Tuesday, July 31, 2018

The Solution is State Power

                         By Gregory Hood

Jacques-Louis David, “Napoleon Crossing the Alps,” detail, 1805

Conservatism is Unrealistic

The Republican Party is useless as a political force. The key battle was not the presidential election of 2012 but the passage of Barack Obama’s health care plan. All of the disparate factions of the American Right joined together to oppose “Obamacare,” and they failed, miserably. Instead of Obama’s Waterloo, as then Senator Jim Demint promised, it was his Austerlitz.

Obama is now cruising into his second term with a Democratic Senate and a compliant media at his back. Meanwhile, the Republican Party is leaderless and rudderless, Jim Demint quit the Senate so he can make money scamming old people for Conservatism Inc., and the Indian-American Republican governor of South Carolina appointed an unqualified black guy so the media won’t call the GOP racist. The next day, a leading political website reported that the Republican Party’s main problem is that it is racist.

If it was not already clear, it should be clear now – there is no longer anything realistic about believing the conservative movement can achieve any of its stated goals. Conservatives frustrated with racial double standards on affirmative action, official multiculturalism, mass immigration, and political correctness are already used to contemptuous treatment by the Republican Party and “the movement.” However, even kosher conservatives worried about limited government, tax cuts, or deficit spending have nothing to look forward to. John Boehner has kept from sobbing and tanning long enough to cave on discussions for the “fiscal cliff,” and nonwhites favor greater government spending by even larger margins than they support immigration liberalization.

The brilliant Republican “consultants” who spearheaded the fearless and inspiring campaigns of John McCain in 2008 and Mitt Romney in 2012 are already hastening to sound retreat on guns, perhaps the one issue where the conservative movement has actually accomplished some good. What we are witnessing is the wholesale surrender of the conservative movement. The model to follow is therefore David Cameron’s conservatives, which changed their logo from a torch to a cartoon tree, is furiously attacking to the right, and is even supporting “anti-fascists.” 

None of this should be surprising – conservatism has never won, conservatives don’t want to win, and arguably the movement has been specifically designed in order to lose. In response, secession is once again mentioned in the political conservation, especially in Texas and the states of the Old Confederacy. While this is nothing really new (remember all the talk about seceding from “Jesusland” after Bush 2004?), what is new is the celebration of Barack Obama as symbolic of a new, non-white, and most importantly, explicitly anti-white America. Just like Hollywood, the political class is ripping off the mask and is increasingly comfortable with overt pronouncements that white people should be dispossessed, disarmed, and destroyed. We only have to look to South Africa to see what a “modern, democratic” nation can do once the demographics have shifted.

Whatever the triumphalism of the liberal scribblers, this isn’t some “new America.” It’s not America at all. It’s not even a country. It’s just some Third World freak show that rolls on and on, careening wildly from one disaster and humiliation to another.

More importantly, this is likely the best it is ever going to get. There is no possibility spending will be restricted and the burgeoning debt reduced. There is no possibility that illegal immigration will be stopped. There is no possibility that the vast system of funding for anti-white activists will be cut. It’s only going to get worse, and whites increasingly know it.

Secession and State Power

If pussyfooting around with conservatism is no longer an option, even theoretically, secession becomes the last quasi-legal hope for those opposed to unlimited liberal control. Secession cannot be simply the cry of a party out of power, or a frustrated grassroots, or a sign of cultural alienation. It’s the only way out, and it’s more realistic than donating to Rand Paul, vainly hoping that someday he’ll cut foreign aid.

That said, secession can’t just be the only way possible to achieve conservative policy goals. It is, of course, but that isn’t the point. The goal should not be to simply create some corporate utopia where workers can be casually exploited and disregarded. Not only would such a state be nightmarish, but the lust for cheap labor would promote mass immigration, and the pattern would simply repeat itself.

It also can’t just be independence in name. A new state carved out of the federal Leviathan can’t just be another colony of the banks with a pointless flag. Though the financiers are powerful, their control is not infinite. Iceland shows that a state can defy the Masters of the Universe and prosper without being crushed by some mysterious legion sent by the House of Rothschild.

The reason for secession is that we as a people need some kind of mechanism to propel forward positive societal change, financially, culturally, and demographically. This requires state power. Let us have no illusions about “individual freedom,” or “limited government,” or “constitutionalism.” Every negative individual choice made in this country, from the children ripped away from a father, to the white workers thrown out of a job, to the women murdered on the street in yet another “random” attack, is partially the product of an entire system pushing its desired outcomes. A healthy, moral life becomes more difficult every day and will eventually become impossible, and the people making it so know exactly what they are doing.

To reverse this requires force. Let us be clear – we want a state in order to use force to create a superior way of life for our people and protect them from their enemies.

What a white ethnostate can do is transcend Left and Right and reconcile the better elements of our warring parties into an actually functional society. Whatever else one may say about them, one of the most thrilling aspects about the novels of Harold Covington is its portrayal of the mundane details of a white ethnostate. An armed populace and disarmed police, efficient and environmentally friendly mass transportation, healthy food rather than mass produced garbage, intact families living happily in mortgage free houses, and quality goods produced by hard workers paid high wages are the kinds of goals that we can all understand and that are worth fighting for. Even the cultural changes he describes, from revitalized heathen and Christian religious movements, to the return of courtly dating, to fashion that promotes dignity rather than degradation – are only possible if whites are able to carve out a space for themselves.

What Paul Kersey has termed Black Run America is not capable of making the trains run on time or preventing Negroes from attacking people or even throwing their own feces. It certainly can’t do anything about mending the social fabric. Progress towards an even tolerable society requires ripping this monstrosity out of the muck, and placing it, by force, on a different track.

State power allows whites to recapture the sense of building a society, “progressivism” in its best sense. It allows us to create a feedback loop of positive action constantly generating further advances. Today, we are stuck defending the rotting inheritance of our forebears, grimly waging a slow retreat and consoling ourselves we’re making them pay for every step. To break out of that system requires breaking this system.

None of this can happen without a state. All other tendencies and activity – metapolitics, cultural societies, spiritual movements, writing, teaching, politics – are means to the end of a truly sovereign white ethnostate. I am a rebel and an anarchist in this society, because it is beyond reform, and attempting to save it from itself is sick and immoral. I am a pillar of the community in the White Republic of the future.

All societies have hierarchy and compulsion. The only question is what kind of compulsion do we want. With intelligence – and compassion – we can build a society that fits with the best elements of human nature so the hand of government is lightly felt. A sovereign state doesn’t mean an intrusive one. Given minimal support or even benevolent neglect, whites will build good societies. Even with all the forces of the tyrant aligned against them, whites are still doing the best they can, carving out a piece of heaven here and there amidst the malevolent carnival that used to be their country.

However, recognizing this doesn’t mean all white advocates have to do is throw off the yoke and then do nothing. We must set a deliberate direction for culture and society through specific government policies.

If you want strong families, you have to reform family and marriage law and create economic policies that reward good choices. If you want quality education, you have to put through policies that recognize that not everyone should be going to college and that real skills and real curriculum should be taught both at a trade school and at a liberal arts university. If you want responsible financial management by families as well as by government, you need policies that reward saving rather than constant consumption. If you want a white ethnostate to stay white, you can’t just bar nonwhite immigrants and yell racial slogans – you have to create a system that prioritizes quality products over plastic junk and skilled labor over dull-eyed helots.

All this can only come from the top. All of this requires force and state power.

Secessionists and white nationalists have to get real and get together. It’s not about petitions, protest, or proscribing certain actions of the government. It’s not about returning to a Constitution that either is working as intended (and therefore sucks) or failed (and is therefore useless). It’s about acquiring power and using it for meaningful, beneficial ends. We will use state power to make a better life for our people at the ground level and promote the upward development of the race. All the rest is a distraction.

Monday, July 30, 2018

Remembering James Burnham

                         By Hubert Collins

       

James Burnham

James Burnham died on July 28th, 1987—thirty-one years ago today, and just before the arrival of the current age. Born in a Catholic 1905, he quickly delved into Marxism in his college days. But Kapital couldn’t keep him, and he quit the party in 1940, and the next year wrote his first post-Marxist, and criminally underappreciated book, The Managerial Revolution. In brief, the book spelled out how the rulers of our day are not cliched nobles and aristocrats, nor rugged pioneers and businessmen, but the technocrats, the pencil-pushers and the “experts” behind the scenes in our ever complexifying society. That book, popular in its day, put Burnham on the map, and he wrote quite a few books thereafter: The MachiavelliansCongress and the American Tradition, and Suicide of the West to name just three. He became a titan within the burgeoning conservative movement—writing regularly for National Review and The Freeman, and reached prominence enough to be a target of George Orwell’s ire from all the way on the other side of the Atlantic. However, for all his new found glory in William F. Buckley’s posse, Burnham never “purged” his mind of his early influences like Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Vilfredo Pareto, and Gaetano Mosca—thus ensuring that his thinking always remained above the echo chamber of Republican policies and Christian morality.

Tragically, he fell from the limelight not with a bang, but a whimper. Largely debilitated by a stroke in 1978, he was largely left in the dust by his conservative colleagues, and one by one his books fell out of print. Though a recipient of the Medal of Freedom—from Ronald Reagan no less, today his mentions are few and far between, certainly nothing in comparison to his contemporaries Russell Kirk and Whittaker Chambers.

All the same, the man was a genius, and hugely influential in the paleoconservative realm, particularly Sam Francis—the intellectual godfather of the Alt Right, who wrote a monographand countless essays on him and his body of work. Burnham’s triumph was his ability to draw from his Marxist past to see the sociological realities of economics while simultaneously pondering the spirit and soul of Western Civilization in the classically conservative sense. All with an eye to power as well. Burnham knew that no amount of insightful wonkery, religious faith, or fervent ideology meant much without power—a harsh reality so many conservatives do their best to wish away.

But don’t take my word for it. Here for the 31 years he’s been gone, are 31 of his sharpest quotes.

1. Bolshevism was launched as a practical enterprise in 1903, when Lenin pieced together the Bolshevik faction during the course of the convention of the Russian Social Democratic Party that met first at Brussels, and then, on the suggestion of the Belgian police, adjourned to London. Its armament consisted of a dozen or so revolvers, possessed mostly by men who didn’t know much about using them. Its treasury was a few hundred pounds borrowed from the first bourgeois fellow traveler. Lenin—in spite of a professed belief in a materialist theory of history—didn’t allow himself to be fooled into thinking that physical resources and power were going to decide the twentieth-century destinies of empires and civilizations.


2. It is false that socialism is “the only alternative” to capitalism. It is false that capitalism will continue. It is false that socialism will replace it.


3. Since there is nothing in essential human nature to block achievement of the good society, the obstacles thereto must be, and are, extrinsic or external. The principal obstacles are, specifically, as liberalism sees them, two: ignorance—an accidental and remediable, not intrinsic and essential, state of man; and bad social institutions.


4. If we consider the problem historically, we will recall that for the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century liberal ancestors, “the state” meant a non-democratic regime in which such conservative and reactionary forces (according to their listing in the liberal lexicon) as landlords, a hereditary aristocracy, a hereditary monarch, the army and the church had weight much beyond their numerical proportion. This was true of the regime as a whole, and to a large extent even of the parliaments within the regime, which were elected on a limited, manipulated franchise, and wielded in any case only portions of the power. Such a “state” was obviously not a very promising instrument for bringing about the liberties, reforms and general prosperity which the pre-liberals sought; in fact, the active intervention of government could be expected to push, much of the time, in the opposite direction. With the gradual extension of the franchise toward universality and the transfer of sovereignty more and more fully into the hands of elective assemblies and officials, the state could be thought of as changing its character from Bad to Good or at least promising Angel. The “state” came to seem to express more and more, at least more than other institutions, the popular or general will. It was no longer outlandish for liberals to expect their democratic state to do liberalism’s work.


5. What if the government that truly embodies the democratic will of the people turns out to be a hideous tyranny, and not the free, scientific and open society of John Dewey’s turgid prose? What if his progressively reared children, unhampered by superstition, custom and traditional disciplines but left free to develop their own free natures, turn out to be not liberals but monsters — turn out to be, let us say, the delinquent monsters that today roam the cement jungles of our great cities?


6. But a renewed conservative movement, incorporating beliefs and a program consonant with the epoch’s issues, challenges, and perils, and able to rally a mass following, has not taken form and is not in sight: a Ronald Reagan might conceivably be elected President, but will not lead a resurgence of the West. The movements outside of the broad liberal-conservative spectrum that exhibit vigor and purpose aim at the destruction, not the renaissance of Western society.


7. I do not suggest that liberalism is “the cause” of the contraction and possible, on the evidence probable, death of Western civilization. I do not know what the cause is of the West’s extraordinarily rapid decline, which is most profoundly shown by the deepening loss, among the leaders of the West, of confidence in themselves and in the unique quality and value of their own civilization, and by a correlated weakening of the Western will to survive. The cause or causes have something to do, I think, with the decay of religion and with an excess of material luxury; and, I suppose, with getting tired, worn out, as all things temporal do.


8. For the liberal ideology, the domestic jungles are the merely temporary by-products of a lack of education and faulty social institutions, to be cleared up by urban renewal programs, low rents, high minimum wages and integrated schools — in which regulations forbid physical discipline, expulsion or failing to certify every student to the next higher grade each year.


9. The backward regions of the equatorial zones are only, for liberalism, enlarged slums that will be put to rights by the standard remedies: education, democracy, and welfare in the special form of foreign aid.


10. The United States is both offspring and organic part of Western civilization. The religion of the United States, its philosophies, ideals and institutions, its conceptions of man, art, science and technology — the errors and heresies as well as the truths — are all derived from common Western roots, with merely local and secondary variations. The Western heritage is given once and for all, indissolubly; there is no parliament that can authorize the nations of the West to renounce their title, no matter how ardently or basely they may yearn to join an anonymous common humanity. They either remain Western or cease to be. Thus the United States can find its destiny only in and through Western civilization, not outside or against the West.


11. When the rural population becomes “radical” in large numbers, it does not turn typically to liberalism in the modern sense but to less polished, wilder and more violent doctrines and programs: to cheap money panaceas, rural anarchism, communism, vigilantism, racial and religious “hate” movements, and for that matter fascism.


12. It makes a certain amount of sense for a Hegelian to speak of the historic guilt of this or that race or empire, or the moral claim of that people; but it makes no logical sense for a liberal to do so.


13. When the Western liberal’s feeling of guilt and his associated feeling of moral vulnerability before the sorrows and demands of the wretched become obsessive, he often develops a generalized hated of Western civilization and of his own country as part of the West. We can frequently sense this hatred in paragraphs of such American magazines as The Nationand Dissent, Britain’s New Statesman, France’s L’Express or Germany’s Der Spiegel.


14. The liberal community not only flagellates itself with the abusive writings of a disoriented Negro homosexual, but awards him money, fame and public honors. The spokesmen of the Black Muslim can openly preach racial hatred, violence and insurrection to their heart’s content, with never a challenge from police, courts or the self-appointed guardians of civil liberties. The guilt of the liberal is insatiable. He deserves, by his own judgment, to be kicked, slapped and spat on for his infinite crimes. The shooting of a Negro in Mississippi, purportedly the act of a crazed and isolated white man, reverberates from liberal sounding boards into weeks of world headlines; the shooting of white men in Maryland by rioting Negro gangs slides back into an obscure and unread paragraph. The truncheons of hard-pressed police struggling to preserve the minimum elements of public order against unloosed chaos become Satanic pitchforks; the rocks and broken bottles of the mob, angelic swords. The force that blocks an entrance to a factory which a union leadership has declared on strike is a courageous defense of the rights of man; the force that might seek to use that entrance for its intended and lawful purpose is a cowardly blow by the hirelings of the privileged.


15. The guilt of the liberal causes him to feel obligated to try to do something about any and every social problem, to cure every social evil. This feeling, too, is non-rational: the liberal must try to cure the evil even if he has no knowledge of the suitable medicine or, for that matter, of the nature of the disease; he must do something about the social problem even when there is no objective reason to believe that what he does can solve the problem — when, in fact, it may well aggravate the problem instead of solving it.


16. It has been more than once remarked that modern liberalism, as manifest within the relatively privileged strata of Western society, bears, only lightly concealed, a heavy burden of Guilt. To uncover a layer of guilt inside the liberal breast is not, to be sure, a startling discovery. Guilt seems to be an emotion, feeling, idea, conviction — whatever it is to be called — that is very widely distributed among men. If one were not committed to a denial of any permanent human nature, one might almost conclude that it is part of man’s essence.


17. No theory, no promises, no morality, no amount of good will, no religion will restrain power. Neither priests nor soldiers, neither labor leaders nor businessmen, neither bureaucrats nor feudal lords will differ from each other in the basic use which they will seek to make of power.


18. For Nietzsche, the supermen were not the conquerors and rulers, who were in fact often as much slaves of convention and prejudice as the servile masses, but above all the supreme poets and artists, the prophets, and the wilder of the saints…. Supermen are more dangerous than H-bombs. The world can’t digest many of them, but it would be a drearier place if there weren’t any.


19. The generalized feeling of guilt toward mass wretchedness and oppression is so widespread today and so pervasive a characteristic of public rhetoric that many persons do not realize it to be a rather new arrival in history. Comparatively few people felt this sort of guilt before the present century, and virtually no one before the second half of the eighteenth century, though there has never been any lack of wretched and oppressed in this world. Nor is a feeling of guilt the only motivation there has been and can be for the attempt to improve the condition of the poor. The hardy breed of Calvinist-slanted early bourgeois, or bourgeois-minded, felt plenty of guilt, but none over the poor and wretched who, their doctrine told them convincingly, had only their own shiftlessness and extravagance to blame for their troubles.


20. The liberal’s feeling of guilt at the condition of the wretched and oppressed is irrational; irrational precisely from the point of view of the liberal ideology itself. According to liberal doctrine, the poverty and oppression are the result of ignorance and faulty institutions handed down from the past; they are none of my doing. Why then should I feel that any guilt attaches to me, individually and personally, because there are poor and the enslaved?


21. It is not necessary for me to go in person to the slum, jungle, prison, Southern restaurant, state house or voting precinct and there take a direct hand in accomplishing the reform that will unblock the road to peace, justice and well-being. Thanks to the reassuring provisions of liberal ideology, I can go about my ordinary business and meanwhile take sufficient account of my moral duties by affirming my loyalty to the correct egalitarian principles, voting for the correct candidates, praising the activists and contributing to their defense funds when get into trouble, and joining promptly in the outcry against reactionaries, who pop up now and then in a desperate effort to preserve power and privilege.


22. Americans have not yet learned the tragic lesson that the most powerful cannot be loved—hated, envied, feared, obeyed, respected, even honored perhaps, but not loved.


23. The principles of an organized society cannot be interpreted in such a way as to make organized society impossible… . Any individual right or freedom is properly extended only to those who accept the fundamental rules of democracy. How … could any society survive which deliberately nursed its own avowed and irreconcilable assassin, and freely exposed its heart to his knife?


24. Proclaiming a fight against power and privilege, Russia at home drives a great gulf between a stratum of the immensely powerful, the vastly privileged, and the great masses of the people. The only country “with no material foundation for imperialism,” in theory, shows itself in practice, brutally and — for a while at least — successfully imperialistic. The “fatherland of the world’s oppressed” sends tens of thousands to death by the firing squad, puts millions, literally millions, into exile, the concentration camp, and the forced labor battalions, and closes its doors to the refugees from other lands. The one country “genuinely against war” performs the act that starts the second world war. The nation “dedicated to the improvement of labor’s conditions” invents, in Stakhanovism, the most intense form of speedup known. The government which denounced the League of Nations as a “den of brigands” enters the League and becomes its most ardent champion. The state which asked the peoples of the world to form a popular front of democracies to stop aggressors overnight walks from the camp of the democracies to that of their sworn and mortal enemies. And yet, in spite of the reiterated predictions, from friends and enemies, of its quick downfall, the regime has endured, without a break, for more than twenty-three years.


25. The ideological movement has gone both ways: just as liberalism shifted toward socialism in its doctrine of the state and its economics, so has the reformist or democratic wing of traditional socialism shifted toward liberalism. The two have come close to meeting in the concept of what has come to be called “the Welfare State”; and there they meet up also with still other currents from radicalism, Christian socialism and even “modern,” as it is sometimes designated, conservatism.


26. From the point of view of the theory of the ruling class, a society is the society of its ruling class. A nation’s strength or weakness, its culture, its powers of endurance, its prosperity, its decadence, depend in the first instance upon the nature of its ruling class. More particularly, the way in which to study a nation, to understand it, to predict what will happen to it, requires first of all and primarily an analysis of the ruling class. Political history and political science are thus predominantly the history and science of ruling classes, their origin, development, composition, structure, and changes.


27. The complex division of labor, the flow of trade and raw materials made possible and demanded by modern technology, were strangled in the network of diverse tariffs, laws, currencies, passports, boundary restrictions, bureaucracies, and independent armies. It has been clear for some while that these were going to be smashed; the only problem was who was going to do it and when.


28. Everywhere, men will have to line up with one or the other of the super-states of tomorrow. There will not be room for smaller sovereign nations; nor will the less advanced peoples be able to stand up against the might of the metropolitan areas. Of course, polite fictions of independence may be preserved for propaganda purposes; but it is the reality and not the name of sovereignty about which we are talking.


29. Liberalism is the ideology of western suicide. When once this initial and final sentence is understood, everything about liberalism-the beliefs, emotions and values associated with it, the nature of its enchantment, its practical record, its future falls into place.


30. Congress, with occasional petty rebellions, sank lower and lower as sovereignty shifted from the parliament toward the bureaus and agencies. One after another, the executive bureaus took into their hands the attributes and functions of sovereignty; the bureaus became the de facto “lawmakers.” By 1940 it was plain that Congress no longer possessed even the war-making power, the crux of sovereignty. The constitutional provision could not stand against the structural changes in modern society and in the nature of modern war; the decisions about war and peace had left the control of the parliament. Time after time this last fact was flung publicly in the face of Congress—by the holdup of the Bremen, the freezing of foreign balances in accordance with policies never submitted to Congress, the dispatch of confidential personal emissaries in the place of regular diplomatic officials, the release of military supplies and secrets to belligerent powers, outstandingly by the executive trade of destroyers for naval bases and by the provisions of the ‘lend-lease’ plan (and by all that these two acts implied). The parliament had so far lost even its confidence that it did not dare protest.


31. The central truth is the insight that there is no adequate rational explanation for the existence and effective working of government, much less for good or fairly good government. (I rule out of the definition of “government” a dominion exercised directly and exclusively by physical strength—a social form which by the nature of the case cannot exist in a group that contains more than three or four human beings.) The universality of this insight is really attested by the scientific writers on society as much as by the ancients. Without exception they too introduce a myth in order to explain the origin of the City. The only difference is that post-Renaissance scientists use a less picturesque language. Instead of Cecrops or Minos or Romulus, they write of a “state of nature” (benign or horrific), an isolated Island with first one and then more than one resident, “primitive communism,” the Dialectic, “challenge and response,” the Zeitgeist, and a host of other mythic entities that have no substantial reality outside of the scientists’ own lively but shamefaced imaginations. . . . Moreover, apart from a few gross and almost self-evident cases, no one has found a purely rational theory to explain why some governments, though very different from each other, do well, whereas others, though closely similar, do badly. When you drop scientist ideology, it becomes clear that you cannot explain the success of some and the failure of other governments without including a non-rational factor that we call, according to our metaphysical habits, chance, luck, accident, magic, or Providence. . . . Government is then in part, though only in part, non-rational. Neither the source nor the justification of government can be put in wholly rational terms. This is and must be so because the problem of government is, strictly speaking, insoluble; and yet it is solved. The double fact, though real and part of historical life, is a paradox.

I Will Not Become My Father

                           By Jef Costello

        


When my father died last month, we had not spoken since Christmas. A few terse emails were exchanged, but that was it. You see, over Christmas dinner my father had revealed that he was contributing money to the SPLC. This didn’t exactly sit well with me. What do you say to your closest relative when he announces that he is financially supporting your worst, most loathsome enemies?

I tried saying exactly that. I tried explaining that the SPLC is a racket that has smeared friends of mine, and would gladly attempt to destroy me (if they figured out who I really am). But my attempts were half-hearted, as I knew there was little chance I would change my father’s mind. There was also no chance of my not taking the whole matter personally – since my father was fully aware of my views, and of the company I keep. So mostly I spent the rest of our Christmas dinner (at a Thai restaurant, of all places) staring silently at my massaman curry.

Yes, my father turned into a liberal in his old age – a very unlikely liberal. Born in the South in the 1930s, an Eagle Scout, a graduate of a prestigious military academy, and a retired career military officer, my father didn’t exactly fit the profile of the typical Democratic voter. And, indeed, he voted Republican for much of his life. But in his last few years things started to go radically wrong. He began parroting the talking points of talking heads: “Russia hacked the election!” he told me at Thanksgiving in 2016. He despised Trump (partly, he said, because of his hair). He admired figures like Rachel Maddow and Stephen Colbert. He received junk mail from Chuck Schumer and Doctors Without Borders. And so on. Christ, it was bad. And baffling.

I returned home after what I came to think of as the SPLC Christmas with a great deal of anger, and the vague imperative that I needed to somehow find a way to deal with this if we were going to continue to have a relationship. But I would be lying if I didn’t admit that I had little desire to see my father again. The donations to Morris Dees felt like the final straw. I knew I would have to somehow overcome that, and I had enough self-awareness to realize that my anger actually had roots that went very deep. I caught myself taking pleasure in an imagined conversation in which I told him that next year I would be spending Christmas elsewhere. And just a few days after confiding all this to a close friend, I got a call in the middle of the night informing me that my father’s neighbors had found him dead in his unlocked house.

Yes, I’m just superstitious and guilty enough to think that this was my punishment. I had allowed politics to come between us, and had dithered about finding some way to repair our relationship. Now I would never get the chance. His neighbors informed me he had been going through a weeks-long period of deterioration, leading up to his death. My father had told me nothing about this; he had not alerted me that anything was wrong. The Bad Thoughts were thus inevitable: in response to my coldness, he had given up hope. Feeling himself now totally alone, he had allowed himself to die. Blah, blah, blah. When I first heard of his death I immediately worried that it had been suicide, partly because that was the death his own father had chosen. I was relieved when I found out that the cause was a heart attack. And my more reasonable side stepped in after a while to remind me of my father’s mean streak, which co-existed (especially in his last years) with a folksy, mellow benevolence that was sometimes real and sometimes merely a mask. I thus considered the possibility that he had kept me in the dark about his deterioration and imminent death as a last act of spite. It was a slim possibility, but you’d think it halfway plausible if you had known him.

The truth is that while the political stuff was bad, our relationship had frayed for other reasons as well. You see, in the last years of his life my father became a hoarder of truly epic proportions. A hoarder worthy of his own reality show. A hoarder of an unusual and perversely fascinating type. And I was inclined to think that the shift in his views to the loony Left was only one part of a general mental decline. It took four weeks of my life to completely sort through all of his possessions, working sun up to sun down. And the more I uncovered, the more it became apparent to me that my father was – to put the matter as delicately as possible – not entirely sound. Functional, but . . .

As I mentioned, my father had had a distinguished military career, during which he was the very model of neatness, organization, and efficiency. Being the son of such a man was no fun. My father was typical of many military dads in that he brought his work home with him. And as his assignments became more important, and his responsibilities greater, he became prone to venting his frustrations at home. There was abuse, some physical but mostly emotional. For the bulk of my childhood and adolescence, I felt no warmth for my father. And I loathed the military. I spent the first seventeen years of my life in that environment, and found it all gray-drab and joyless. It was only years later that I realized it had had any positive effect on me at all.

The military has a funny way of encouraging men in thinking that once they’re done with it they never have to live up to any standards again. The father of one of my best friends likes to say, when bidden to exercise by his doctors, “I swore when I left the Marine Corps I would never exercise again!” “I’ve done my bit,” is the philosophy of a lot of these men, and once they retire they often turn to lives devoted, in some fashion or other, to a benign self-centered self-indulgence. Had my parents stayed married, my father might have been spared this fate, but my mother divorced him several years after he retired, unable any longer to endure his volatility and uncommunicativeness. It was after my mother died, and he no longer had to pay her a fat monthly alimony check, that my father began his steep decline.

In a rare moment of frankness, and self-reflection, my father once told me that the divorce had severely depressed him. He began dealing with this by cultivating various hobbies, some of which were revivals of interests he had had as a boy, and then given up. On one level, this showed some real psychological insight on his part: he was consciously dealing with depression and loneliness by reconnecting with things that had made him happy in the past. For example, he was fascinated by old postcards. So, with great earnestness, he began collecting them, and, for a while, this was his obsession. When my father chose to cultivate some interest, he didn’t do things halfway. In the end, thousands of dollars were spent on postcards, all of which were carefully placed in protective, plastic sleeves in large binders – and all carefully cataloged in endless lists he kept on his computer.

Making lists was one of my father’s specialties. I had long thought that he had learned this in the military, but it became clear to me over time that it was somehow a part of his makeup, for which the military had simply found a good use. Thus, the desk he kept in his living room was literally covered in stacks of lists. And not just of the postcard collection. For example, there were stacks of steno pads filled with hundreds of usernames and passwords. He never used a password twice. Security’s got to be tight! All of them were randomly generated strings of characters, and all got changed periodically. It was like he thought he was guarding the launch codes to the Doomsday Machine.

Once all the postcards had been duly filed and cataloged, they were placed in carefully labeled banker’s boxes (my father had beautifully legible, draftsman’s handwriting). And then they were deposited in storage units and never seen again. Eventually he acquired six such units, all of which became packed to the gills with his collections. He was paying more a month for those units than he was paying on his mortgage. Mind you, he had only rented the units as a matter of necessity, once his house had become completely filled. And when I say “completely filled,” I mean that all available space was occupied either with furniture or with stacks of various kinds, including stacks of boxes. His spare bedroom was so jam packed it was impossible to walk in the door. The basement was entirely filled. And his bedroom looked entirely filled, until one realized that the bed was surrounded by boxes, as if he had built himself a fort.

Once my father tired of the postcards, he graduated to other hobbies. For example, he collected model planes and ships. So many, in fact, that they filled around one hundred and fifty boxes, occupying two storage units. Other collections were intrinsically less impressive. He went through a period in the ’90s when he was videotaping everything on television that interested him. Four VCRs were set up to record all day long. He quickly accumulated more than he had time to watch. And so the tapes were carefully packed into carefully labeled bankers boxes (all alphabetized by title: “A-B, “B-C,” etc.) and whisked off to the storage units, where they remained unplayed, until I threw them all out.

Some of the items in the units were covered with close to an inch of dust, in some cases packed with newspapers dating back to the 1970s. In fact, there was so much dust that a friend who volunteered to help me sort through them had a severe allergic reaction and had to quit. In all honesty, I was content to go through the units alone, as I had high hopes I might find an epic porn collection. I imagined my father as another Ralph Whittington, the celebrated “King of Porn.” Sadly, I found that he had put a lot less effort into this area. Still, what he had (all DVDs and VHS tapes) was carefully inventoried in long lists: name of film, names of performers, number of scenes, etc. (These lists were the first things to go into the trash once I had access to his place.)

When the storage units were entirely filled, my father at some point apparently faced a crisis: his mess kept growing, but he had nowhere to put it. He must have ruled out the possibility of renting a seventh unit, because he started stacking boxes outdoors, behind the house. He had a neighbor help him cover them with a water-proof tarp. What items of importance did I find in those boxes? Mostly old mail and obsolete electronic equipment. Without any irony, the boxes of old mail were labeled “To Be Sorted and Culled.” It was this discovery, more than anything else, that forced me to confront the issue of my father’s sanity. What kind of process led to this man thinking “I just have no alternative but to stack all that old mail behind the house and get somebody to help me cover it up so it’ll be safe . . .”? Was there any moment at which he considered that it might be better to just throw it away? Apparently not. And what kind of “friend” would help him cover that mess in a tarp, and carefully tie it up with inscrutable nautical knots?

In the end it took four days and just as many crews to completely empty his house and the units. This is not counting the day I transported a truck full of his stuff back to my place. I kept quite a few mementos of his military career, and all family-related items (including photos, some of which dated back to the 1890s). The collections, all except the lonely, unwanted VHS tapes, were sold to dealers. And the rest was simply hauled away as trash. This included the centerpiece of the sad, strange world my father had created: an old, stained recliner of indeterminate color. Never was I so happy to see a piece of furniture sitting on the curb.

Once everything was gone, another layer of the mess was exposed – and, it seemed, another layer of my father’s madness. I had known for several years that he had a mouse problem. I would see the traps when I visited him, and sometimes watch as he baited them with peanut butter. On one occasion I actually saw a mouse: a little gray blur in my peripheral vision, darting around a piece of furniture. My father explained that it was a general problem in the neighborhood, and that he had it under control. This turned out to be far from true. For when all the debris was removed, there were mouse droppings literally everywhere – even behind the pots on the kitchen counter. Crumbs had fallen beneath an old toaster, unmoved for years, and the mice had dined on them and left their poop there. Underneath one cabinet were the remains of several candy bars. The mice had apparently spirited some fallen candy away and eaten it under the cabinet, again leaving their feces behind as a sort of calling card. Several banker’s boxes had been invaded by mice, and some of the old mail had been shredded to form nests.

I had no idea of the extent of the filth until the place was emptied. Despite the egregious clutter, everything seemed “clean” to me whenever I would visit. His house had an antiseptic, hotel-like smell to it. And my father himself was always well groomed and neatly dressed. In my mind, the mouse poop quickly became emblematic of what disturbed me most about the whole situation. Here was a person who, on the surface, was a model of organization, efficiency, planning, and dutifulness. But beneath the surface he was a mess.

There were other things as well – little things, that seemed in retrospect like more pieces of the puzzle. For instance, there were his neurotic driving habits. He had a morbid fixation that people standing on street corners were going to run out in front of his car and be hit. So he would stop and wave at them to cross – often well before they were ready to, much to their consternation. And when stop lights turned yellow he would SLAM on the brakes, for fear he might be caught by a traffic camera and sent a ticket. Several times when I was with him he was almost hit from behind by cars following a little too closely.

This was all evidence of “OCD,” a psychologist of my acquaintance has suggested. And he had more to say. Upon hearing a description of my father’s collecting and listing, and his walls covered in nothing but pictures of machines (planes, helicopters, ships), my friend was ready to locate him somewhere on the “autism spectrum.” That made a lot of sense to me. But what about the hoarding? What about the irrational retention of old mail, VHS tapes, old clothes, electric fans, obsolete electronic equipment, post-it notes, rubber bands, markers, file folders, etc.? An anxiety disorder was the suggestion. When he contemplated throwing something away, he experienced anxiety: “But what if I need this?”

And anxiety could also explain his political views. He had lived all his life with the idealistic smarm about our land of “all races, creeds, and colors” – drummed into him from wartime propaganda, the Boy Scouts, and the military. But I suspected he was well aware that all of that was unraveling, and that “diversity” had shown itself to be a curse and not a blessing. A lot of old people reach a point where they need to believe that everything is going to go on just the same way after they die, and that all will be well. What my father saw with his own eyes in today’s America, and what I relentlessly reported to him, must have been terrifying. In talking to him about my own beliefs, I assumed he was honest and open. Big mistake. And if I had it all to do over again, I would have let him slumber peacefully.

In the end, my father reacted to his repressed horror at what America had become by digging in his heels, and adopting a radical version of American civic nationalism. He was very much like a religious man beset by doubts who reacts by going full fundamentalist. Indeed, it might actually have helped if he’d had a genuine religion to turn to – like his brother, who in his old age became a lay preacher. But my father was sort of a flat-souled skeptic who reflexively blamed “religion” for the world’s problems. The only thing in his will that went beyond standard boilerplate was a request that no religious service should be held at his gravesite. He couldn’t strive upward so he strove outward, filling more and more space with things he couldn’t take with him. Appropriately, there was a Scrooge-like aspect to my father as well. He spent thousands of dollars each month on storage units, toys, and clothes (did I mention the huge wardrobe stored in boxes, much of it still in plastic wrappers?). Yet he drove around town looking for the cheapest gas prices and insisted on doing his own taxes. If only he had been visited by Marley’s ghost and the rest of the crew.

As an explanation for the hoarding, an “anxiety disorder” sounds tame enough, until you concretize it and remember that he was putting a tarp over boxes of old catalogs and VCRs because he “might need them.” This was just deranged. And there’s no way around this. I’d like to find a way, because this was my own father. His loss and its aftermath were difficult on multiple levels. First, there was the intense resentment at having to clean up this irresponsible mess. This was a reaction I knew in advance I would have, and that I’m sure he knew I would have. But somehow that wasn’t enough of a motivator for him to do something, even a little something, about the shambles his living situation had become. However, my resentment alternated with pity. I would go from cursing him as I tripped over stacks of catalogs, to intoning, with a sigh, “my poor father” as I uncovered yet another sad, strange list. How could someone who was once so shipshape and squared away have been reduced to this? There was no getting around what a sad end it was.

And he knew it. In the days and weeks following his death just about every friend and neighbor I spoke with reported that he would never let them into his house. I even found out that he had had a girlfriend for a while, but she broke things off because he would not let her into his place. I found a letter he had written to her on his computer and made the mistake of reading it. The letter began, “Dear Evelyn, I’m very sorry about my behavior at the Cheesecake Factory the other night, but I was never very good at talking about my feelings . . .” Instantly, I could reconstruct the whole scene in my mind, based on his relationship with my own mother. Poor Evelyn had pressed him a bit on some emotional matter and, feeling threatened, he had lost control of himself, blown up at her, and felt miserable about it later. It was just the sort of thing that had ruined his marriage. He was aware of that, and felt tremendous guilt over it – all of which came out when my mother was dying, years after the divorce.

So why couldn’t he have avoided doing it again? Why couldn’t he control himself? Why did he have to fall into the same mechanical pattern, like one of the machines that fascinated him? The truth is that he was probably wondering the same thing. And sifting through the wreckage of my father’s life made me think long and hard about the issue of my own freedom of will. My father doesn’t seem to have been able to help being who he was. Over and over again, as I vacuumed up the mouse poop, I asked myself whether I was headed for the same fate. One evening I had a nightmare that I had finished at my father’s and returned to my own apartment, only to find it intolerably dim. I acquired a sack full of light-bulbs and as I installed them and switched them on, I saw to my horror that my own place was filled with boxes and trash, and crawling with rats.

Like most of us on the Right, I’m a great believer in the explanatory power of genetics. And while I wouldn’t call myself a strict genetic determinist, I do believe that a great deal about us that we imagine we choose is actually genetically fixed. But now this theory struck a bit too close to home. I began feeling like the main character in H. P. Lovecraft’s “The Shadow Over Innsmouth,” who is horrified to discover that he is actually descended from the “fish people” he abhors, but then gradually feels himself identifying with them, becoming one with them: “Some frightful influence, I felt, was seeking gradually to drag me out of the sane world of wholesome life into unnamable abysses of blackness and alienage; and the process told heavily on me.” Am I headed for hoarding, and listing, and pretending I don’t notice the mouse poop? Is this the abyss of blackness and alienage that awaits me? Or will my fate be still more cromulent?

As I drove a truck full of my father’s things, all in labeled banker’s boxes, back to my place I began to wonder if I wasn’t inviting “the cursed hoard” into my life. Should I have thrown more of the old dragon’s stuff away? No, I thought, I only kept what I had to: items of value, sentimental or otherwise. Of course, I immediately realized that this was exactly the sort of thing my father told himself. I began to develop an irrational aversion to the stuff, feeling I had to keep it but not wanting to touch it; washing my hands every so often, after handling the boxes. It was probably the mouse poop association. And would I even have room for the stuff in my place? (It turned out I did.) A “helpful” friend suggested I simply rent a storage unit. “But that’s how it begins!” I shouted in response, horrified at the suggestion. I made a vow then and there that I would never acquire so much stuff that I needed to “store” it. I re-read D. H. Lawrence’s short story “Things.” And, yes, I heard Tyler Durden in my head: “The things you own, end up owning you.”

This was one of the lessons I have taken away from the whole experience. In many ways, my parents were both very fine individuals, and on the whole I received a much better upbringing than most people. I have to credit them – especially my mother – with much of what I’d like to think of as my “good points.” But, at the same time, they were damnably difficult and flawed people. In addition to all the good examples my parents gave me, they also did me a great service in providing examples of how I did not want to be. Many was the time I would react to something they said or did by thinking, “Gee, this is not how I want to turn out.” And my father’s final legacy to me was the most disturbing and effective cautionary tale I could ever have received.

Yes, I do believe that genetics shapes who we are. In certain ways, genetics determines us outright, and without wiggle room. In other ways, it merely inclines us in certain directions. I do see the seeds of my father’s madness in me: the OCD, the Asperger’s, the irrational anxieties. But the significant difference between me and my father seems to be just that I see these things. Yes, I imagine he had moments of self-awareness too. In fact, I know he did. When I first discovered the extent of my father’s hoard, while he was still alive, I was appalled and blurted out “You’re crazy!” “Probably, yes,” he responded, sheepishly. But such moments of clarity didn’t seem to amount to anything.

Now and then, I see myself trending in the same directions as my father, whenever, for example, I hesitate before throwing old mail away. But now I’ve seen where it could all lead. And while genetics is a powerful influence, so is will. I believe in the power of will, and in the power of consciousness. In other words, I believe that if we can see our habits and our tendencies, we’ve already achieved a certain distance from them. And that distance allows us to resist. I know several people who have no willpower at all – who are often well aware of their problems, but powerless to do anything about them. I’m not that kind of person. I have a strong will, and I do not shrink from self-criticism (quite the contrary, in fact).

However, the lessons here don’t reduce simply to an imperative to avoid hoarding and listing through sheer force of will. Another aspect to my father’s decline is one I have not heretofore remarked on, but which may now be obvious to my readers: the utter triviality of his concerns. His decline was not all an issue of unchecked accumulation. It also had to do with the completely trivial nature of his interests and preoccupations. My psychologist friend told me, “As people age, their worlds shrink.” I’ll say. By the end, my father had been positively miniaturized – like Stephen Boyd in Fantastic Voyage. A life devoted to accumulating postcards and toys, keeping careful lists, and tucking them all out of sight where they couldn’t even be enjoyed.

By contrast, I’ve devoted my life to things that matter – and I don’t see that changing in my old age. My father had a meaningful life at one time, but, as I’ve said, that all went out the window when he left the military and decided to devote himself to acquisitiveness. I suppose there’s something poetically appropriate about that: after years of safeguarding the pursuit of “the American Dream,” perhaps he just decided to start living it. By contrast, what makes my life meaningful is doing what I can to save my race and my culture – and I would go so far as to say that there is nothing more important than the cause I have chosen. What makes my life meaningful are precisely the commitments that, unfortunately, so frightened and scandalized my father. (“I think you’re sick!” he shouted at me once. Oh, the irony . . . )

In the end, this redeems whatever mess I leave behind. My heirs (both of them comrades in the Movement) might be left with a few stacks of old mail, but as they toss it into trash bags they will say, “Yes, but he helped save the white race.” They may not know what to do with my collection of Dark Shadows memorabilia, but as they list it on eBay they will say, “Yes, but he wrote for Counter-Currents.” Indeed, when moving the furniture they might even find some mouse droppings (though I doubt this). But as they vacuum it up they will say, “Yes, but after all, he wrote The Importance of James Bond & Other Essays and Heidegger in Chicago. And he wrote even more important stuff under other pen names . . . .”

In the end, it doesn’t matter if we make a big mess, so long as we do it in the name of something big. So long as we believe in something important, and fight for something that matters – and keep on doing that, until the end. So long as we stay big, and don’t shrink. But I’m going to manage to do this without making a mess that burdens my heirs. My father’s final years cannot have been particularly happy. I hope he rests in peace. But as God is my witness, I will not become him.

Sunday, July 29, 2018

The Rights of Man

                         By Maurice Bardèche

        

Translated by George F. Held

Editor’s Note:

The following excerpt from Maurice Bardèche’s Nuremberg ou la Terre promise(Nuremberg, or The Promised Land) (Paris: Les Sept Couleurs, 1948) prophesies that the ideology of universal human rights enshrined at Nuremberg would lead to a New World Order in which European man is destroyed through miscegenation and non-white immigration and a mongrelized and enslaved humanity is ruled by a Jewish technocratic elite. The title is editorial.

When we think of a human person, we see a father with his children around him, with his children around his table, in a room on his farm, and he shares soup and bread with them, or in a house in the suburbs, and there is nowhere he’s so well off as on his farm, or in his fourth floor apartment, or in his house in the suburbs, and he returns from work and he asks what happened that day; or he is in his workshop, and he shows to his little boy how one properly makes a board, how one passes one’s hand over the board to check that the work is good.

It is this human person whom we defend and respect, this human person and no other, and all that belongs to him, his children, his house, his work, his field. And we say that this human person has the right that his children’s bread be assured, that his house be inviolable, that his work be honored, that his field belong to him.

That his children’s bread be assured, that means that a Negro, an Asian, or a Semite will not dispute with him about the place to which he has a right inside the city, and that he will not be obliged someday, in order to live, to be the proletarian and the slave of a foreigner.

That his house be inviolable, that means that he will be able to think what he wants and say what he wants, that he will be the Master at his table and the Master in his house, that he will be protected if he obeys the edicts of the prince, and that the Negro, the Asian, or the Semite will not appear in front of his door to explain to him what it is necessary to think and to invite him to follow them to prison.

That his work be honored, that means that he will meet with the men of his trade, those whom he calls his partners or his colleagues, as he wants, and that he will have the right to say that his work is hard, that the chair which he is making is worth so many pounds of bread, that each hour of his work is worth so many pounds of bread, that he has the right also to live, that is, not to wear worn-out shoes and torn clothing, to have his own radio if he so desires, to have his own house if he puts money aside for that, his own car if he succeeds in his work, the share of luxury that our machines owe him, and that the Negro, the Asian, or the Semite will not fix at Winnipeg or Pretoria the price of his day’s work and the menu at his table.

And that his field belong to him, that means that he has the right to call himself the master of this house which his grandfather built, master of this city which his grandfather and those of the other men of the city built, that no one has the right to drive him out of his residence or out of the council house and that the foreign workmen whose grandfathers were not there when they built the belfry, the Negroes, the Asians, and the Semites who work in the mine or who sell at the crossroads will not have at all the power to decide the destiny of his little boy.

That is what we call the rights of the human person, and we say that the duty of the sovereign is nothing other than to ensure respect for these essential rights, and to manage his nation well, like a good father of a family as the rental leases say, like a father leads his family; that the laws are nothing other than wise rules, rules known by all, written with the help of the counsel of qualified men, posted on walls and sovereign; and that these rights, without which there is no city, must be defended by force if necessary, and in all cases by an effective protection.

As one can see, we are in favor, we also, of the defense of the human person. But in these terms. And not in the sense understood by the Court. It is simply a matter of understanding oneself [de se comprendre].

This man of the earth and the cities, this man who has been man as long as there have been peoples and cities, it is precisely he that Nuremberg condemns and repudiates. For the new law says to him:

You will be a citizen of the world; you yourself will also be packaged and dehydrated; you will not listen anymore to the rustle of your trees and the voice of your bells, but you will learn to hear the voice of the universal conscience; shake the dirt [terre] from your shoes, peasant; this land [terre] is nothing anymore; she soils, she obstructs, she prevents one from making pretty packagings.

Modern times have come. Listen to the voice of modern times. The Polish laborer who changes jobs 12 times a year is the same man as you; the Jewish rag-hawker who has just arrived from Korotcha or Jitomir is the same man as you; they have the same rights as you on your land [terre] and on your city; respect the Negro, O peasant. They have the same rights as you, and you will set places for them at your table and they will enter into the council where they will teach you what the universal conscience says, which you do not yet hear as well as you should. And their sons will be respected men [des messieurs], and they will be established as judges over your sons; they will govern your city and they will buy your field, for the universal conscience gives them expressly all these rights.

As for you, peasant, if you meet with your friends and long for the time when one saw only local boys at the city fair, know that you are opposing the universal conscience and that the law does not protect you against that.

For such, in truth, is the condition of man after the demotion of fatherlands. One perforce supports regimes that make cities wide open to strangers. One demands that these foreigners receive the same rights as the inhabitants of the country, and one condemns solemnly every attempt at discrimination. Then, one recognizes as legitimate only one manner of deliberation: that which is purely numerical. Under this system, what city will not be, in a given time, overcome by a peaceful conquest, swamped by an occupying army without uniforms and offered finally to the reign of foreigners?

The end result is thus attained. National differences will be little by little annihilated. International law will establish itself so much better than native law that the latter will no more have defenders. The national administrations which we were just describing take on in this perspective their true meaning: the States will be no more than administrative districts of a single Empire. And, from one end of the world to the other, in perfectly similar cities (since they will have been rebuilt after bombardments), there will live under similar laws a bastard population, a race of indefinable and gloomy slaves, without genius, without instinct, without voice.

Dehydrated man will reign in a hygienic world. Immense bazaars echoing the sounds of record-players will symbolize this race of men of equal worth [à prix unique]. Rolling sidewalks will run alongside the streets. They will transport every morning to their slave work the long line of the men without faces, and they will bring them back in the evening. And this will be the promised land.

They will not know anymore, these users of the rolling sidewalks, that there was formerly a human condition. They will not know what were our cities, when they were our cities: no more than we can imagine what was Ghent or Bruges at the time of the aldermen. They will be astonished that the earth was beautiful and that we loved it passionately. For them, the universal conscience, clean, theoretical, and die-cut in disks, will illuminate their skies. But this will be the promised land.

And above will reign in fact the Human Person, the one for whom this war was waged, the one who invented this law. For at last, no matter what one says, there is a Human Person. And this is not the Germans of the Volga, nor the people in the Baltics, nor is it the Chinese or the Malagasy; it’s not the Annamese or the Czechs; and of course it’s not the proletariat.

The Human Person, we know very well what this is. This term has all its signification only (one can even say that it only has signification, in the sense understood by the Court) if it refers to a stateless individual, who was born in a Krakow suburb, who suffered under Hitler, was interned, is not dead, and has nonetheless been resurrected . . . in the form of a French, Belgian, or Luxembourg patriot, on whom we are invited to bestow all our respect and adoration.

The Human Person, in addition, is usually provided with an international passport, an authorization to export, a tax exemption, and the right to requisition apartments. We might add that the Human Person, so defined, is most especially the agent [dépositaire] of the universal conscience: he is, so to speak, its electoral urn.

For this role he possesses organs of an exquisite sensitivity which other men lack: thus in a country where he has just arrived, he designates with certainty the true patriots and detects at a great distance the organisms which stubbornly resist the vibrations of the universal conscience. Accordingly these precious gifts are used as is appropriate before public opinion.[1] All their vibratory reactions are carefully recorded, and the total of these vibrations constitutes what one calls at a given moment the indignation or the approval of the universal conscience. They are what formulate finally the dogma which we already mentioned and which has as its title: defense of the human person.

It follows that the defense of the human person, in the sense understood by the Court, is a sort of mathematical truth, almost analogous to the Rule of Three.[2] One can express it thus:

Whoever is stateless and born at Krakow resides within the universal community, and every act which scratches or bruises them resounds deeply within the breast of the human conscience; to the extent that your specific definition distances you from being stateless in character and Krakowian in origin, you separate yourself from the universal community, and to that extent what bruises you has no longer a corresponding resonance in the human conscience. If you are resolutely hostile to the stateless individuals originally from Krakow, you are not at all part of the universal community, and one can do to you whatever one wants without the human conscience feeling the least bit hurt.

These catechumens of the new humanity have customs that are sacred. They do not work the land; they do not produce anything; they find slavery repugnant. They do not mix with the men of the rolling sidewalk; they count them and direct them toward the tasks that are assigned to them. They do not at all wage war, but they like to establish themselves in brilliantly lit shops where in the evening they sell at a high price to the man of the rolling sidewalk what he has made and what they have bought from him at a low price. No one has the right to call them slave merchants, and nevertheless the peoples in whose midst they are established work only for them.

They form an order. It is this that they have in common with our former knighthoods. And is it not just that they are distinguished from other men, since they are the ones most sensitive to the voice of the universal conscience and furnish us the model which we must imitate?

They have also their high priests in distant capitals. They revere in them the representatives of these illustrious families who have made themselves known by gaining a lot of money and by distributing a lot of advertising. And they themselves rejoice to read on the coats of arms of these heroes the amounts of their dividends.

But these powerful men have great concerns. They meditate on the map of the world and decide that one such country will produce henceforth oranges, and another cannons. Leaning on graphs, they channel around the millions of slaves of the rolling sidewalk, and they determine in their wisdom the number of shirts that they will be allowed to buy in a year and the number of calories that will be allocated to them in order to live. And the work of the other men circulates and is registered on the walls of their office as in those panels with transparent tubes in which run without stop various colored liquids.

They are the stagehands of the universe. Who revolts against them speaks against the gods. They distribute and decide. And their servants, placed at intersections, receive their orders with gratitude, and they indicate to the man of the rolling sidewalk the direction in which to go. Thus works the world without borders, the world where everyone is at home, and which they have called the promised land.

Notes


1. “Aussi ces précieux dons sont-ils utilisés comme il convient devant l’opinion.” Bardèche frequently uses opinion to mean “public opinion.” His point here seems to be that these special gifts are used before the public for the sake of helping it to form public opinion. — Trans.

2. In mathematics, the “rule of three” is the method of finding the fourth term of a mathematical proportion when three terms are known. — Trans.

Thursday, July 26, 2018

Beyond Human Rights

                 

Beyond Human Rights:
Defending Freedoms
Foreword by Eric Maulin
Arktos Media, 2011
118 pp

Read F. Roger Devlin’s review here

Beyond Human Rights is the second of Alain de Benoist’s book-length political works to appear in English. 

Alain de Benoist begins Beyond Human Rights with an examination of the origins of the concept of ‘human rights’ in European Antiquity, in which rights were defined in terms of the individual’s relationship to his community, and were understood as being exclusive to that community alone.

This changed with the coming of Christianity to Europe, after which rights were redefined as a universal concept derived from the idea of each individual as the possessor of a soul that is transcendent and independent of any social identity.

This culminated in the Enlightenment belief in ‘natural rights’, which found its practical expression in the doctrines emerging from the American and French revolutions, in which all individuals were said to possess rights simply by virtue of the fact of their being human.

In turn, laws issued by the State came to be viewed as negative impositions upon the naturally independent individual. Benoist deconstructs this idea and shows how the myth of a ‘natural man’ who possesses rights independent of his community is indefensible, and how this conception of rights has, in modern times, led to their use as a weapon by stronger nations to bludgeon those weaker states which do not conform to the Western liberal-democratic form of rights, as we have recently seen in action in the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Libya. As such, he presents us with a crucial critique of one of the major issues of our time.

CONTENTS

1. Are Human Rights a Part of the Law?

2. In Search of a Foundation

3. Human Rights and Cultural Diversity

4. Beyond Human Rights: Politics, Freedom, Democracy

The Masculine Preconditions of Individualism, Part 4

                        By Ricardo Duchesne

            


The Radicalizing Logic of Modern Individualism

With the formation of nation states in the modern era, as liberal institutions were emerging in the form of constitutional rule, freedom of religious expression, and representative bodies in which members of the bourgeoisie were included, rather than aristocrats only, this ethnic cohesion was reaffirmed along national lines. The idea that Western liberal nations were intended from the beginning to be based on civic values alone is a deliberate act of scholarly deception enacted by cultural Marxist academics. Liberal theorists in the nineteenth century did start to argue that citizenship should be extended to loyal ethnic minorities long inhabiting within the nation state. This theory of minority rights, however, was not conceived as an invitation card for millions of foreigners to acquire citizenship.

It is hard to deny that Western individualism has been characterized by a radicalizing logic that is currently destroying the very cultural fabric that has sustained this individualism, as Europeans seek to “liberate” themselves from any form of ethnic collective identity. Many on the New Right, including Traditionalists, think that this current situation is an inevitable consequence of individualism. The most influential recent critic of Western individualism, Alexander Dugin, insists that our current liberalism is not a recent aberration but an essential characteristic of the West against which all traditional cultures must take a stand. He writes that Western liberalism created the normative conditions for a humanity predisposed toward a world government in its “glorification of total freedom and the independence of the individual from any kind of limits, including reason, identity (social, ethnic, or even gender), discipline, and so on.” For him, liberalism = America’s current military and foreign policy = Western civilization = European history since ancient times = Evil. The idea that America is a propositional nation, says Dugin, is “in essence…an updated version and continuation of a Western universalism that has been passed from the Roman Empire, Medieval Christianity, modernity in terms of the Enlightenment, and colonization, up to the present-day” [9].

Problem with this interpretation is that it does not understand that, without free subjectivity the modern world would have never been produced, and the West would have never become the one civilization responsible for almost everything that is great in art, philosophy, science, exploration, and architecture. Without this subject, the Greeks would have never discovered the mind, invented prose writing, developed a sense of men as makers of history, a formal logic for the purpose of proper disputation between rational combatants, a geometry using concepts, points, lines, planes, angles, that are abstracted from physical objects and are thus freed from particular objects and thus freed to be used universally.

Catholics would have never created universities with a rational curriculum and a scholastic method with its emphasis on argument and counter argument directed at resolving contradictions unbecoming to men demanding consistency. The Cartesian method in which only the veracity of the thinking self is demonstrated, and only exact mathematical truths are accepted, while every prior claim to the truth and everything outside the thinking mind, even God, is doubted, would have been impossible. The Kantian categorical imperative, drawing out of one’s rational will alone a moral law that is binding to all humans, indispensable to the modern constitutional state and the idea that Europeans can think for themselves the moral content of their laws without blindly following the dictates of unquestioned traditions, would have been impossible.

Holding the radical European subject responsible for the evaporation of any form of European collective identity is intrinsically a flawed argument, for it fails to understand that this radicalizing subject did produce as well a “counter-Enlightenment” which argued that there is no such thing as an isolated and disembodied self existing independently of any external presupposition, independently of naturally given forces and societal norms. This counter-Enlightenment “failed” because it sought to defeat outright Europe’s radical subject by resurrecting traditions, religious beliefs, and customs which had already been rejected by the European mind and could not be revived. The counter-Enlightenment correctly pointed out that individuals can never be absolutely abstracted from their communities of birth and that humans have a natural need to belong to communities that offer them meaning and direction even as they engage in rational pursuits. But they were wrong in insisting that Europeans should remain within the spirit of their “positive” institutions and age-old traditions.

Meanwhile a liberal-socialist line of criticism gradually came to dominate European politics because in the same vein that it condemned the purely formal nature of “bourgeois individualism” and called for nurturing communities, it employed the logic of the radicalizing subject against the eradication of all “bourgeois” forms of authority, capitalist and patriarchal structures. This line pointed to the ways in which individuals were still “situated” within oppressive social structures, at the same time that it effectively argued that humans do have a need for membership in communities.

Whereas conservatives were unable to articulate a philosophy that would accommodate both the uniquely European subject and the need for community, socialists persuasively argued that individual freedom is important but that this freedom can only be actualized within a community that nurtures everyone’s individuality rather than the individuality of a privileged class, race, and sex. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, liberal socialists found multiple ways in which to defend progressive institutions and practices as expressions of the democratic will of individuals self-consciously legislating ideas and norms based on universal criteria. More recently, in the post-WW II era, there was Jurgen Habermas’s highly influential argument that the Enlightenment project should be radicalized as long as it was shown that Western societies depended, not on norms validated by isolated individuals, but on norms validated through “intersubjective” democratic communication without coercion. In conceiving progressive politics in relation to intersubjective cooperation and validation, Habermas was thus seen to be offering a freely established rational defense of progressive communities. While Leftists were seen as reasonably capable of offering good arguments to justify their new communities as “morally truthful” in the face of criticism, conservatives were seen as backward reactionaries incapable of handling the progressive dynamic of Western history and the independent mindedness of young Europeans.

In the last few decades, liberal socialists even got away advocating a liberal form of multicultural communitarianism sympathetic to the traditional values of non-European immigrants while being explicitly against European traditions. Whites were told that their culture had to be decoupled from their nation state and that culture would be a matter of individual choice within a nation state that was newly identified as a multicultural community within which minorities would enjoy group rights to overcome the oppressive leftovers of a still prevailing White supremacist form of communitarianism. Immigration restrictions against non-Whites would have to be eliminated and Western nations would have to open their borders to full diversification. Whites would enjoy individual rights combined with government-financed progressive communities, at the same time that their nations would legally enact multicultural rights for minorities.

The academic liberal establishment, along with the “new” conservatives, the progressive conservatives, would successfully endorse this vision of multiculturalism and racial diversity as a solution to the two seemingly incompatible images of “man” harboured in post-Enlightenment Europe, one of human beings “naturally” seeking to be free from all coercive external authorities, and another of human beings “naturally” in need of communitarian bonds. They promised the biggest community of all, for humanity, a progressive community without outsideness in which the US versus Them division would be abolished.

White Identitarians should not counter Leftist success by calling for a reversal of the unique way in which Europeans are self-constituting individuals in awareness of their situatedness. Modernity, the rational understanding  of nature, would have been impossible without a clear awareness of the distinction between subject and object, the rational and the affective, the scientific and the religious. To this day non-Europeans have a hard time making a distinction between the inner world of the individual and the world surrounding them. Richard Nisbett’s The Geography of  Thought: How Asians and Westerners Think Differently…and Why (2004) is a study of how East Asians are more embedded to their surroundings, the natural world around them, the norms, rules, and habits of their society, which they follow without critical reflection, and so their reasoning has less autonomy. Leftists admire this Asian communitarian way of thinking without realizing that their politics has been possible only in a Western setting. The same leftists who are tolerant of non-Europeans forms of collectivism despise any White communitarianism that is not dedicated to progressivism.

The counter-Enlightenment drew on the “organic” medieval tradition and the ancient Greek ideal that the highest form of individuality could only be attained within the city-state in a public life. The ancient Greeks lacked the modern conception of individualism; while they did discover the mind as an entity separate from the appetites and the spirited side associated with indignation and pride, they experienced their selfhood only as members of city-states and never as private individuals with a conscience of their own in distinction to the accepted norms of the public realm. (Mind you, Hegel saw in Socrates the first act of an individual with a moral conscience distancing himself from the pre-given norms of the city-state.) The ancient Greeks also saw themselves as one with a meaningful teleological cosmos, in distinction to the sharp Cartesian separation between mind and matter. The ancient Greeks did no value the privacy of the individual, and did not have a modern theory of natural rights pertaining to each individual. They did not value as much the bourgeois desire for security and prosperity; but postulated perfect natural laws and Forms, existing outside humans, according to which humans should model their lives, in the actualization of their potentialities. The counter-Enlightenment of the 1800s erred in believing that European man could return to this ancient (and medieval) unity, since European man in the 1800s had already transcended the prereflective values and institutions of those times. It is my view that Hegel offered a very strong argument reconciling Europe’s radicalizing subject with communitarian values within a nationalist state that recognizes both the negative liberties of individuals and the need for collective values.

Hegelian Reconciliation of “Libertarian” and “Collectivist” Freedom

“The Germanic Spirit is the Spirit of Freedom”

Paleo-conservatives, Traditionalists, Alain de Benoist and the European New Right, are wrong in condemning Western individualism and in calling for some return to ancient Greek ideals of “social” freedom, or feudal “organic” values, or for a “traditionalism” that is inherently illiberal in the manner of non-Europeans. There is much to be learned from these schools in their emphasis on the natural inequalities of nature, their valuing of the wisdom attained by past ages, the Aristotelian virtues, their respect for order and traditions. But there is no returning back from a European subject “confident that for it there can be no insuperable barrier…[from a subject that] opposes the world to itself, makes itself free of it, but in turn annuls this opposition, takes its Other, the manifold, back into itself, into its unitary nature” [10]. Nature is not generated out of the willing of the subject, but whatever exists is mere appearance or dogma unless there is a subject who has freed itself from the external world through the use of concepts, explanations, and technology. There is no way out of European modern consciousness. There are no laws of nature, Darwinian drives, that can be seen to determine, on their own, blindly, what a European is or should do. These laws have been uncovered by Europeans, and so the outside is no longer an alien other, but part of the European subject’s identity, as a conscious being that is capable of employing the laws of nature for his own purposes and genetically altering his own nature. The same is true of human laws. We can’t obey natural laws, natural rights, or any law that is said to be “divinely ordained” or in “accord with nature” independently of the judgments of European men.

While I credit the prehistoric Indo-European aristocracies with originating individualism, and welcome the limitations imposed by feudal aristocracies against despotic powers throughout ancient and medieval times, White Identitarians should be wary of calling for a return of aristocratic rule in our modern age. We should welcome the political freedom and the equal rights of the citoyens sanctioned by the French Revolution. By modern times, the aristocracies of Europe had become parasitic courtiers, and were understandably replaced by bourgeois elites calling for representative institutions. Contemporary European nations should not accord superior rights and privileges to any European social class.

In my judgement, Hegel is the one modern thinker who offers the most adequate theoretical framework for the reconciliation of our individualism and our communitarian needs. The multicultural “reconciliation” of the left was imposed from above by hostile elites against the prejudices of European peoples, against their own ways of life, their own communities, and their own (rationally-approved) in-group preferences. The communitarianism of Hegel, however, recognizes i) the substantial unity of the traditional family, ii) the private sphere of markets and the world of civil society, in which individuals enjoy “negative liberties” (private freedoms) to pursue their own lifestyle, as well as iii) a state, which expresses the general will and constitutes the sphere in charge of ensuring the “social freedom” of citizens, legislation and execution in accord with the “shared” values of the community, and constitutional liberal principles. Hegel specifically set out to solve the problem of how the growth of individuals who had subjected all traditional collectivities to the judgements of critical reason could create public institutions and a nation state that would make possible the central value of private freedom while ensuring that the nation would express the collective identity of the people, would embody their general will, and the national interest of the citizens as a group.

There is no space here to get into a long textual disquisition about Hegel’s political philosophy. Suffice it to say that Hegel’s basic argument is that freedom has both a “private,” subjective or “libertarian” component, and a public, objective or collective component. Liberalism today tends to be defined by conservatives with free markets, formal equality before the law, and private enjoyment of life’s goods. These private freedoms are known as “negative liberties” in that they don’t require anything from the public other than laws guaranteeing the security of private contracts and associations. The collective social freedoms are identified by leftists today with “social rights,” equality of opportunity, welfare provisions, the removal of all “socially constructed” differences between men and women and races. Getting to the true aims of Hegel is very difficult because politically correct academics have forced onto him ideas that portray his collectivism in socialistic terms, at the same time that they have suppressed his rationally reflected traditionalism and nationalism. They have put forth a Hegel that views “social rights” as rights for greater equality, a Hegel that synthesizes the atomism of free markets and private rights, with a state that ensures social rights for everyone and promotes the “collective economic good” of society.

It is true that Hegel argued (correctly) that being recognized as a citizen while living in abject poverty was a violation of individual self-expression, insomuch as this was a result of the actions of powerful citizens having complete freedom of contract without any social rights protecting workers in the form of state regulation of working conditions. But there is a lot more to Hegel’s concept of social freedom. When Hegel writes about a shared conception of the good, when he says that individuals enjoying their negative freedoms in the private sphere can be capable of embracing the social freedom of the state, that is, experience the ends of the state as integral to their own selfhood as modern rational citizens, he does not mean economic goods only; he means as well the cultural collective goods and sense of peoplehood (Volk) that can be guaranteed only by a national state. Hegel indeed appeals to the idea of national identity as the clue that can tie otherwise rational private citizens by virtue of their belonging, through birth and ethnicity, to a single culture.

Current interpreters of Hegel, notwithstanding the merits of their works in organizing and clarifying Hegel’s extremely difficult ideas, rarely mention or willfully misread Hegel’s emphasis on national identity [11]. Frederick Neuhouser, for example, argues that Hegel could not have appealed to a sense of national belonging “akin to bonds of brotherhood” since such bonds would be rooted in a “prereflective attachment,” which is supposedly inconsistent with a post-Enlightenment culture in which individuals accept only communitarian identities that are “consciously endorsed through a process of public reflection on the common good” [12]. Since it is a pervasive inclination of our times to argue that Western nations must be based on values alone, and since the dominant interpretation of Hegel today is that he was a liberal socialist, academics have happily deluded themselves into believing that the act of consciously subjecting our laws, customs and beliefs, to rational debate, approval by reason, automatically negates the actual biological realities of human bonding, “the bonds of nature.” But this is wishful thinking inconsistent with a free thinking subject.

For starters, Neuhouser well knows that the “bonds of love” that unite Western families are not purely “free” and “rational” even as the union of husband and wife was freely decided rather than coerced by unreflective customs. There is a strong natural bond between parents and children and between men and women as sexual beings who can reproduce children, not to mention the multiple customs that regulate the marriage ceremony and child-rearing. There is also a strong natural (but no longer prereflective) bond uniting people with the same historical ancestry, territorial roots, and language within one nation. This bond is consistent with a rationally free subject on two levels. Firstly, history teaches that those states possessing a high degree of ethnic homogeneity, where ancestors had lived for generations — England, France, Italy, Belgium, Holland, Sweden, Norway, Finland, and Denmark — were the ones with the strongest liberal traits, constitutions and institutions. Before immigration restrictions were eliminated starting in the 1960s, the very rationally oriented nation states of the West were reserved for people of similar ethnic and religious identities.

Secondly, and contrary to our current misreading of Hegel, the subjection of “pre-reflective bonds” to rational examination does not necessarily entail the cultural Marxist idea that everything is “socially constructed” or that only “propositional values” can be said to be acceptable as the uniting bonds of a nation. Thinking critically about “prereflective bonds” means that these bonds can no longer be seen as unknowable, mysterious forces that control the affairs of men; it means that we now know their nature, that we can explain why we individuals tend to be attached to people of their own ethnicity and historical lineage. It means that we have rationally explained studies about in-group attachments, biological dispositions, and genetic determinants [13]. It means that we can see that leftist communitarians are deceivers, that the cosmopolitan universal values our current elites advocate are not rationally based, but have been concocted by rootless cosmopolitan academics and politicians engage in the deliberate misreading of the great thinkers of the past to promote the insane idea that European ethnic identity is inherently violent and exclusionary, even though only Europeans are responsible for modernity and even though there is now substantial evidence showing that humans are genetically inclined to prefer their own ethnic in-group and that diversity is coming with an incredible cost in the form of systematic rapes, social disunity, suppression of rational debate, illiberal controls, and economic/environmental costs.

Notes

[9] Alexander Dugin (2012). The Fourth Political Theory (2012), pp. 18, 74.

[10] Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind. Being Part Three of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences [1830]. Trans. William Wallace (1972) p. 45.

[11] See Dominico Losurdo, Hegel and the Freedom of the Moderns (Duke University Press, 2004); Frederick Neuhouser, Foundation of Hegel’s Social Theory (Harvard University Press, 2000); Fred Dallmayr, G.W.F Hegel: Modernity and Politics (SAGE Publications, 1993); and Shlomo Avineri, Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State (Cambridge University Press, 1972).

[12] Frederick Neuhouser, p. 138.

[13] I am taking Hegelian reason as far as possible while aware that we ultimately don’t know why the universe exists in the first place; why there is being instead of nothing. There are limits to reason, but Europeans today can speak rationally about these limits and what’s beyond reason.

Source: https://www.eurocanadian.ca/2018/05/masculine-preconditions-of-individualism-indo-europeans-hegelian-concept-collective-freedom.html