drawn into the brokers’ world but often became emotionally attached to their stocks, with the “gambling fury” like that described by Werner Sombart. The author writes that the “observer of the market was now the observer of abstract variations, not of picturesque and more or less morally dubious characters . . .” (p. 143). These abstract variations — seemingly following scientific laws — created entirely new fields of study within economics.

In the fifth chapter, “From Afar: Charts and Their Analysts,” Dr. Preda discusses the perception of finance as open to the public yet controlled by experts by analyzing the history of financial chartism. Also known as technical analysis, financial chartism is defined by the New York Institute of Finance as a “method of forecasting the prices of stocks, futures contracts, indexes, or any kind of financial instrument.”[5] Considered by many economists to be a sort of pseudo-science, financial chartists claim to be able to “detect patterns in market action that they can identify as having happened often enough in the past to be reliable as an indicator of future price levels.”[6] By focusing on this popularly successful but academically marginalized movement, the author seeks to draw the reader’s attention to the ways in which the presentation of expertise shapes market behavior and public perceptions of finance. Financial chartists developed their techniques, made strategic connections with brokers, and managed to convince clients that they were “buying protection” (p. 162). Individual practitioners were then able to develop in ways analogous to the earlier creation of stock market boundaries: “cult status and inaccessibility, public presence and distance from the public” (p. 163). Again, the ability to selectively reveal information and to pose as scientific and ordered allowed for the appearance of legitimacy. Dr. Preda observes: “Seen in a broader perspective, [financial chartism] is part of the process through which the power of representation, the authorial, authoritative voice about finance, is concentrated within specific groups tied to financial institutions” (p. 170). The public was invited to participate in a seemingly open market yet, at the same time, held at a distance by “expertise,” allowing financial chartists to ensure their status and wealth. It also allowed for the development of cults of personality around particularly charismatic industry authorities.

The sixth chapter, entitled “The Kaleidoscope of Finance: Speculation, Economic Life, and Society,” deals with the idea that speculation, once legitimized, becomes a way to view the world in and of itself. The premises of speculation are no longer contested and any and all objections or concerns are viewed “through” legitimacy. It is worth quoting the author at length:

Once their domain of action (i.e., financial speculation) is seen as meaningful within the world, it can be accepted or contested within a given categorical system. In the same way in which a kaleidoscope produces various images combined from the same little pieces of colored glass, the boundaries of finance provide different programs of action based on categorical combinations.

This means that voices of authority writing about stock exchange and financial speculation not only claim that true access to financial transactions (and success) is ensured by special knowledge; they also elaborate representations of the social and natural order in which to integrate financial speculation with its successful occurrences, as well as with its failures, representations supported by and emanating from this special financial knowledge. Such representations, based in classificatory operations about financial speculation and the stock exchange, can support reformist (changing the world starting from speculation) or conservative programs (keeping the world as it is). They can compete or clash with programs generated by exogenous social groups. Seen from this angle, the boundaries of finance go beyond the walls of stock exchanges and offer a blueprint for the whole of society. (p. 173)

The idea that speculation was a part of the natural order led to its being incorporated into various discourses from the 19th century on: progress, science, patriotism, education, and philosophy were all connected to financial markets (p. 177). Indeed, in contrast to their previous social position, speculators were seen as being manifestations of the highest forms of the human spirit. Some saw speculation as a civilizing force that could harmonize socio-economic relationships; others saw it as the “wild spirit of adventure” (p. 178). But whether it stabilized or vitalized, speculation itself was seen as a universal and permanent social fixture. It is no surprise then that discussions of speculation increasingly incorporated biological metaphors, with the stock exchange being seen as the heart of a living financial market (pp. 184-87).

At the same time, the various stock exchanges morphed into symbols of nationhood. Architecturally, they stood for national power, wealth, and prestige. The buildings themselves were a source of pride. Conceptually, they stood for national vitality. The power of finance was recognized across the political spectrum. Even preachers got in on the act. Forgetting the old religious injunctions against gambling and usury, men such as Thomas de Witt Talmage, a Presbyterian preacher from New Jersey, encouraged his flock to invest, pray for financial health, and give a little of the profits to Christian charities (p. 190). And, during times of national crisis, speculation was considered to be a patriotic duty in much the same way as shopping is now. Speculation had gone from being a sinful vice to a mental disorder to a life-giving biological organ and, finally, to an expression of love for one’s country and people. It was now an entirely legitimate field of human endeavor.

Chapter seven, “On the Dark Side of the Market,” deals with what happens conceptually when the rational calculation of speculation meets the chaos of the human emotional response: “The biggest problem of the speculator is not errors of calculation; the biggest problem is given by these seemingly uncontrollable emotions which take hold of you, spread like wildfire, and, in an eye’s blink, seem to annihilate all calculative efforts” (pp. 201-202). The author discusses a bit more the contradictions between the notion of speculation as “anchored in knowledge, discipline, hard work, observational skills, and specific cognitive tools” (p. 205) and the idea that speculation is “driven by a vital force” (p. 205). In typical contemporary academic Leftist fashion however, Dr. Preda spends much of this chapter on literary characterizations of speculators and merely repeats on a different canvas, as it were, much of what he has already theorized.

In chapter eight, entitled “Panic!,” he discusses, as one might guess, the problem of financial panic as it pertains to “psychology, sociology, and economics” (p. 215). He begins by providing a very brief background of panic as a subject of pathology. He references experiments done in Germany in the early 20th century in which evidence was sought for how panic spreads in collectives. Based on an understanding common in the late 19th century of panic as a response to visual stimuli and related to hysteria, these experiments were strictly utilitarian and only tried to discern how leadership techniques could quell panic in group situations (p. 215). It was not until the 1960s that “panic became a clinical term” and not until 1980 that panic “was recognized as a separate psychiatric entity” (p. 215). Preceding the medical investigation of panic was the sociological investigation. The author discusses Gustave Le Bon’s work, in which panic was defined as “dispersed individuals acting in step and sharing the same beliefs, in spite of their spatial dispersion” (p. 216). These medical and sociological definitions cannot be easily reconciled though. How, he wonders, can there be “mob hysteria” when the “herd” (the crowd or other dispersed actors) cannot be seen (p. 218)?

If, as a medical phenomenon, panic (hysterical as opposed to rational) is an abnormal bodily reaction to stimuli, and if, as a sociological phenomenon, panic is a form of collective behavior spread by imitation, how does one conceptualize panic without undermining “any attempt to treat collective behavior as rational” (p. 219)? The author suggests that the ideas of sociologist James Coleman could provide at least part of the answer.[7] Dr. Coleman “emphasized the role played by transfer of control in the emergence of panic phenomena” (p. 220). Using the classic theater fire scenario, he theorized that panic was a question of agency. Those who take the lead in exiting a burning theater are exhibiting non-conformity by not complying with the burgeoning panic of the others and the others, by conforming to these non-conformists, can ensure an orderly exit. That is to say, panic can be avoided if some in the crowd refuse to transfer control, i.e. refuse to abandon agency (p. 220). Others have argued that emotion must play a larger role in the panic response: tension, conflict, verbal exchanges, bodily contact, fear of a loss of control (p. 220), but financial panic can be neither entirely of a medical nature nor of a sociological nature. The author turns next to how economists have analyzed panic.

Economists have tended to deal with panic in terms very similar to those of medicine and sociology. Herd behavior, hysteria, mood-swings, and mania have all figured prominently in analyses of financial panic (p. 222). The author points out, however, that “symbolic elements” (p. 222) are neglected in these diagnoses. He writes:

. . . when social or personal hierarchies perceived to support the order of the marketplace crumble, this latter can unravel. When personal symbols of power and authority suddenly disappear or lose their charismatic force, disorder can spread. Social arrangements relying in combinations of rational and irrational elements (of knowledge and personal charisma) can be particularly susceptible to the unravelling of symbolic elements. Such unravelling does not have to be observed directly: symbols work on the basis of their representational force (pp. 222-23).

As an example of this, he refers to the stock ticker. Although real-time price data are conveyed, the observer must be able to narrativize the information and relate it to the hierarchy of market actors. “A questioning of the force underlying this hierarchy can generate disorder and uncertainties, and imitations of represented behavior can amplify the perceived disruptions” (p. 223). The observer of a downturn in the market identifies with others who he knows (or assumes) are observing the downturn elsewhere. If he feels that the social hierarchy of market actors is incapable of preventing a negative outcome panic will ensue. Dr. Preda observes that this greatly diminishes the notion of the speculator as a force of charisma and vitality — that is, as a symbol of human freedom, will, the battle against the market — and bolsters the notion of the speculator as existing in the herd or in the “dark shadow of the crowd” (p. 233). For Dr. Preda, if “the boundaries of finance include representations of financial ‘heroes’ (be they individuals or institutions) having exemplary force, panics delegitimize these representations” (p. 234). We saw this in 2008 when the failure of prestigious and “trustworthy” financial institutions was exacerbated by that very perception of prestige and trustworthiness.

***


So what does all of this mean for the New Right? The history of the stock exchange is not merely an economic one. It is also the history of deception, of human weakness, and of predation. It is the history of whites trying to reconcile tradition with progress, instinct with propaganda, the national with the international. The stock exchange serves not only as a vehicle for Jewish power but as a formula for Jewish deception: subvert, routinize, fake honorability, claim legitimacy, attract collaborators, and then pretend that there is no alternative, that this is the natural order, the way things have always been. Just as the stock market serves as a discursive kaleidoscope so too does Jewish power — indeed, the latter props up the former. We are all too familiar with the fact that Jews selectively open themselves to the public while keeping their physical and intellectual boundaries strictly policed. We know why they do it. To understand how is crucial. To understand how is to do more than collect facts: it is to understand how facts are arranged and manipulated; to understand the interplay between the empirical and the theoretical.

As the capitalist order is the current primary economic arm of Jewish hegemony, all aspects of capitalism are worthy of investigation. To expose the mechanics of this internationalist order is crucial. We need to ruthlessly dissect and study the ways it works against us so that we may dig ourselves out from underneath it and ensure that it never happens again. The idea that revolutions are, in actuality, gradual transformations must always be at the forefront of our minds. Many of us have come to perceive these incremental changes in other areas — movies, advertisements, art, literature, philosophy, politics — and recognize them for what they are: efforts at dispossession and cultural subterfuge. Economics must play a larger part in our critique if we are to be successful. It is safe to say that the wool will not be pulled over our eyes in the future. The goal now is not only to spread the message but to continue to tear apart the Jewish narrative, to find every last remnant of harmful Jewish intellectual residue and steel ourselves against it. And much of it festers in our notions of economic “freedom” and fetishization of “the market.” We need to recognize that the intellectual and cultural milieu in which we live is based on assumptions and assertions which require our consent and our obedience. But we need not provide them. We will no longer transfer control.

Notes


1. For an interesting and accessible examination of this notion (from a decidedly Leftist perspective) see: Randy Martin, The Financialization of Daily Life (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2002).

2. This (that networks precede markets) is not precisely what Dr. Preda argues. He believes that markets are networks. This is, of course, true but provides no answer as to how financial markets originate in the first place. Markets do not–indeed cannot–appear deus ex machina.

3. In both New York and the United Kingdom these transactions were codified in law in 1909. (p. 62).

4. One might think that because the number of Jews was limited (only at certain times and in certain places) that Jewish influence was minimal. But this actually only confirms the disproportionate number of Jews engaged in speculation. Why limit them unless they are deemed to be overrepresented? And if group legitimacy is one’s goal, why limit the numbers of a particular group of people unless they were shady individuals who would not aid any attempts to claim legitimacy?

5. New York Institute of Finance 1989, p. xiii. Quoted in Preda, p. 146.

6. New York Institute of Finance 1989, p. 2. Quoted in Preda, p. 149.

7. On an unrelated note, James Coleman came under intense fire from the American Sociological Association (ASA) in the mid-1970s for reversing his position on busing black students into white schools. Observing that white parents moved away from forcibly integrated schools, he determined that the program undermined the integrity of the educational system. His expulsion was called for but the effort failed. See: Barbara J. Kiviat, “The Social Side of Schooling,” Johns Hopkins Magazine, April 2000, http://pages.jh.edu/~jhumag/0400web/18.html(accessed December 7, 2015).